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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that the Islamic finance industry has its ideological foundations in the business 
ethics and stakeholder theory since the Islamic jurisprudence supports the ethical foundation of 
business and financial intermediations. These ethical practices can be traced back to jurisprudential 
concepts of Maqasid Al Sharia and Maslaha in Islamic law. The current practices of IFI however fails 
to follow the ethically sound (and in line with the Maqasid and Maslaha ideals) stakeholder model 
because of competitive pressures from the conventional financial industry and is thus modelled 
more on the Neo liberal shareholder profit maximisation ideology, focusing mainly on ensuring that 
the shareholders and certain investments account holders get maximum returns, thereby foregoing 
the interest of other stakeholders. It is thus argued that due to the incompatibility of the Neo liberal 
ethos with the Islamic finance ideals (the Maqasid of Financial intermediation), the Islamic finance 
industry needs to focus on more stakeholder oriented practices. The major reason for the failure of 
the current regulatory framework for the Islamic finance industry is the lack of any compliance and 
enforcement mechanism to ensure that uniform sharia governance mechanisms can be applied 
across the jurisdictions. This it is argued can best be achieved by international principle based Meta 
regulatory framework focusing on the stakeholder nature of the Islamic finance involving the IFSB 
and the AAOIFI and giving these bodies the authority to issue certificates of sharia compliance 
whereby the IFI’s would be required to obtain these certificates to function as ‘Islamic’ institutions. 
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Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION 
1    Introduction  
The thesis argues that from a purely theoretical point of view the regulation of the 
Islamic financial industry, as opposed to any other kind of industry, is justified and 
necessary under the simple but effective pretext of the number of stakeholders 
involved in Islamic finance as well as the fact that Islamic finance as an industry is 
no longer restricted to ‘Islamic countries’ and has gained a more global role in the 
International Financial systems.
1
 It is now common place amongst both finance and 
law/ regulation literature to argue that in any case the financial sector needs to be 
regulated more strictly since it is one of the main contributors of any economy, this 
argument is even more cogent in the case of Islamic banks taking into account the 
additional factor of such financial institutions having to meet religious precepts and 
ideals as well as function as profit making institutions for their shareholders.  The 
Islamic concept of distributive and economic justice is what derives the basic ideals 
for the industry as well as the overall economic architecture,
2
 thus showing that the 
whole edifice of the Islamic financial intermediation is built on the pretext of 
keeping the society and the community’s benefit and welfare as the highest priority 
while generating wealth for the individual as well as society.
3
 Thus it is argued in 
this thesis that proper principle based regulation and supervision of all aspects of the 
                                                          
1
 C Vasile and C Maria ‘Why Are Banks Special? An Approach from the Corporate Governance 
Perspective’ (2007), Scientific Annals- Al.I.Cuza University Of Lasi, Economics Series, 55-66, 
(Electronic Copy Available At: Http://Ssrn.Com/Abstract=1090291. Visited  10
th
 March 2010) 
2
 M U Chapra The Future Of Economics: An Islamic Perspective (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 
2000a) 
3
 Z Iqbal and A Mirakhor, An Introduction To Islamic Finance; Theory And Practice (Wiley Finance 
2007)  
2 
 
Islamic financial industry will ensure that the Islamic financial institutions (IFI’s) do 
not go through the same situation that the western commercial banks had to go 
through during the most financial crisis because of poor corporate governance 
practices which focused on blind profit maximization pursuing a neo liberal 
shareholder oriented corporate governance regime. With the introduction of the IFI 
into the main stream the question as to the role of supervision and regulation of IFI’s 
keeping in view their (IFI’s) peculiar nature has become ever more important and 
practically significant.  
It is argued in this thesis that for any banking or financial system to be prudentially 
regulated and supervised the first and foremost step is the identification of the risks 
inherent in that system, which is why it is important to identify and eventually 
manage the inherent risks in IFI’s for an effective supervision and regulation.4  In 
this thesis it is identified that the other major risk being faced by the Islamic finance 
as an industry is the sharia noncompliance risk at the Micro level( individual 
financial institution level)  as well as the issue of acceptance of Sharia as a valid 
source of law at the Macro level( the regulatory level) for the Islamic financial 
industry. This specific issue of non-recognition of Sharia as a valid source of law for 
Islamic financial industry calls for a rethinking of the current regulatory framework 
across the Islamic financial industry. It is in this regard that it is argued that Islamic 
financial industry should move towards a more principled based meta regulatory 
framework, so that the operation of individual IFI’s are made more acceptable in 
jurisdiction which do not accept Sharia as a valid source of law and at the same time 
the IFI’s are allowed to follow the true letter and spirit behind Islamic finance and 
Islamic economics ideology.  
                                                          
4
 A Salman and Dr J Amanat  ‘Risk Management In Islamic And Conventional Banks: A Different 
Analysis’ (July 2009), Journal of Independent Studies and Research-MSSE, volume 7, number 2  
3 
 
2. Aims 
The aim of this thesis is to establish the role of corporate governance theories in 
defining the regulatory framework for the Islamic financial institutions in order to 
regulate and govern IFI’s as per the Ideological and axiomatic Islamic economic 
framework.  The thesis aim to establish such an International/ cross jurisdictional 
regulatory framework which would cater to the dual nature of modern day IFI’s by 
allowing the Islamic ideals to be well amalgamated with modern governance and 
regulatory principles. It is thus argued that since the ethos and the ideological basis 
of Islamic finance are entrenched into religious and moral norms as espoused by the 
different traditional and modern sources of Islamic teaching and law like the Quran, 
Sunnah, Ijma and Qiyas makes the regulatory and governance aims of Islamic 
financial industry unique in its nature. It is thus argued that the best conventional 
corporate governance theory that can form the basis for governing IFI’s is the 
stakeholder theory because it encapsulates the essence of Islamic finance and 
economics by propagating a more ethical, moral and societal friendly approach and 
at the same time encourages a more interventionist regulatory approach by the 
states( or international regulatory bodies) and can in turn ensure that all risks arising 
from the inherent corporate governance issues in the IFI’s are properly addressed 
and monitored.  
3. Background  
 The need for a specific uniquely tailored regulatory regime for IFI’s has been felt 
for some time now, but the dearth of shariah qualified professionals in the non-
Muslim majority countries coupled with complex religious precepts that guide IFI’s 
has made the task anything but easy. With the current economic and regulatory 
4 
 
atmosphere in the financial world moving towards intervention by the governments 
and harmonization internationally , it is about time that IFI’s were brought in the 
main stream and regulated the same way that conventional banks are albeit with 
separate and specific rules and regulation tailored for the IFI’s. It is in this regard 
that it is accepted that effective corporate governance principles aimed specifically 
at IFI’s may be the best way to efficiently regulate the Islamic finance industry by 
mitigating the specific risks that arise in IFI’s rather than trying to impose principles 
of conventional corporate governance and regulation on the very unique nature of 
IFI’s. 
Amongst other areas of substantive prohibitory rules, by rejecting interest/ usury and 
speculative trading as morally abhorrent the IFI’s set a very high ethical and moral 
standard for financial intermediation at both the individual actor level as well as at a 
more macroeconomic level.
5
 The stakeholder model by emphasizing upon the 
ethical practices also highlights such traditional ethical values of Islamic finance as 
justice, fairness, distributive justice and morally high standard of conduct both at the 
individual level as well as the collective (organizational) level. 
6
 
One of the major reason for adopting the stakeholder model of governance in this 
thesis
7
 for IFIs is the fact that it brings in and accentuates the ethically sound 
business practices ensuring accountability, transparency, distributive justice, 
recourse to a larger number of remedies for all stakeholders (both legal and non-
legal) and allowing for access to effective informational channels between all 
                                                          
5
 S N H Naqvi, Perspective On Morality And Human Well-Being: A Contribution To Islamic 
Economics. (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2003) 
6
 Z Iqbal and A Mirakhor ‘Stakeholders Model Of Governance In Islamic.’ Economic System (2004) 
Islamic Economics Studies. 11 (2),  43-63 
7
 B A Ackerman and A Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (Yale University press 1999) 
5 
 
stakeholders and is thus considered to be the best possible model for corporate 
governance for all IFIs. 
4.  Laying the Ground Work: Issues, Challenges and Solutions. 
To understand Islamic banking it is imperative to know how and why the Islamic 
concept of finance and economics is different from the conventional financial 
system. As per popular belief one of the main points of difference between Islamic 
finance and conventional finance is the prohibition of Riba (interest based 
transactions/ usury) ,
8
 whereas this is one of the main features of the Islamic 
financial system it is by no means the only difference from the conventional finance. 
Issues of Gharar and Mysir ( speculative transactions, contractual ambiguity and 
gambling)
9
 also make Islamic finance completely devoid of any swap or derivative 
transactions which involves speculation, thus making Islamic finance rely on its own 
ingenuity to come up with different financial and banking products while keeping 
within the precepts of the Sharia(the Islamic law).  
Sharia law has its roots in the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah (teachings of the 
Prophet Mohammad). This religious feature makes Islamic Finance it unique in its 
nature,
10
 as one of the main features of Sharia based economic and financial rules 
dictates that all activities of the economic agents in an Islamic financial system are 
to be governed by the underlying relationship between man and God, therefore high 
standards of morality and ethics become an integral part of the economic system.
11
 
                                                          
8
 S N H Naqvi, Ethics And Economics: An Islamic Synthesis (Leicester, The Islamic Foundation 
1981) 
9
 Iqbal and Mirakhor (n 3) 67 
10
 S Haron, The Philosophy Of Islamic Banking In A. Siddiqi Anthology Of Islamic Banking  
(Institute Of Islamic Banking And Insurance, London 2000a) 
11
 Iqbal and Mirakhor (n 3) 15 
6 
 
In Islamic finance, moral and normative ethical principles are further translated into 
the concept of economic distributive justice and pursuit of social welfare for the 
society as a whole which can be deemed analogous to the ‘public good’ argument 
made in the financial regulation literature that states that regulation of financial 
institutions is necessary to further the public good of the society.
12
 Under Islamic 
financial system, unlike the conventional financial system, the emphasis is more on 
economic justice, distribution of wealth over a wide spectrum of society and social 
wellbeing. Following this argument the aims of an IFI are not restricted merely to 
pure profit making activities
13
 but transcend into more ‘social’ goals and thus a 
regulatory and governance framework which can serve these ideological purposes 
should be put in place for IFI. It is thereby argued that trying to use the conventional 
en vogue neo liberal profit maximizing norms will fail the Islamic finance industry 
as a whole.  This aspect of societal wellbeing emphasized in the Islamic finance 
literature can be translated to also then mean that the IFI’s should work towards the 
goal of a stable financial system devoid of any unnecessary crisis situations.
14
  It is 
thus argued that coupling this particular argument with the fact that the best method 
of corporate governance for the IFI is the stake holder method and the CSR model, 
means that the IFI’s need to also provide a very robust and sturdy risk management 
system to be in place which takes all the stakeholders into consideration.
15
 Thus by 
adapting the stakeholder and the business ethics model of corporate governance, the 
IFI’s cannot only maintain their own unique nature but can also prove to be 
exemplary financial institutions by adopting the pursuit of ‘Public good’ for the 
                                                          
12
 M T Usmani, An Introduction To Islamic Finance (Karachi, Pakistan, Idaratul Ma'aririf 2000) 
13
 M Choudhoury The Foundation Of Islamic Political Economy (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1987)  
14
 S Qutub  Social Justice In Islam In A. Khurshid (Ed.)  Islam Its Meaning And Message (The 
Islamic Foundation, Leicester. 1980) 
15
 Iqbal and Markhor (n 6) 
7 
 
society and applying very robust Risk Management practices by keeping their 
emphasis on the adherence of the basic ideology of Islamic finance which also be 
translated into the concept of Maqasid Sharia and Maslaha as enunciated in the 
Islamic legal jurisprudence . It is thus also argued that the regulatory framework 
should be such where these aims are pursued keeping in view the Sharia aspects of 
Islamic finance. 
 Therefore in the thesis it is argued that a common ground between the Sharia rules 
pertaining to finance and the western business ethics model (as espoused by the 
stakeholder theory) is the abhorrence of the idea of excess profit making. Whereas 
Islam doesn’t discourage profit making it doesn’t agree with the concept of profit 
making at the cost of others.
16
 Profit is not considered the end in itself and just like 
in western business ethics and stakeholder theory, in Islamic finance and economics 
literature, profit is considered necessary to facilitate economic growth and 
redistribute wealth and not simply enhance individual wealth and income.
17
 Profit is 
thus considered a means to an end and not an end in itself. The stakeholder theory 
thus based on the ethical and moral ground provides a justification for governmental 
intervention in the shape of regulation and laws as a furtherance and upkeep of the 
normative ethical standards of a society.
18
 Regulation that provide the checks and 
balances both at the macro and micro levels for all financial institutions in general 
but specifically IFI should be put in place since the IFIs tend to involve a large 
number of stakeholders that need to be provided safeguards against any corporate 
misadventure and scandal and it is thus argued that the theoretical framework of the 
stakeholder model provides those safeguards.  
                                                          
16
 Iqbal and Mirakhor  (n 3) 19 
17
 F E Vogel and S L Hayes Islamic Law and Finance, Religion, Risk And Return (Kluwer Law 
International 1998)  
18
 R E Freeman Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman 1984)   
8 
 
The stakeholder and CSR forms of governance helps the corporation in its pursuit of 
a Public Good for the whole society and  facilitates the move away from the concept 
of blind profit maximization, which has been equated to greed, especially after the 
collapse of the financial markets across the globe. These factors surrounding the 
stakeholder and business ethics model of governance when looked into in detail are 
found to be in line with the ideology of Islamic finance and thus gives credence to 
the argument that in essence a regulatory framework based on stakeholder 
governance model and ethos is the most suitable for regulating the IFI’s even in non-
Muslim majority jurisdictions as well as Islamic jurisdiction so that a semblance of 
harmony is brought in the regulatory standards. It is acknowledged in the thesis that 
the current standards of corporate governance given by the two standard setting 
bodies IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board) and AAOIFI (Audit and Accounting 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions) though elaborate fall short because 
of the lack of compliance mechanism. In order to overcome this lack of compliance 
mechanism it is recommended by this thesis that a Meta regulatory framework 
should be instituted which integrates the two standard setting bodies into the overall 
regulatory architecture of the Islamic financial industry with substantial powers to 
effect compliance as well as set effective regulatory and supervisory standards. 
The reason for the IFI’s being better regulated under the pretext of the pursuit of 
Public Good at an international Meta regulatory level is the fact that the normative 
Islamic financial model puts great emphasis on the ethical and moral practices
19
, 
taking into account majority of the stakeholders and including the welfare of the 
society as an aim that is to be achieved at both the micro and the macroeconomic 
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level.
20
 This requirement of higher ethical standards in the shape of stakeholder 
mode of corporate governance and CSR policy, as will be  proven in this thesis, is 
the basic underlying requirement to implement both the pursuits of  ‘Public good’ 
and a robust Risk Management system in any IFI at both the macro as well as micro 
level.  
It is in view of the similarities with the business ethics model, that it falls on to the 
international regulatory bodies as well as the state(s) where the IFI’s are operating 
by means of regulation and supervision to address these issues that may arise out of 
the operations of IFI’s in the Non-Muslim majority jurisdictions and ensure that the 
pursuit of Public good and the establishment of a robust Risk Management policy as 
well a tailor made corporate governance system is facilitated and complied with. It is 
argued in this thesis that regulations in this regard play an indispensable role, 
especially in the globalized economy where the corporation and banks (both 
conventional banks and IFI’s) are no longer restricted to countries or even regions, 
but have transcended jurisdictional borders. In such a powerful corporate 
environment, regulatory positive intervention by the governments/ national 
regulators in cooperation with the International standard setting bodies for Islamic 
finance like the IFSB( Islamic Financial services Board)
21
 and the AAOIFI ( audit 
and accounting Organization for Islamic Financial institutions)
22
 by mean of Meta-
regulation is essential to protect the ‘Islamic’ identity of the Islamic financial 
Industry.  
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Meta regulation is specifically well suited for Islamic financial industry because of 
the lack of a coherent single body in the international financial architecture to 
oversee the operations and working of the IFI’s as an industry.  This is specifically 
true for the function of the oversight of sharia compliance and enforcement, which in 
essence becomes a regulatory impracticality keeping in view the differences between 
regulatory frameworks across the different jurisdiction coupled with the issue of 
non-recognition of sharia as a valid source of law in many secular and Muslim 
majority jurisdictions. Thus a principal based Meta regulatory approach with 
emphasis on ‘substance’ rather than ‘form’ in ideological and practical terms can be 
best achieved through Meta regulations with focus on gauging results rather than 
rules.
23
 
It is therefore argued that the regulatory bodies in jurisdictions that allow for Sharia 
to be a source of law (called Islamic countries)
24
 also need to ensure that their 
regulatory framework for the Islamic Financial institutions is in line with the 
stakeholder theory so that the essence of the Islamic teachings is comfortably 
amalgamated with the conventional corporate governance and regulatory practices at 
both the macro and the micro level. Likewise it is argued that those jurisdictions that 
do not accept Sharia as a source of Law( called non Islamic or secular countries) 
would also benefit from such an international Meta regulatory framework because 
by  allowing the international standard setting bodies (IFSB and AAOIFI) for the 
Islamic financial industry to be given a more of a licensing authority for individual 
IFI’s, these secular jurisdictions can segregate the Sharia compliance issues from 
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local  legal and regulatory issues. In essence, rather than hoping for local national 
regulators to make exceptions for or draft separate regulatory standards for the IFI’s, 
the international standard setting bodies like the IFSB and the AAOIFI become the 
sole arbiters of sharia compliance issues by being more of certification bodies rather 
than  simple standard setting bodies. Thus creating a two tiered regulatory approach 
for the IFI’s, where by the standard setting bodies for the IFI’s are given a sole 
responsibility for the enforcement and assurance of adherence to sharia standards 
only  by issuing certificates of compliance for those financial institutions which 
intend to function as IFI’s. This over all Meta regulatory financial architecture will 
enhance the stakeholder confidence in the whole industry and will allow Islamic 
finance to truly reach a global audience and customer base.  This is discussed in 
detail in the final chapter of the thesis. 
Keeping in view one of the main  normative standards of Islamic economic system 
as discussed by Asutay in his model of Islamic moral economy as well as other 
traditional and contemporary writers like Umar Chapra, Naqvi and Siddiqui the 
focus of Islamic economic seems to be  primarily on economic and distributive 
justice. The argument is also made in this thesis that the conventional system of 
corporate governance with its focus on the neo liberal notion of profit maximisation 
has failed to achieve any social benefit and has led to systemic crisis of the financial 
system as well as confidence in conventional neo liberal based regulatory and 
corporate governance frameworks. It is therefore argued in this thesis that IFI’s, 
basing their reliance on Sharia based  economic and financial norms and values, 
should move away from such a governance and regulatory framework and move 
towards a more ethically sound stakeholder based governance model with special 
emphasis on ‘substance’ and ‘principles’ and not ‘strict rules’ and ‘form’.  
12 
 
It is also established in the thesis that under the Islamic economic model, the state 
has the right and the duty to re-distribute property, among those who have the 
primary right (stakeholders), and those who have a secondary right (the society). 
This is in the first stead achieved by distribution of wealth in the form of zakat 
(obligatory Alms giving or Tax).
25
 The second method of achieving the goal of 
distribution of wealth is through economic activity carried out by the individuals 
under the principles of shariah with a focus on fostering partnerships and ensuring 
that wealth is not accumulated by the few.
26
 Thus to achieve this goal the Islamic 
finance literature and principles do not accept ‘loans’ as a viable and preferred 
method of financial activity, seeing it as merely charitable, the emphasis instead is 
on generating real economic activity by risk sharing and financing through 
partnerships.
27
 It is therefore argued that Islamic financial institutions should be 
providing funds on equity or profit sharing basis and be more concerned with risk 
return proportion (meaning that those who take the most risk should get the most 
return in an economic transaction) and the real economic activity generated by that 
transaction than with collateral and guarantees of the borrowers as is the case in 
conventional banking practices.
28
 In the normative Islamic financial system those 
who are not wealthy, but have worthy investment projects, may also gain appropriate 
access to finance by fostering partnership contracts or agency relationships that may 
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be entered into under the rules dictated by the sharia. In essence it ought to truly 
reward entrepreneurship.
29
 
It is thus argued that since Islamic banking is entrepreneurial and the underlying 
aspect of the economic system is real asset based contracts of exchange and services 
(like the Mudarabah, Musharakah, salam , Murabaha, Ijara etc) which are devoid 
of speculation (gharrar and Mysir) and excessive Interest (riba), the Islamic 
economic system has the ability to foster a more risk averse, morally and ethically 
more sound system of finance both at institutional/ Macro level as well as an the 
Micro/ individual level.
30
 
However as with all corporate entities , in practice  the IFI’s face certain corporate 
governance issues, like the issues related to the working of Sharia Supervisory 
Board (SSB), the issues related to Investments Account holders (IAHs), regulatory 
enforcement mechanisms, transparency, disclosure of financial information and 
taking into account and balancing the interests of the different stakeholders, amongst 
other issues.
31
To counter these and other corporate governance issues and the 
ensuing risks inherent to the IFI’s  it is deemed necessary that a well thought out and 
elaborate corporate governance structure needs to be put in place across the Islamic 
finance industry so that the regulatory environment is stable and adapted to the ethos 
of Islamic teachings.
32
 Looking for a one size fit all corporate governance structure 
or regulatory environment may not be possible for all jurisdictions and schools of 
thought in Islamic finance industry and thus therein lies a major conundrum for the 
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practitioners and academics working in the Islamic finance industry, as well as 
policy makers and regulators. However to find some common ground and bring 
some uniformity in standards and practices work is being done by the two primary 
regulatory and standard setting bodies for the IFI’s i.e IFSB and AAOAFI and other 
national level regulatory/standard setting bodies, but there lacks an effective 
enforcement mechanism at an international level for the governance standards that 
are being published.  It is thus argued that to overcome this lack of enforcement 
mechanisms the best possible solution is the instituting of a Principle Based Meta 
Regulatory framework which should be set out by the IFSB and the AAOIFI, with 
specific certification powers having been granted to these bodies to instil confidence 
in the stakeholders. 
5. Methodology 
A theoretical analysis of the research question will be carried out. The research 
question will be answered with reference to secondary sources such as journals, 
books, published standards of ISFB and AAOIFI and the writings of academic 
writers as well as primary sources like the Quranic decrees original writings of 
traditional Fuqaha( jurists) belonging to the different schools of Islamic thought as 
well as established Sunnahs and Hadiths of the Prophet Mohammad. The thesis will 
also draw upon the works of different academic writers in the fields of Agency 
theory, Corporate Social responsibility (CSR), Stakeholder theory and Business 
Ethics. The thesis will further look at the different theoretical and practical issues in 
Islamic Finance and how these apply to modern day IFI’s by taking examples from 
regulatory regimes already in place in different jurisdictions. In the end it will look 
at the different theories justifying regulation in financial institutions in general and 
IFI’s in particular and while using those theories policy recommendations are given 
15 
 
for a more harmonised international regulatory framework for the Islamic finance 
industry. 
 An empirical study will not be undertaken since the research question requires only 
a theoretical analysis of the already established works by writers in fields of 
corporate governance, stakeholder theory, business ethics and Islamic finance. 
 
6. The Theoretical framework.  
The thesis uses the shareholder primacy theory or the Anglo-US model(as espoused 
by Berle and Means 
33
and later developed by several other writers) as the main 
substantive theory to gauge all other theories against, predominantly because of its 
extensive use in the two major developed financial and commercial jurisdictions i.e. 
the US and the UK and its influence on the intellectual development in the area of 
corporate governance and management theory over the last ninety years across the 
globe. On the other end of the spectrum Islamic finance literature which is derived 
from the different sources of Islamic jurisprudence ( sources like the provisions 
provided in the Quran, the Hadith , writings of  traditional  and contemporary 
scholars) is  used to draw out basic underlying principles and norms that may both 
form the basis of a coherent corporate governance theory that can be applied to 
modern day IFI’s and at the same time lays down the axiomatic framework of 
Islamic economics and business ethos, which ought to form the basis of guiding 
rules and principles for the modern day Islamic financial industry.    
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The Islamic finance literature and theories relating to commerce/finance are then 
pitted against the shareholder or the Anglo-American model of governance and a 
deduction is drawn relying on the available literature of both Islamic finance and 
conventional corporate governance as to whether it is possible to draw some 
parallels between the two different sets of theories or not. The thesis recognizes the 
fact that following the Anglo-US model with its emphasis on profit maximizing 
goals leads the IFI’s to lose their actual essence of a morally and ethically sound 
financial system and at the same time highlights the corporate governance problems 
endemic to the IFI’s because of following the Anglo-US model of Corporate 
Governance. The thesis then moves on to compare the alternate Corporate 
Governance models like the Stakeholder model, the CSR literature and the business 
ethics literature and draws parallels with the normative Islamic finance model. The 
parallels between the stakeholder theory, conventional business ethics and normative 
Islamic finance theory are then used to form a coherent and practical corporate 
governance and regulatory theory for the Islamic finance industry which is deemed 
to encapsulate the essence of Sharia teachings as well as be acceptable to both 
sharia based and non-sharia based jurisdictions.  
This assertion is based on the simple premise given in all of Islamic finance, 
economic and commercial literature emphasising that the Islamic financial agents( 
whether banks or persons) are to operate according to the principles of ; distributive 
justice, socio-economic welfare, ethical business practices, truth, honesty, 
transparency, fair dealings, holding the economic agent( and its components in case 
of a company or a bank) responsible for contribution to the economic growth of 
other stakeholders via long term and sustainable growth taking into account factors 
like the environment and other stakeholders like employees, customers, the 
17 
 
Government regulatory body etc and ensuring that no one is made economically  
better off at the cost of someone else irrespective of the activity being undertaking 
whether halal or haram.
34
All of these conditions and characterise help in devising a 
regulatory framework which is deemed the most suitable for the modern day IFI’s. 
The thesis is divided in the following chapters: 
In the second chapter we identify the main sources of Islamic law, being the Quran, 
the Hadith (the saying and doings of Prophet Muhammad), Ijma (consensus) and 
Qiyas (analogous reasoning) and how that differentiates the Islamic financial system 
from the conventional legal systems. We also discuss the essence of Islamic contract 
law as being the basis of modern day Islamic financial intermediation and financial 
product development as carried out by IFI’s. 
In the third chapter we look at the main ideological principles of Islamic finance 
derived from contemporary and traditional writing focusing mainly on the ethical 
aspects of economic and financial activity. This chapter will focus mainly on the 
ethical and axiomatic aspects of Islamic finance and economic framework, in doing 
so the chapters lays down the main principles of the Islamic business and economic 
system that colours Islamic finance literature and practice and should form a main 
component of the normative regulatory framework for the Islamic finance industry.  
In the fourth chapter we will look at the most commonly used corporate governance 
theory in the Anglo-American corporate and finance literature i.e the Agency or the 
shareholder theory and its short comings and the effect that the Neo liberal political 
discourse has had on modern day Corporate Governance and how that fails to satisfy 
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the needs of a financial regulatory and governance framework based on Islamic 
principles, which will lay down the main theme of the thesis. 
In the fifth chapter we will look at how the conventional western Business ethics and 
CSR theories as embraced by the stakeholder theory is compatible with the 
normative and the practical aspects of IFI’s and should form the basis of a 
governance and regulatory framework for modern day IFI’s as a perfect alternative 
to the en vogue Neo Liberal Anglo US corporate governance model. 
In the sixth and the seventh chapter we look at the different financial instruments 
being used by modern day IFI’s and the resulting governance and regulatory issues 
emanating from their use from a sharia as well as a conventional point of view. The 
chapter will include the point of views of the different schools of thought as well as 
contemporary literature in Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh) regarding the acceptability 
of these instruments and the different terms and conditions that the different schools 
accept as valid. 
In the last two chapters, we argue for a regulatory framework for IFI’s based on the 
stakeholder and CSR model, which can be customised for the IFI as an industry only 
by moving away from a rule based framework and adopting a principle based Meta 
regulatory framework. The principles which must be focused must be the 
stakeholder approach and the normative ethical standards as espoused by the Islamic 
finance literature. The main point for devising such a framework is the cooperation 
between the national regulators and the standard setting bodies of Islamic finance 
IFSB and AAOIFI, where by two tiered regulatory regime is put in place for IFI’s 
that are operating in jurisdictions where sharia is not accepted as a source of law. It 
is argued that the responsibilities of the standard setting bodies should be enhanced 
19 
 
to be more on the lines of a licensing authority issuing sharia compliance certificates 
for IFI’s wishing to work as sharia compliant financial institutions. These certificates 
of compliance should be considered as a separate mandatory requirement for IFI 
from the national regulatory requirements. It is thus strongly argued that a new level 
of cooperation between national regulators and the IFSB and AAOIFI should be 
developed and enforced if such a scheme has to work. 
It is thus argued that a move from a neo liberal profit maximising ethos to a 
stakeholder oriented approach is deemed the best way to achieve governance and 
regulatory uniformity as well as ensure that Islamic finance industry supports both 
social, ethical and economic achievement- providing the citizens, the depositors, the 
investors and other stakeholders who are directly and indirectly involved with the 
protection and confidence they need to feel safe when dealing with the Islamic 
finance industry as being well structured, safe secure, sharia complaint, well 
governed and risk averse. 
7. Conclusion 
Thus it is argued that the stakeholder theory and the CSR concept, by allowing and 
justifying governmental (or international) regulatory intervention in the shape of not 
only black letter laws and regulations but also by providing such principles and 
norms which are in line with the axiomatic Islamic economic principles can be 
deemed to be the best governance models for Islamic finance as an industry. These 
principles in turn provide a viable option for the supervision and regulation both at 
the macro and micro levels for the Islamic financial industry in the shape of a 
Principle based result oriented Meta regulatory framework. At the same time the 
practice of following a stakeholder and CSR oriented approach brings the principles 
20 
 
and practices of Islamic finance in line with international practices and can therefore 
easily form the blue prints for a separate regulatory regime for the regulation and 
supervision of IFI’s. By making CSR and the stakeholder theory as the basis of an 
international regulatory regime for IFI’s it is ensured that the regime that is drafted 
for IFI’s takes into consideration the multifarious unique aspects of Islamic finance 
and remains within the precepts of Sharia and the Islamic economic model. 
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CHAPTER. 2 AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC SOURCES OF 
LAW AND THE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT AND THEIR 
RELEVANCE TO MODERN DAY ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
1 Introduction 
To better understand the theoretical aspects of Islamic finance it is imperative to 
understand how Islamic law in general is practiced and what the major sources of 
Islamic law are, specifically those relating to Islamic finance. In the same stead the 
understanding of Islamic law pertaining to finance will help decipher one of the 
major characteristics of Islamic finance, being its divine nature as derived from the 
various sources of Islamic law.   The other purpose of this chapter is to emphasis on 
the role that the perception regarding the divinity of the sources of Islamic finance 
have on the adherents to Islamic finance specifically Muslims and how that 
perception gives legitimacy to cannons of Islamic finance for Muslims wanting to 
practice Islamic finance not only as an alternative to conventional finance but as a 
religious duty. An additional purpose of this chapter is to also introduce the concept 
of Maqasid Sharia and Masalaha as representing the practical and legal 
embodiment of modern day Sharia and the role that these two legal concepts can 
play in the overall architecture of contemporary Islamic finance. 
This introduction to Sharia as a legal concepts is deemed necessary to discuss 
because it has to be understood that at the heart of the Islamic finance industry lies 
the pretext that the alternative available in the financial industry is the interest based 
banking system which is not only riskier in financial and economic terms, giving rise 
to ethical and corporate governance issues, but is considered ‘haram (illegitimate)’ 
by the Muslims. By focusing on the sources of Islamic law (and thus the genesis of 
Islamic finance) it can be established that the ideology behind Islamic finance merits 
22 
 
the use of a governance and regulatory framework which is specifically tailored for 
Islamic finance and caters for the ethical and moral principles as laid down in the 
Islamic literature related to finance and economic activity and is in line with the 
legal doctrine of Maqasid Sharia and Maslaha. The importance of Sharia 
compatibility forms the backbone of today’s contemporary Islamic finance industry 
and thus sharia itself has to be defined and deciphered in order to make a logical 
connection with the way today’s Islamic financial industry is operating 
internationally and the way sharia is viewed as being the source of law for Islamic 
financial industry.
35
 
 
2. Sharia and its meaning 
 For a Muslim his/ her life is dictated by the Islamic religious law called The Sharia. 
The word Sharia literary means ‘the path that leads to the spring’.36 Figuratively, it 
means ‘a clear path to be followed and observed’.37 On the other hand Islamic law is 
also sometimes called ‘Fiqh’, the confusion stems from the fact that while 
translating from Arabic to English both ‘Sharia’ and ‘Fiqh’ are bundled into one 
category for convenience. However if looked at from a pure legal terminology, Fiqh 
refers ‘to the science of deducing Islamic laws from evidence found in the sources of 
Islamic law’.38  In essence for an easier understanding of the generic term ‘Islamic 
law’ in a more western civil law and common law context, Sharia refers to the sum 
total of Islamic laws which were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and which are 
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recorded in the Quran as well as  deducible from the prophet’s divinely guided life 
style ( called the Sunna).
39
  So in essence the laws of Sharia are general in nature and 
lay down basic principles, Fiqh on the other hand is more specific and demonstrates 
how these principles are to be applied in given situations.
40
 For this thesis we will be 
referring to the more general Sharia as embodying Islamic law and the defining 
principles of Maqasad Shariah, unless specified otherwise. Thus it can be construed 
that Islamic religious law springs from various sources namely the Quran and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) in the form of Hadith which are 
categorized as the primary sources, whereas Ijma and Qiyas along with the 
Jurisprudence developed by the different Schools of thought can be categorized as 
the secondary sources.
41
 
 
3. Primary and Secondary sources of Islamic law 
As has been already mentioned that when one talks about “Islamic law”, it has to be 
noted that this is somewhat an ambiguous term since it combines two Arabic terms, 
Shari’ah (divine law) and fiqh (human comprehension of that law).The distinction 
between Shariah and Fiqh is an important one since the difference basically lays 
down the ground work for any development of modern day Islamic laws regarding 
any aspect of the Islamic life.
42 
 In the first instance, since the Muslims hold the view that God is the true and only 
law-giver, any legal position must ultimately be derived from the Quran which 
Muslims believe, was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, also called the 
Messenger of God, by the angel Jibril (Gabriel) and thus any edict present in the 
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Quran can neither be denied or amended and is the ultimate authority for any aspect 
of a Muslims life.
43
 However the matter of interpretation of the Quran’s edicts is a 
contentious issue and is left to the Jurists who are deemed to be the experts in that 
area. The role of the jurists and sharia scholars is one of the major characteristics of 
the modern day IFI, since these religious scholars and jurists form the sharia 
supervisory board of individual IFI’s as well as contribute greatly to the regulatory 
standard setting bodies like the IFSB and AAOIFI, whereby they act to ensure that 
all IFI’s work within the ambit of sharia. 
The second one is the Sunna,
44
 that is, the deeds, utterances and tacit approvals of 
the Prophet Muhammad, as related in the al-hadith or traditions (the singular hadith 
is also used for tradition in general),
45
 handed down through a dependable chain of 
transmitters. Sometimes, the term Sunna is used in a wider sense, including the 
deeds of Prophet Muhammad’s companions and successors. In essence however 
Sunna is understood to be the revelation of His (God’s) divine will transmitted 
through the prophet Muhammad.
46 
The Quran and the Sunna are the primary sources. They are taken by Muslims as 
representing the actual word and the will of God and thus rank in priority to the 
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other sources of law.
47
 Even though having acknowledged these sources as the 
divine will and the authentic source(s) of Islamic law pertaining to almost all the 
aspects of life, the modern day Muslims still face a conundrum of what to do with 
problems that have not been either addressed at all or incompletely addressed in the 
Quran and the Sunna . 
In order to supplement such gaps the jurisprudence established to give authority to 
the Hadith has been developed by the different schools of thought and jurists over 
the period of time, with elaborate checks and balances ensured in the system of 
authentication to derive the validity of such Hadith which can actually be attributed 
to the words, actions and habits of the Prophet Muhammad.
48
This is an important 
aspect for the Islamic Finance industry as most of the earliest jurisprudence 
developed regarding Islamic finance has been done through the reliance on Hadith 
with further developments through the use of Qiyas (analogous reasoning) and Ijma 
(consensus).
49
 
However even the reliance on Hadith as such do not cover all aspects of modern day 
finance and trade and the other complex corporate issues for Muslims like issues of 
the Limited liability of the modern day corporation, corporate governance, 
intellectual property and the permissibility of many of the trade practices and 
complex financial instruments involved in modern day Islamic finance. Another 
problem that has always been an concern for Muslim thinkers and intellectual, both 
modern and traditional, is the fact that the Quran and the Sunna leave room for 
different interpretations, giving rise to the risk of subjectivity in the interpretation by 
individual jurists and scholars thereby raising concern for the implementation of 
rules pertaining to the different aspects of an injunction as expounded in the Quran 
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and the Sunna.  This issue of subjectivity can systemically diminish the effectiveness 
of the religious injunctions since the differences are not necessarily restricted to the 
individuals but also transcend the different schools of thought across the Muslim 
Ummah.
50
  To counter this problem of subjectivity, the Muslim Ummah( Ummah 
meaning a society based on religious affinity) as a whole has the option to resort to 
secondary sources to further clarify and elaborate upon any issues of concern that 
are not clear in the primary sources.
51 
So to give these primary sources a practical manifestation and to adapt these primary 
sources to the everyday situations( including those novel and unique situations 
which have not been discussed in detail in the Quran and Sunna), the responsibility 
is transferred to those individuals who have the requisite skills in interpreting the 
revealed sources, namely qualified religious scholars or ulama.  
 
4. Fatwas; an introductions 
In case of where there is a confusion or where the issue at hand is unclear the 
Muslim as an individual or as a body (legislative body, as a court or any other legal 
body like a bank or company) can ask for expert opinions from the religious legal 
scholars called Mufti(s) or ‘Ulama’ who are experts in Fiqh, these Ulama in turn 
give their decisions in the shape of legal opinion based on the principles of sharia. 
This legal opinion is called the ‘fatwa’ and these form an indispensable source of 
modern day Islamic law in general and is probably one of the most important 
characteristics of modern day Islamic finance.
52
  In modern day IFI’s these fatwas 
are delivered by means of a sharia supervisory board (SSB), which is responsible for 
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the sharia compliance of the IFI operations and activities. From both a corporate 
governance and regulatory point of view, the working and the regulation of SSB 
activities is of prime importance for the IFI’s as an industry, something which will 
be discussed in chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
 
5. Islamic law schools and their legal and socio-economic effects on modern day 
Islamic finance. 
Another very important aspect of Islamic law is the presence of the major schools of 
thought or madhabs amongst the Muslim community.
53
 This division of the schools 
of thought tends to determine many of the important questions and their answers as 
these schools of thought tend to agree on only certain aspects of the Islamic law and 
tend to be in divergence with each other in the certain other aspects of the 
applications of the sharia principles. This division of opinion giving rise to many 
complications when applying and interpreting a particular principle of Islamic law 
which in turn erodes the aspect of uniformity in Islamic law. 
 From the point of view of the Islamic finance industry, this is a very important 
aspect of sharia that it allows for the practitioners, regulators, customers and other 
stakeholders to carry out what is called sharia forum shopping.
54
 As a caveat it must 
be mentioned that only a brief introduction will be given to these schools of thought 
and that too only from the point of view of Islamic financial industry here since it is 
not possible to discuss all the intricacies of the jurisprudential difference and 
similarities of all these schools of thought in this thesis in any great detail. 
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The ability of Islam in general and Islamic law in specific to adapt according to the 
need and requirements of changing times are to be further looked at through the 
prism of the different schools( madhabs) recognized by both traditional and 
contemporary  Islamic scholars.
55
 This ability to adapt is both beneficial and 
necessary for Islamic law and its adherents. One major aspect of the Islamic 
jurisprudence is the presence of these schools of juristic thought, which have 
interpreted and adapted different facets of sharia as and when the requirement arose 
relying on both the primary as well as secondary sources of Islamic law.
56
 
 This is not to say that there have been no problems with this particular aspect of 
Islamic jurisprudence, specifically pertaining to the issue of lack of uniformity at 
many places and in some instances giving rise to some very serious disagreements 
between the schools of thought.
57
 This particular issue is further exasperated by the 
fact that Muslims no longer necessarily live in Muslim majority countries and thus 
may not have central religious authorities that may provide any kind of oversight of 
such a function being carried out by these scholars. Therefor giving rise to the very 
likely possibility that even where Muslims are in the majority in one jurisdiction 
there may be adherents of different schools of thought living and using ‘their’ own 
version of a particular school to decide upon a particular issue. However these 
instances can be curtailed significantly by dialogue and by using Ijma and Qiyas 
amongst the scholars of the different schools of thought, which may give rise to a 
very rich and detailed culture of debate and agreement on most of the pressing issues 
facing Islam in general. This is specifically a major ongoing academic and practical  
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issue for the Islamic finance industry across the globe specially because the Islamic 
finance industry has not yet overcome ( or mostly overcome) internal disagreements 
about how to interpret different aspects of  jurisprudential and practical issues 
relating to Islamic finance and have yet to unite to face challenges posed by these 
differences. 
Even though the Islamic jurisprudence laid down by the different scholars 
(belonging to different schools of thought) is an important source of modern day 
Islamic law, it has to be kept in context of what has already been mentioned, that a 
distinction has to be drawn between the two sources of Islamic law i.e the sharia and 
the Fiqh. For Muslims the sharia is the actual source of Islamic law comprising of 
the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad and is thus immutable and 
accepted by Muslims as such, there is no room (or very little room) for any 
interpretation what so ever,
58
 however on the other hand, the Islamic Fiqh or Islamic 
Jurisprudence which is derived from the different schools of thought is open to both 
interpretation and to an extent criticism as it is in essence only a juristic opinion by a 
renowned scholar(s) of their times. So the sources and thus the effects thereof of 
these sources are to be categorized accordingly in that hierarchy.
59
 
  According to Hans Visser
60
 there are thus four major schools of law belonging to 
the contemporary Sunni Madhab. These schools of thought are usually of differing 
opinions regarding some of the subjects but more often than not they are in mutual 
agreement on certain basic principles of the subjects.  The four Sunni madhahib are 
the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali Schools.  
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The relevance of these schools of thought and the difference and the similarities 
therein are important even today since some countries follow exclusively one school 
where as other countries have adherents of more than one school inside their 
borders. From the point of view of the current situation in the Islamic financial 
industry these differences can mean the categorizing of permissible (Halal) and non-
permissible (Haram or illegitimate) modes of finance. Thus there is an ongoing 
debate regarding this particular issue of compatibility of religious findings and 
rulings (called Fatwas) amongst the scholars, academics, regulators and practitioners 
of Islamic finance.
61
 It is therefore argued that if the importance of these differences 
is not comprehended and taken into account the whole Islamic finance industry is at 
the risk of collapsing because if there is no uniformity and unanimity regarding the 
permissibility of certain financial instruments amongst the different countries of the 
Islamic world (and even countries which are not populated by a Muslim majority) 
there can be no regulatory developments and no international trade, commerce or 
financial activity can flourish in this atmosphere of uncertainty. This lack of 
certainty is believed to be one of the major challenges of the modern day Islamic 
finance industry globally and poses a unique kind of risk in financial regulatory 
terms called Shariah governance risk and reputational risk.
62
 
6. The basis of Islamic financial instruments: A short introduction to Islamic 
contract law 
There are three main pillars of modern day Islamic finance, the prohibition on Riba ( 
Usury) being the most renowned one, the second is the Prohibition of Gharar and 
Mysir ( speculations and Gambling) and the third one being the law of Islamic 
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contracts, which has some unique feature that determine the validity of modern day 
Islamic financial instruments. Besides the two pronged prohibitions on Riba and 
Gharar, the law of contract in Islamic teaching has a unique feature that needs to be 
understood in the context of the Islamic business practices. There are two different 
schools of thought on the permissibility of the kinds of contracts that can be used 
under Islamic law. The more traditional explanation for the law of contract is that 
the forms of the contract that were historically accepted by the Prophet Muhammad 
and his followers are the only kinds of contract that are permissible, their terms may 
be varied slightly remaining within the boundary of the original form.
63
 On the other 
hand the more flexible theory, also derived from the Quran itself is that all contracts 
are basically allowed as long as they have not been specially banned by either the 
Quran, hadith or Ijma( consensus) and Qiyas( analogical reasoning).
64
 So in essence 
anything not specifically banned is allowed.
65
 Ultimately all financial instruments 
and legal vehicles that have been or normatively can be used to develop any 
financial product have to be compliant with sharia principles and have to be carried 
out according to the principles of the law of contract in Islamic law.
66
  It is in that 
light that it has to be understood that unlike western law of contract, Islamic law of 
contract is not considered to have a general theory of contract. 
67
 
Vogel and Hayes and other contemporary writers have concluded that the Islamic 
law of contract does not have any specific legal theory that can be applied to the law 
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of  contract,
68
  instead the rules and principles of Islamic law of contract are derived 
from very specific archaic  forms of contract that have been derived from the main 
sources of Islamic law and customary trade practices of Arabia which were carried 
out during the times of Prophet Muhammad who endorsed those practices by oral 
words or by practicing them himself and these laws and rules of contract have been 
translated into specific nominate contracts.
69
 Even though the more traditionalist 
Islamic scholars argue that no new contracts can actually be initiated or accepted 
because the only acceptable contracts were the ones that were in practice during the 
time of Prophet Muhammad, however the more contemporary writers refer back to 
the basic provision about the law of contract in Islamic law that if a contract is not 
going against any of the substantive prohibitions of the Quran and the hadith, a new 
contract can be allowed.
70
 
The main underlying theme of these nominate contract has been their historical 
religious roots which have made these nominate contract rigid in their form since the 
development of the trade in Arabia at the time of the advent of Islam was regulated 
by these contracts and since these nominate contracts were substantial in covering 
the basic trade in those times and subsequent time till the late twentieth century, 
these contracts have remained static and have gained a very specific form rarely 
being changed or disagreed upon even by the different schools of thought.
71
 This 
particular context of the foregoing historical development of the law of contract in 
sharia has the modern Islamic finance industry on the whole facing a conundrum as 
to how to handle new financial and legal issues that have cropped up with the ever 
changing spectrum of business and finance on the whole. 
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The other very important aspect of the Islamic law of contract that has been argued 
by scholars is that the concept of the freedom of contract as understood by western 
legal scholars is significantly curtailed under Islamic law, as the will of the parties is 
restricted to those particular events that pertain to the entering into the specific or 
nominates contract types. Even though the contract may have been concluded by the 
parties the effect of the contract is not what the parties would have agreed upon or 
intended, rather the effect(s) of the contract will be what the sharia determines.
72
 
The aim of this particular restriction is the protection of weak parties against 
injustice and exploitation.
73
 This is different than the western law of contract where 
offer, acceptance, intention to create legal relations and consideration constitute a 
valid contract as long as the objective of the contract is not illegal under that 
particular jurisdiction’s law. In Islamic law of contract the objective of the contract 
remains the most important aspect, over shadowing the freedom of the contract of 
the parties.
74
 If the objective is one that is recognised by the rules, principles and 
laws governing sharia the contract will be valid and enforceable but if not the whole 
contract may be held void or if it is deemed that only one or more term is against the 
basic principle of sharia and the Islamic ethics of justice and equality that term may 
be removed to make the rest of the contract valid even if that term is a substantive 
aspect of the contract.
75
 In essence then the normative rules of Islamic law governing 
contracts requires the substance as well as the form to be complaint with the basic 
principles of sharia, specifically governing the commercial and business law( called 
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Fiqh Muammalat) and ethics.
76
  The Islamic law of contract can thus be analysed 
under two different heads, first:  The term of the contract (shurrut) and second: The 
object of the contract. 
 
i. Innominate contracts and stipulations (shurut) 
The different type of nominate contracts that the fuqaha (jurists) developed are the 
contract for sale (bay), partnership (musharaka / mudaraba), hire (ijara) and pledge 
(rahn).
77
  Traditionally the sale contract was recognised as the basic form of a valid 
business contract and it was on the basis of this sale contract that the traditional 
jurists and writers developed a body of the other contracts like partnerships, hire and 
pledge. The sale contract is primarily important because it allows a certain amount 
of freedom of contract in trade with some flexibility sketched in its substance and 
form. It is for this reason it is frequently said by scholars that there is no law of 
contract in Islamic jurisprudence rather there is a law of ‘contracts’.78 It is primarily 
for this reason that even today Islamic banking products are formulated on the basis 
of sale of assets and some forms of partnerships and it is thus argued that 
partnerships and real asset based transactions ought to form the majority of Islamic 
financial transactions, however that is not the case. It is this divergence from the 
basic forms of economic activity dictated by Islamic economic and commercial 
principles that raises the fear of possible systemic failure of the whole Islamic 
finance industry.   
Despite the effort of early Muslim scholars to develop a body of contracts that could 
cater for most of the needs of the time, the mechanisms could only be engineered 
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within the frame work of the existing pre Islamic practices and that led to a 
prolonged period of reliance on old forms and stagnated any growth and 
development of this body of law.
79
 Some developments have since then taken place 
and the Islamic law of contract is now better suited to financial and legal engineering 
to adapt to modern times due to work done in this area over the last couple of 
decades, but at the heart remains the basic fundamental ethos of Islamic finance: ban 
on Riba, ban on excessive speculation, ban on gambling, ban on exploitation, 
equality of bargaining positions, justice, honesty and an overarching requirement 
whereby any contracts that are in clear violation of Islamic injunctions can never be 
validated.
80
 
The major reason for restricting the parties ‘will’ in a contract is the aim of ethical 
control of Islamic law to prevent injustice and exploitation of parties. It is believed 
by scholars that the wisdom behind this control over the parties ‘will’ is so that the 
parties may not enter into contract that may circumvent any of the prohibitions 
categorically mentioned in the Shariah.
81
 
The different schools take different positions in this regards too, with some schools 
allowing for the alteration of certain terms and other disallowing them. The major 
area of difference in the point of views of the different schools of thought regarding 
the law of contract under Sharia is the distinction between what Tarek al diwany 
calls ‘cornerstones’ (Rukn) of the contract, things which are indispensable and 
essential for the existence of the contract or in other words the absence of which the 
contract cannot exist and ‘conditions’ (shurut) which are over laid over the 
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cornerstones.
82
  All the juristic schools of thought assert that the relationship 
between the cornerstones and conditions is symbiotic in the sense that if the corner 
stones are present a valid contract can be concluded. However the schools are 
divided on the relevance of the ‘conditions (shurut)’ in a contract. The hanafites 
believe that if in a properly concluded contract  a condition which is prohibited is 
entered into, the contract becomes defective( fasid) but not void, however the other 
schools of thought believe that such a condition would render the contract as void( 
batil).
83
 
There is also some difference between the schools of thought as to what conditions( 
shurut) are actually allowed in a contract and also as to how flexible are the 
nominate contracts in altering such conditions. The strictest position regarding the 
alteration of terms of the contract under Islamic law is taken by the now much less 
relevant school of thought the Zahirites who believe that all contracts and conditions 
not expressly allowed by the shari’a through the Quran, Sunna and Ijma (consensus 
of opinion) are prohibited.
84
  Their strict application refers not only to the contracts 
themselves , meaning that not only do they not accept any new contracts other than 
the ones already established under shariah, they also refuse any alteration in the set 
terms( called Shurut or conditions) of these contracts. The basis for this extreme 
position of the Zahirites is found in the hadith (saying) of the Prophet: “he who has 
done an act which we have not ordered him to do, his act is null and void.” and a 
second hadith: “What then do you think of men who stipulate conditions that are not 
in the Book of God. Whatever condition there be which is not in the Book of God is 
void, be it a hundred conditions.”85 
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The Hanafite scholars take a slightly more lenient stance; they divide shurut into 
three categories. The first category consists of those conditions which are inherent in 
the nature of the contract
86
 add nothing new to the contract but only confirm effects 
that the contract has under the shari’a (shart yaqtadih al aqd).87  Or in simpler terms 
these are the most obvious of the terms in the contract which may or may not be 
present in the contract, for example the stipulation that upon changing of possession 
of a good in a concluded contract the title would change hands too (assuming the 
sale has been concluded and the reason of the sale was to change possession of the 
said goods). The second category is of conditions that are suitable to that contract 
(shart mulaim lil aqd) like pledge and security. The third category comprises 
conditions which are in customary use in the geographical area (shart mutaraf) 
examples would be any local trade practices or trade customs. Any other conditions 
which fall outside the above stated categories and which have the effect of being 
advantageous to one of the parties are prohibited (shart fasid).
88
 The basis of the 
restriction is the protection of the parties from being exploited and ensuring a just 
and equitable transaction.
89
 
The other Sunni schools of thought the Shafiites and the Malikites follow in essence 
the Hanafi position and are not considerably dissimilar from that of the Hanafites 
with regard to the rules relating to the condition in a contract (shurut).
90
 
However The Hanbalite point of view on the subject of conditions (shurut) is by far 
the most lenient amongst the main schools of thought and is more pragmatic keeping 
in view the modern face of trade and finance. It is this flexibility of the Hanbalite 
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point of view that prompted the Ottoman Empire to shift its law relating to contract 
from the Hanafites jurisprudence to a Hanbalite jurisprudence to keep pace with the 
then modern practices of trade and commerce.
91
  The prominent Hambalite scholar 
Ibn Taymiyyah was of the opinion that all contracts and conditions not expressly 
forbidden by the sharia were allowed. He wrote: “The parties decide as they wish 
the content of their juridical acts and determine the effects on the condition that 
these effects are not contrary to public order and morals.”92 In essence this was the 
first time in history that the Muslim scholars accepted freedom of contract in line 
with the more western understanding of the concept. However the emphasis still lay 
in the freedom of contract within the moral bounds and public order, which meant 
that freedom of contract was held captive to the ethical, social, moral and justice 
standards as espoused by the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad 
and ensured that the disparity of bargaining position would not allow one party to 
unjustly treat the other party.
93
 
ii. Object of contract 
 The second of the heads under which the Islamic law on contracts can be analysed 
is the head of the ‘object’ of a contract. Here the word ‘object’ of the contract refers 
to the subject matter that forms a part of a contract and this aspect is also well 
regulated under the Islamic law.
94
 This forms another barrier to what is normally 
understood as freedom of contract for the parties.  The purpose of this particular 
prohibition is to regulate all contracts in such a way that they remain within the 
ambit of the division of permissible (halal) and the prohibited (haram) in the 
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Sharia.
95
 The trade of the Haram items is strictly banned in sharia and many verses 
in the Quran clearly state what is haram (prohibited).
96
The purpose again is to 
prevent contracts that contravene Islamic injunctions regarding certain objects that 
are considered illicit and to maintain a balance between exchanged benefits so that 
no gain is made through trade of these objects. Many of the principles regarding the 
objects of a contract have an overlap with the concept of Gharar (uncertainty or 
speculative trading) that will be discussed in more details below. For example   for 
an object to be licit or mashru’( permissible or legitimate) it must be in existing at 
the  at the time of agreement, there must be a possibility of performance or the 
contract must  be capable of performance, legitimate( according to the tenets of 
Islam) and its characteristics (quality, specie, genus and value) must have been 
settled.
97
 The uncertainty of the existence, quantity, quality etc of a subject matter 
may render a contract void under the sharia, this being a main principles of Islamic 
finance as embodied in the financial instrument of Salam contract. There are 
however exception to this rule which will be discussed under the concept of Gharar( 
below) and in the next chapters when the contracts of Mudarabah, Musharakah, 
Murabaha, as examples of financial instruments being utilised in modern day IFI’s 
are discussed. There is yet another category of prohibitions in Islamic law regarding 
contracts, for example some contracts are prohibited because the reason or sabab 
behind them diverges from the set principles and moral ethos of Islam.
98
 An example 
of this could include anything that is grown to manufacture alcoholic drinks, like 
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grapes or wheat, which in itself is not haram (illicit) but the reason for them being 
grown is an illicit purpose that is to produce wine or beer.
99
 
 
7. The concept of halal (lawful and allowed) and haram( unlawful and banned)  
 One of the main tenants of the Islamic teaching is the very strict bifurcation 
between what is considered right or Halal and what is considered wrong and 
forbidden or Haram. The Halal and Haram categorisation lay at the two extremes of 
the of spectrum of what is permitted and/or prohibited in Islam and thus derive the 
jurisprudence as well as the philosophical underpinning of the Islamic teachings 
regarding everything and therefore according to Kevin “any human act will fall 
under one of the following five types: obligatory (wajib or fard), recommended 
(mandub), reprehensible (makruh), permissible (mubah) and forbidden (haram).”100 
Kamali also contends that: “while the first and last types of activities (wajib and 
haram) have legal force, the remaining three activities fall in the domain of morals 
that cannot be adjudicated in courts. When Sharia proscribes usury or gambling, 
these become legal obligations.” However, as an example, Islamic teachings 
encouraging people not to cause injury to women and elderly or animals reflect “the 
moral underpinnings of Sharia” (whereby there is no obligation as such to do so; 
however it is greatly appreciated by God if done). 
101
 
As with everything else in Islam, Islamic economic system makes very categorical 
distinctions between what is permitted being lawful (Halal) and what is forbidden 
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being unlawful (Haram), and thus gives us the moral and legal underpinning of 
modern day Islamic finance industry. Thus to determine what is permitted or lawful 
(Halal) and what is forbidden or unlawful (Haram) for Muslims remains the sole 
prerogative of God and that is by far the most distinctive feature of Islamic 
economics and business practices.
102
 Accordingly, under the notions of Islamic 
moral economy none but God is empowered to pronounce what is right and what is 
wrong and a clear demarcation has thus been made between lawful and unlawful 
aspects in the economic sphere. Therefore, man under Islamic law has been allowed 
to participate in activities which are deemed lawful and has been strictly forbidden 
to participate in those that are deemed unlawful.
103
 At a philosophical level, there 
can then be a further categorisation of activities that may be allowed under the 
Sharia, but if they lead to an unfair and unjust result or are contrary to any other 
principles of Islamic teachings these activities can then be considered unlawful. An 
example of this kind of activity/ action would be lending money, which in itself  is 
allowed but if the money is leant for gaining interest then it is considered unlawful 
and Haram and comes under the ambit of Usury.
104
 This is one of the rationales 
behind banning Riba/Usury and speculative trading, to ensure that the exploitation of 
the borrower is curtailed.
105
 Thus in essence Islamic economic and business is an 
ethically motivated principle based system where all activities are to be carried out 
according to certain ethical and legal principles at both the Macro and micro level 
making Islamic economics and business teachings unique and demanding in 
practice.
106
  It is this strict adherence to the principles of right and wrong and Halal 
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and Haram enunciated by the Islamic teachings regarding economics and business 
that makes an economic and business environment uniquely ‘Islamic’.107 
Thus no human being has power to say what is right (Halal) and what is wrong 
(Haram) unless ordained by the established sources of the Sharia.
108
 The Qur’an 
clarifies this principle in unambiguous terms when it commands: “And speak not 
concerning that which your own tongues qualify (as clean or unclean), the 
falsehood: “This is lawful, and this is forbidden”, so that ye invent a lie against 
Allah…”109 and “O ye who believe! Forbid not the good things which Allah hath 
made lawful for you, and transgress not, Lo! Allah loveth not the transgressors. Eat 
of that which Allah hath bestowed on you as food lawful and good and keep your 
duty to Allah in whom ye are believers.” 110 This is uniquely pertinent to the Islamic 
financial industry, whereby some activity which may be following Islamic edicts in 
‘form’ however still leading to exploitation and injustice for the parties involved, 
can be categorised as reprehensible (makruh) or permissible but discouraged 
(mubah), if not entirely Haram. This is why the debate in Islamic finance regarding 
‘Form’ over ‘substance’ has been at the center stage of the larger regulatory debate 
because there is a very strong argument that modern day Islamic finance is not 
following the principles of justice, fair play and non-exploitation, which is the actual 
essence of Islamic economic system, however the modern day Islamic banking 
practices lead to exploitative practices by charging markup rather than interest per se 
and the financial instruments being utilized emulate the conventional financial 
instruments rather than true partnership form. From a regulatory point of view, it is 
thus argued that a regulatory arrangement should therefore be in place which caters 
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to the ‘substance’ and ‘essence’ of the principles of Islamic finance, rather than strict 
adherence to rules and ‘Form’. 
 
8. Using the concept of Maqasid al sharia and Masalah as a source of sharia  
  It is therefore argued that to encapsulate the issue of substance and form, the 
Islamic finance industry should be turning to an already well-established concept in 
Fiqh, that of Maqasid al Shari and Maslahah.
111
 As has been discussed above that 
the Islamic financial institutions because of their religious nature cannot be 
considered as a single dimensional profit making entities, they embody an actual 
religious activity for many of the Muslims who want an alternative to the 
conventional interest based financial system.
112
 These two concepts are based on 
religious principles of sharia which further embodies other ethical principles of 
justice, equity, non-exploitation, transparency, social and economic welfare of the 
society, non-speculation, Interest free transactions as well as based on certain legal 
principles derived from the basic sources of Islamic commercial and business based 
laws. These and other unique features make the whole industry unique in its nature, 
both in ‘substance’ and ‘form’, but more so in ‘substance’.113 Thus the essence of 
Islamic finance lays in its ethical principles which are predicated on the normative 
results that the industry ought to be aiming to achieve. These normative principles 
and outcomes are attributable to the doctrine of what is called Maqasid al Shariah in 
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traditional and contemporary Fiqh.
114
 Maqasid al Sharia in essence can be translated 
to simply mean the objectives of Islamic law, though this is too simplistic a 
definition, however for the sake of clarity we will refer to Maqasid al shariah as the 
intended objectives or outcomes that sharia aims to achieve.
115
 This particular 
concept has a significant role to play in the modern day Islamic finance industry, 
specifically because the Islamic finance industry claims itself to be adhering to the 
basic principles of sharia pertaining to finance like providing services and financial 
instruments devoid of Riba( usury) and Gharar and upholding the basic tenet of 
Islamic commercial law( Fiqh al muamlat). It is thus argued that the regulatory and 
governance framework that the Islamic finance industry ought to adopt must be 
sharia compliant as well, however as we will see in the next chapter while discussing 
the possible effectiveness of the Islamic moral economy,
116
 that such a framework 
will not always be possible due to the fact that Islamic finance as an industry is now 
operating in jurisdiction where sharia is not accepted as a source of law, which may 
create a conundrum for individual IFI’s as well as regulators and standard setting 
bodies.  It is therefore argued that one possible option that these individual IFI’s as 
well as the industry may benefit from is to focus on the Maqasid al Sharia 
framework. This it is argued will give the regulatory bodies as well as the industry 
the flexibility and convenience to follow the main guiding normative principles of 
sharia and focus on the outcome rather than be tied down by strict rules, while 
maintaining the essence of sharia in their day to day working. 
                                                          
114
 A Dasuki and A Abozaid ‘A critical appraisal of the challenges of realizing Maqasid al-Sharia in 
Islamic banking and Finance’ (2007), IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, 15:2, 143-165  
115
 U Chapra ‘ The Islamic vision of development in the light of Maqasid al-Sharia’ (2007), Working 
paper, Islamic Development Bank 
116
 M Asutay ‘ Political economy approach to Islamic Economics: Systemic Understanding for an 
Alternative Economic System’ (2007), Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area studies, 1-2, 3-18 
45 
 
 Here in the context of Islamic economics and finance, the pursuit of Maqasad al 
Sharia would also encapsulate the essence of another legal doctrine of Sharia: that of 
Maslaha ( consideration of Public interest), Maslaha being one of the aims of the 
overall Maqasid al sharia framework. In essence Maslahah is a doctrine which 
according to al Ghazali as reiterated by Kamali ‘secure a benefit or prevent harm but 
which are simultaneously harmonious with the Objective (Maqasid) of the 
Sharia’.117 Thus the doctrine of public interest in an economic sense is to be 
reflected in the activities of the economic agents,
118
 be it the IFI’s or the individuals 
carrying out business activity, so any activity which harms the public interest would 
fall foul of the overall sharia framework and be deemed unacceptable. It is therefore 
argued that Islamic finance as an industry ought not to be pure profit maximising 
entities( which is different from profit making entities), and ought to take into 
account other social and ethical aspects as embodied in the overall teaching of 
Islamic ethics and elaborated by the numerous edicts of sharia. This it is argued in 
this thesis can be achieved by contemporary IFI’s by adopting the stakeholder and 
CSR model of governance,
119
 which would mean that these IFI’s will not only be 
adapting a more universally accepted governance mechanism but would actually be 
catering to the sharia needs of their stakeholders. 
In the economic sphere the Maqasid al sharia can be considered to be aimed at 
promoting social and economic welfare, equitable distribution of incomes, public 
welfare, act as a catalyst for development, abolition of Usury and speculative trading 
and avoiding evil, in essence the financial institutions ought to be ethical in their 
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operations.
120
 Maqasid al sharia besides providing principled guidelines for the 
operations to the industry also can be used to gauge the results and the intended 
outcome. This it is argued can be considered a part of the outcome and principle 
based regulatory framework that the international regulatory bodies like the IFSB 
and AAOIFI should endeavour to replicate in their standards. It is also argued that 
the IFSB and the AAOIFI can use the stakeholder corporate governance model and 
the business ethics model to emulate as well as integrate the Maqasid al Sharia 
framework in the proposed outcome based regulatory structure, focusing on ensuring 
compliance mechanisms which are in line with both Maqasid al Sharia as well the 
stakeholder governance model. 
However for the purposes of this thesis it is argued that the reference to Islamic 
business ethics in context of Islamic finance would encapsulate both the guiding 
principles of Islamic Moral economy as enunciated by Asutay
121
 as well as the 
desired outcomes of the maqasid al sharia in the context of the Tawihidi framework 
as elaborated by Chapra,
122
 Neinhaus,
123
 Ibn Ashur 
124
(2006), Siddiqi (1988), Al-
Najjar
125
, Dasuki
126
 and Jasser Auda.
127
 It is therefore argued that  corporate 
governance theory that is used for the Islamic finance industry have to encapsulate 
the Tawihidi framework which takes into account the Maqasid and Masalah aspects 
of Islamic Jurisprudence. In essence it can therefore be argued that as long as the 
Islamic finance industry caters for the Maqasid and Maslaha aspects of economic 
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activity, the Tawahidi framework will automatically be catered for. It is therefore 
further argued that the stakeholder theory of corporate governance with its 
theoretical roots in Business ethics is the closest the Islamic finance industry can 
come to in following the Tawahidi framework. 
9. Riba and Gharrar: an introduction 
According to Noor the ‘Two cardinal Sharia doctrines that have held sway in the 
development of Islamic contract law through history are:  Riba and Gharar. Looking 
at these doctrines and their juristic interpretations enables us to understand the past 
and to project the future of Islamic law of contract’.128 Thus by this definition the 
basis of Islamic contract law in specific as well as Islamic finance in general is the 
ban on Riba( Usury) and Gharrar ( speculative trading) and this then forms an 
absolute rule for any financial or commercial activity  under the Sharia. This ban 
may be supplemented by other conditions and terms, but these two elements remain 
constant and need to be understood by anyone trying to study and understand 
Islamic finance. 
10. Riba 
 The prohibition on Riba in the Quran has been the most emphasized edict regarding 
the financial life of a Muslim and there have been many revelation/ verses in Holy 
Quran regarding Prohibition of Riba: the first of the surah’s from the Quran says 
“Those who swallow down usury cannot arise except as one whom Shaitan (Satan) 
has prostrated by (his) touch does rise. That is because they say, trading is only like 
usury; and Allah has allowed trading and forbidden usury. To whomsoever then the 
admonition has come from his Lord, then he desists, he shall have what has already 
passed, and his affair is in the hands of Allah; and whoever returns (to it)-- these are 
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the inmates of the fire; they shall abide in it.”129  In the second Surah the Quran say: 
“Allah does not bless usury, and He causes charitable deeds to prosper, and Allah 
does not love any ungrateful sinner.”130 In the third surah the Quran further 
emphasises:  “O you who believe! Be careful of (your duty to) Allah and relinquish 
what remains (due) from usury, if you are believers.”131  The fourth surah: “O you 
who believe! Do not devour usury, making it double and redouble, and be careful of 
(your duty to) Allah, that you may be successful.”132 The fifth and the sixth surah 
read: “And their taking usury though indeed they were forbidden it and their 
devouring the property of people falsely, and we have prepared for the unbelievers 
from among them a painful chastisement.”133 “And whatever you lay out as usury, 
so that it may increase in the property of men, it shall not increase with Allah; and 
whatever you give in charity, desiring Allah's pleasure-- it is these (persons) that 
shall get manifold.”134 
In contemporary and classical Islamic jurisprudence the word Riba has been held to 
mean ‘excess’, ‘increase’ or ‘addition’, which correctly interpreted according to 
Sharia terminology, implies any excess compensation without due consideration 
(consideration does not include time value of money).
135
 This definition of Riba is 
derived from the Quran and is unanimously accepted by all Islamic scholars.  
Besides the Quranic edicts regarding Riba there are some agreed upon hadith
136
 
which dictate the contemporary as well as classical rules regarding Riba. Riba in 
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Hadith start from Jabir ibn ‘Abdallah, giving a report on the Prophet Mohammad 
farewell Pilgrimage said: The Prophet, addressed the people and said, ‘All of the 
Riba of Jahiliyyah
137
( literal meaning Ignorance) is annulled. The first Riba that I 
annul is our Riba, that accruing to ‘Abbas ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib (the Prophets’s 
uncle); it is being cancelled completely.’138 From ‘Abdallah ibn Hanzalah: the 
Prophet said ‘A dirham of Riba which a man receives knowingly is worse than 
committing adultery thirty-sic times’ Bayhaqi has also reported the above hadith in 
Shu’ab al-iman with the addition that ‘Hell befits him whose flesh has been 
nourished by unlawful.’139 From Abu Hurayah: The Prophet said: ‘God would be 
justified in not allowing four persons to enter paradise or to taste its blessings: he 
who drinks habitually, he who takes Riba, he who usurps an orphan’s property 
without right, and he who undutiful to his parents.’140 
In another hadith, Usamah ibn Zayd reported that the prophet Muhammad said that 
‘there is no Riba except in Nasia’h( waiting).’141 But Muslim narrated on the 
authority of ’Abu Sa‘ıd Al-Khudriy that Bilal, one of the prophet’s companions 
visited the Prophet Muhammad with some high quality dates, and the Prophet 
inquired about their source. Bilal explained that he traded two volumes of lower 
quality dates for one volume of higher quality. The prophet said: ‘this is precisely 
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the forbidden Riba! Do not do this. Instead, sell the first type of dates, and use the 
proceeds to buy the other.’142 
In another stead jabir ibn Abdullah narrated that the prophet cursed the receiver and 
the payer of Riba, the one who record it and the witnesses to the transaction and he 
said: They are all equal (in guilt)’.143 
One of the most significant understanding and detailed explanation of what Riba 
entails is derived from this particular hadith: Abu Sa’id al khudri reported that the 
Prophet Muhammad said: ‘Gold is to be paid for by gold, silver for silver, wheat by 
wheat, barley by barley, dates by dates and salt by salt, like for like and equal for 
equal, payment made by hand to hand. He, who makes an addition to it or asks for 
an addition, deals in Riba’.144 
At this point it has to be mentioned that the detailed study of the actual meanings of 
all the hadith and Quranic edicts regarding Riba and its resultant debate(s) is beyond 
the scope of the present study as the study requires in detail and in depth analysis of 
both contemporary and classical teaching referring back to almost a thousand years 
of views, research and opinions spanning the most prominent scholars belonging to 
the major schools of juristic thought in Islamic Fiqh( Jurisprudence) and thus only 
those views which are regarded as having been agreed upon by most scholars will be 
dealt with here. 
In more specific terms Nabil A Saleh has given a more contemporary definition of 
Riba which takes into account most of the classical as well contemporary 
understanding of the concept of Riba as: 
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 Riba in its sharia context can be defined, as generally agreed, as an unlawful gain 
derived from the quantative inequality of the counter values in any transaction 
purporting to effect the exchange of two or more species, which belong to the same 
genus and are governed by the same ‘efficient cause’( illa’ in Arabic). Deferred 
completion of the exchange of such species or even of species which belong to 
different genera but are governed by the same cause (illa) is also Riba, whether or 
not the deferment is accompanied by an increase in any one of the exchanged 
counter values.
145
  
In their writing Iqbal and Mirakhor have quoted Lane’s lexicon as comprehensively 
covering the meaning of the concept of Riba as meaning ‘to increase, to augment, 
swelling, forbidden ‘addition’, to make more than what is given, the practicing or 
taking of usury or the like, an excess or an addition, or an addition over and above 
the principal sum that is lent or expended.’146  Deriving a simpler version of the 
definition of the term Riba, Iqbal and Mirakhor have given their own streamlined 
definition in economic terms as: ‘the practice of charging financial interest or a 
premium in excess of the principal amount of a loan.’147 In his writing Tarek al 
Diway has pointed out that (either or both) the following feature that will need to be 
present in any Riba transaction: ‘first, a surplus ( al fadl in Arabic) in the amount of 
the counter value over the other in barter transactions of specific commodities and/or 
secondly, a delay ( al-Nasa or al-Nasi’ah in Arabic) in the settlement of one or both 
counter values.’148 
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It is however pertinent to further point out that the context of all these revelations in 
the Quran and the hadiths will be discussed as it relates to our current study. The 
context is the emphasis of the Islamic jurisprudence relating to trade, economics and 
finance on the aspects of justice, eliminating economic and social exploitation, 
resource mobilization,  eliminating greed and hoarding of resources, focusing on 
ethical and moral dealings, honesty, contributing directly and indirectly to the 
society as a whole specially taking into account that segment of society who cannot 
contribute to economic activity and thus are unable to reap the benefits of the 
market. 
 
11. The substance over form debate: the Riba conundrum 
Whatever the controversy in the definition of Riba, the essence of the whole ban is 
to stop exploitation of either of the parties involved in the transaction. That is the 
‘substance’ or the Maqasid149 of the ban on Riba in the Quran and the Hadith and it 
should be considered and preferred over the ‘form’ when analysing a particular 
transaction and deciding whether that transaction falls within the ambit of Riba as 
espoused in the Quran and other sources of Sharia or not.   In essence the 
conundrum regarding the ban emanating from the Quranic injunctions and the 
recognised hadiths of the Prophet Mohammad is whether to blindly follow the 
‘form’ or the ‘substance’ of the ban on interest/ usury/ Riba and thus mould the 
practical guide lines for the contemporary Islamic finance practices in such a way as 
to ensure strict compliance with all the rules that emanate from the debate. On the 
other hand, the other fundamental question that arises is whether the Ulema ( 
specifically those sitting on the SSB’s of the individual IFI’s or those sitting on the 
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central regulatory and standard setting bodies) ought to be more flexible in looking 
at what the outcome of a particular transaction is going to be and decide whether that 
falls within the ambit of Riba or not. This ban on Riba in all its manifestations, 
contemporary as well as traditional, emphasises on the aspect of fairness, justice and 
ethical practices in dealings with others. Even where at times certain kinds of Riba 
transactions are allowed they are still deemed immoral or discouraged (even though 
legal). The rationale given by all scholars across the broad spectrum spanning the 
different juristic schools, historical eras or specialisations (economics, law, Fiqh, 
finance etc) is that Islam focuses on the morality or the ‘Substance’ or the Maqasid 
of the transactions and not per se the ‘Form’.  
That is why a large part of the Riba debate revolves around the concept of loan 
giving (qard), a mainstay of contemporary banking industry. The Islamic injunctions 
are very categorical about the standing of loans, they are to be charitable, if the 
borrower can repay it back, then he must, but if the borrower cannot pay back the 
loan, the lender should give up the claim rather than trying to extract further 
payments by imposing an interest over the principal, which in essence leads to the 
existence of Riba al jahilya( a kind of Riba that was practiced in Arabia at the time 
of Prophet Muhammad). 
150
 
There are thus very clear injunctions in Islam about the loans, as mentioned by Saleh 
in his writings according to the well-known Islamic scholar Sanhuri ‘the qard( loan) 
contract is basically a gratuitous transaction and thus it negates the existence of 
Riba’.151 But then he goes on and argues that by analogy the loan can become a 
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rabawi transaction (rabawi: meaning susceptible to Riba) by analogy with sale when 
it secures to the lender an interest or a premium.’152 
Of course these provisions have to be taken in context of the whole business ethics 
perspective under contemporary Islamic finance literature. That is why Islamic 
business ideology focuses mainly on fostering partnerships and trade rather than 
giving simple loans, it is argued by scholars and all the academics that by doing so at 
the Macro level the economy can not only prosper but there is economic stimulation 
which should lead to more distributive justice and welfare for the whole society, 
which is what the Islamic economic system aims to achieve. In essence the Maqasid 
Sharia behind the ban of Riba is the overall stimulation of economy and ensuring 
that there is more distributive justice while decreasing exploitation of vulnerable 
parties.   
It is however accepted that from a purely contemporary economic perspective most 
of these provisions banning Riba and Gharar in Islamic finance literature and ethos 
may seem archaic and slightly terse for the contemporary business entity, but it has 
to be understood that Islamic finance isn’t just about business practices; it is a part of 
the whole Islamic life style and not just a means to an end. And any practices that 
may be exploitative and unjust should be discouraged and avoided by modern day 
IFIs. 
 
12. Gharrar 
Gharrar basically means ‘Uncertainty, risk and speculation’.153 The concept of 
gharrar is derived from the doctrine of the Quran  where out of concern for the 
possibility of human beings harming themselves from their own folly and 
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extravagance, the Quran has banned games of chance/ hazard( gambling and 
speculations) in surah .II:219 and s.V:93 of the Quran which says:  
They ask you about wine and gambling. Say, "In them is great sin and [yet, some] 
benefit for people. But their sin is greater than their benefit." And they ask you what 
they should spend. Say, "The excess [beyond needs]."Thus Allah makes clear to you 
the verses [of revelation] that you might give thought.
154
  
Another tradition that has led to the suspicion towards Gharrar is the concept of 
protection of one party with a stronger bargaining position from exploiting the 
weaker of the two parties and thus giving rise to the command that all commercial 
and business transactions should be devoid of any uncertainty and speculation and 
this could only be secured through ensuring that both the parties have perfect 
knowledge of the counter values intended to be exchanged.
155
 Thus the reason for 
the modern day suspicion of sharia’s scholarship of any transaction that entails any 
kind of transaction where the subject matter, the price or both are not determined 
and fixed in advance, is that any such transaction would fall short of the 
requirements of ‘Gharrar’. 
The Definition of Gharar has been of some controversy amongst the scholars of 
Islam both traditional and contemporary, some of the most prominent scholars have 
given their understanding of Gharar in the light of both the Quran and the teaching 
of the prophet Muahamad as well as on the basis of Ijma and Qiyas. Ibn Qayyim Al-
Jawziyya
156
 defined Gharrar as being the subject matter that the vendor is not in a 
position to hand over to the buyer, whether the subject matter is in existence or not. 
Sanhuri
157
 on the other hand focused on the ‘jahl’( the want for knowledge), saying 
                                                          
154
 The Quran as quoted in Nabil A.Saleh (n 119) 49 
155
 Saleh (n 119) 50 
156
 Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, I’Lam Al-Muwwaqqi’ In ,Vol.I,  357-61 
157
 Sanhuri, Masadir Al-Haqq, Vol.III,  49 
56 
 
that jahl brings about Gharrar in the following circumstances: i)  when it is not 
known whether the subject matter exists or not, or  ii) if it exists, whether it can be 
handed over to the buyer, or iii) when want of knowledge affects the identification 
of the genus or species to which the subject matter belongs or its characteristics or 
its quantum, its identity, or its condition remaining satisfactory or iv) the want of 
knowledge with regard to the date of future performance, if any also creates Gharar. 
Ibn Juzay
158
 outlined ten differing cases and circumstances where Gharrar is a 
possibility: 
a. Difficulty in putting the buyer in possession of the subject matter 
b. Want of knowledge with regard to the price or the subject matter 
c. Want of knowledge with regard to the characteristics of the price or of the subject 
matter. 
d. Want of knowledge with regard to the quantum of the price or the quantity of the 
subject matter, such as an offer to sell ‘at today’s price’ or at the ‘market price’ 
e. Want of knowledge with regard to the date of future performance, such as an offer to 
sell when a certain event happens. 
f. Two sales in one transaction, such as selling one article at two different prices, one 
for cash and one for credit, or selling two different articles at one price, one for 
immediate remittance and one for deferred one. 
g. The sale of what is not expected to revive, such as the sale of a sick animal. 
h. The last three categories are of different sale transactions which involve the 
inadequate inspection of the sale object by the buyer called, Bay ‘al-hasah, Bay ‘al-
munabadha and Bay ‘mulamasa, which is the sale performed by the vendor without 
giving the buyer the opportunity for properly examining the object of the sale. 
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Ibn Rushd
159
 has defined the parameters of when Gharrar can occur and when 
Gharrar can be avoided in the following terms: “Gharrar in sale transactions causes 
the buyer to suffer damage (ghubn) and is the result of a want of knowledge which 
affects either the price or the subject matter.” However according to Tarek “ 
Gharrar can be averted if i) both the price and the subject matter are known to be in 
existence, ii) if their characteristics are known, iii) if their amount is determined, iv) 
if the parties have such control over them as to make sure that the exchange shall 
take place and v) if the date of future performance is defined.”160 
So in summary the following three conditions can be used as a guideline on how to 
avoid gharrar
161
: first of all there should be no want of knowledge (jahl) regarding 
the existence of the exchanged counter values. Secondly there should be no want of 
knowledge regarding the characteristics of the exchanged counter values or the 
identification of their species or knowledge of their quantities or of the date of future 
performance, if any. And third control of the parties over the exchanged counter 
values should be effective. 
From an ethical point and Maqasid Sharia point of view the reason for banning 
Gharrar is simply to give both the parties the opportunity to trade on equal terms, it 
need not be that the parties have to have exactly the same position for that would 
render the concept of competitive trading completely null and void and leave Islamic 
finance ill-suited to modern day finance. The point is to provide justice to both 
parties and avoid exploitation of any one particular party. Thus any transaction or 
financial instrument that falls foul of the provision of Gharar will be deemed as 
haram (illegal and impermissible) in the eyes of Sharia. For the modern day IFI’s to 
ensure that such a transaction does not occur has to be a top priority, however it is 
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also asserted that for modern day IFI to function and compete at an international 
level the temptation to introduce Gharrar based instruments is very high as the rest 
of their competition in the conventional financial industry employ future based 
transactions like derivatives in one way or the other, which have proven to be 
extremely profitable for the banks. It is thus argued that IFI’s need to be extra 
careful to ensure that they do not follow such practices as they are outside the ambit 
of the sharia provisions regarding finance and will surely fall foul of the Maqasid of 
the prohibition. The need is to follow a Islamic moral economic model which 
embodies the basic principles and tenets of Sharia.  
13. Conclusion 
It is thus argued in light of the foregone discussion regarding both Riba and Gharar 
and the strict conditions of the law of contract under sharia, that a regulatory and 
governance system for IFI’s which does not take into account these specifities of 
Islamic finance cannot be deemed suitable for the Islamic finance industry. It is 
actually of essence that the services and products that IFI’s offer are based purely on 
the basis of the Islamic law of contract(s) and ensure that no transaction has any 
element of Riba or Gharar. The principles of Islamic law are immutable and must 
remain so if Islamic financial industry has to succeed.  Just like the general laws of 
Sharia, the specific issues surrounding the enforcement of contracts is an issue of 
great importance for IFI’s to successfully operate as ‘Islamic’. Therefore the 
adherence to maqasid al Sharia are deemed to be fundamental for the success of a 
regulatory framework which seeks to be sharia compliant as well as be flexible to 
adapt to modern day finance architecture.  
However it is argued that one of the major hurdles for any one IFI specifically or the 
whole Islamic finance industry in general will be the recognition of the specific 
59 
 
forms of Islamic contracts or financial instruments based on the Islamic contracts in 
the international regulatory context. Without this recognition IFI’s as an industry 
may never achieve their full potential. In the current regulatory framework for the 
IFI’s in the non-Islamic countries, it is very unlikely that national regulators or the 
judiciary are going to recognize contracts based on sharia and therein lays a major 
source of contention for the Islamic finance industry. On the other hand the 
substance over form debate is at the heart of regulatory and governance debate for 
IFI’s and the issues of recognition of sharia based contracts lies at the heart of this 
debate too. The focus of the whole industry and their stakeholders including the 
governing and regulatory bodies should be on a principle based framework which 
encapsulates the Maqasid and Maslalha frameworks so that the IFI’s are allowed 
some flexibility to devise their own operations, systems, supervision, strategy, 
reporting, management, product development etc. competitively and according to the 
local laws but the over sight of the implementation/ enforcement of the sharia 
principles is made the top priority by both the local regulators and the Islamic 
financial industry itself. This, it is latter argued, can only be done if the local 
regulators accept, understand and facilitate in applying the basic principles of 
Islamic finance or allow the international standard setting bodies for Islamic finance 
like IFSB and AAOIFI to enforce these principles, since without this enforcement 
capabilities of either the local regulator or the international standard setting 
authorities the whole Islamic finance industry faces major systemic risks. It is thus 
being argued that the Islamic finance industry needs to move towards a more 
principle based regulatory framework where the responsibility of ensuring sharia 
compliance is made the responsibility of an international supra national regulatory 
body. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE ISLAMIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSINESS ETHICS, LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
1 Introduction : Islamic business ethics 
 Islamic business ethics and the related law stem from the basic premise that 
business activity is considered to be a socially useful function leading to better social 
and economic conditions for society. Thus, any business activity that is deemed 
harmful towards the achievement of societal benefit is banned or restricted. The 
importance attached to business activity and its surrounding regulatory jurisprudence 
in a society dominated by Muslims is attributable to the fact that the Prophet 
Muhammad was involved in trading for much of his life; he and his early followers 
attached great importance to views relating to consumption, ownership, goals of a 
business enterprise and the code of conduct of various business agents.
162
 
Whilst Islamic teaching regarding business activity is wholesome in the sense that it 
supplies a practical life program, it is also important to note that the Islamic 
socioeconomic system includes detailed coverage of specific economic variables 
such as interest, taxation, circulation of wealth, fair trading and consumption.
163
 
Sharia (Islamic law) is derived from the Qur'an and sunnah, and covers business and 
buyer-seller, employer-employee and borrower-lender relationships in depth, with 
even the most elaborate details of business and commercial activity having been 
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dealt with in Islamic literature.
164
 It follows that sharia acts as the governing source 
of business ethics, commerce, finance, law and economic norms for all adherents of 
Islam, whether these are individuals or society as a whole. 
Further, Rossauw asserts that because Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all closely 
related there are in fact many ethical principles that apply to businesses (such as 
honesty, trustworthiness and taking care of the less fortunate) that have come to 
form the basis of almost all laws and codes regulating business activity, whether 
they be for financial services, trade, shipping or any other commercially motivated 
activity. However, even though modern day western business practices follow the 
traditional ethical ethos laid down by religious teachings, Rossauw believes the 
church should have no role in economic systems as it is not within the purview of 
the church to condemn or approve any one particular system or practice, something 
which has been followed in neoliberal business ethics.
165
 This completely contrasts 
Islamic understanding of business ethics. 
In practice, this means that western neoliberal business ethics and practices are 
different from the Islamic approach insofar as the whole socioeconomic system is 
based on religious teachings as derived from the Qu’ran alongside the teachings and 
sayings of the Prophet Mohamad. Rossauw further asserts that because economic 
systems are morally ambiguous, Christians should be encouraged to ‘keep a critical 
distance from the economic system in which they are working’.166 
On account of Islamic business ethics and the business related provisions of sharia 
being derived from a strict religious source, the overall architecture of Islamic 
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business and economic activities maintains a careful balance between satisfying the 
needs of the individual along with those of society.
167
 Islam not only allows people 
to satisfy all their needs, but actually encourages profit making concurrent to 
ensuring that profit maximisation is carried out as a useful social activity rather than 
out of greed. Indeed, it is this basic human urge of greed and selfish pursuit of 
profits that Islamic business ethics and sharia counters by having laid down a very 
elaborate system of taxation and charity at the macro level. Further, these have 
instituted a system of best practices in the form of a three tiered system of Haram 
(things and activities that are prohibited), Makroh (things and activities that are 
allowed but discouraged) and Halal (things or activities that are encouraged and 
allowed), as mentioned in chapter two.
168
 In this manner, Islamic law and ethics 
relating to business activity remain morally and practically significant at both 
individual and societal level. At the same time, it maintains integrity and practicality 
as an economic system, which is adaptable with time and transcends geographical 
and jurisdictional boundaries, something which is of utmost importance for the 
modern day Islamic financial system.
169
 
 One of the main objectives of the Islamic economic system is to set up a ‘moral 
filter’ whereby all economic decisions being taken by private individuals and 
governmental/public bodies are gauged against a set of normative moral values, after 
which it is decided whether that particular practice should be allowed in an ‘Islamic’ 
society or from a sharia point of view.
170
 This gives Islamic economic and business 
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ethics an advantage over their conventional counterparts in the context of individual 
decision making and practical manifestation of religious values, since such values 
can be traced back to a predetermined set of principles and edicts derived from either 
the Qu’ran or the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad.171 Accordingly, Islamic 
business ethics and practices are both flexible and certain, an elusive quality that is 
much sought after in conventional business ethics and one that can be attributed to 
the acceptance of religious values as a part of a socioeconomic system, rather than 
discarding religious ethos completely.
172
 Nonetheless, it remains an issue of great 
importance for Islamic financial institutions that they have a uniform system of 
values that are not restricted to jurisdictions where sharia is deemed a main source 
of law but are capable of international adherence by Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. If the Islamic financial industry is to compete and succeed in face of intense 
competition from conventional financial institutions, such values are imperative. 
The goals espoused by Islamic business ethos are not primarily materialist; they are 
based on principles of human well-being, the pursuit of socioeconomic justice, 
pursuit of a common good (public good or public welfare) for society and a pursuit 
of a good and fulfilled life, an ideology which can be traced back to the concept of 
Maslaha. All of these stress the humane aspect of all socioeconomic activities 
whereby harmony and balance can be achieved between that which is considered 
worldly and that which is considered divine and spiritual.
173
 In essence, it can be 
said that in Islam, it is ethics that dominate economics and not vice versa.
174
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There is thus a deep ideological divide between Islamic economics and a neoliberal 
capitalist ideology. An example of the divide between the two views can be seen in 
free market capitalist economies wherein the free market uses market determined 
prices as a filtering mechanism to distribute resources. The use of the price system 
alone, however, can frustrate the realisation of socioeconomic goals.
175
 This can be 
attributed to neoliberal economic thought whereby the markets are thought to be 
inherently perfect and are considered the best possible allocators of resources 
amongst a society.
176
 However, neoliberal economics are silent regarding the very 
complex and intensely deep question regarding the role of human behaviour in a free 
market economy where the markets are left to regulate themselves (something which 
is problematic from the Islamic business ethos point of view owing to the 
presumption that all men and women are naturally committed to ‘good’).177 This 
starting point about human commitment to ‘good’ is the reason why an Islamic 
economic system believes in mandatory charity and associates a very high rank in 
this world and the life hereafter for those who are voluntarily charitable.
178
 If this 
presumption is taken as the basis of the Islamic economic ethos and belief system, 
then the divide between neoliberal free market economy proponents and the Islamic 
system becomes deeper and impossible to bridge. 
 This basic divide can be seen manifesting itself in another way; if the overall aims 
and pursuits of the western neoliberal free market economic system are profit 
maximisation and the blind pursuit of profit, then this would mean that the whole 
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system is based on assumption that those who can exploit the given resources to best 
suit their needs and wants will do so with little regard to the needs of others. In 
simpler terms, one would not be wrong to say that the system is predicated on 
greed.
179
 Conversely, the aforementioned raison d'être of the Islamic economic 
system is the pursuance of a system which works towards a more socially and 
economically just society with very well sorted and established values and 
principles.
180
 These values and principles are looked at as mandatory for the whole 
of society and thus formulate both the macro and micro level economic and business 
policy(s) in any given society.
181
 This contemporary argument of the whole raison 
d’etre being socio economic and distributive justice is in essence the idea of 
Maqasid al Sharia of the Islamic economic system being the driving force behind 
many of the socio economic normative values, which is being argued in this thesis, 
ought to also be practised in Islamic finance. 
Nevertheless, when writing about the free market and Islamic business ethics Chapra 
categorically states that although in some respects there may seem to be no inherent 
conflict amongst Islamic principles and the free market system, there is a caveat. 
The Islamic world view which allows the free market to be established, only does so 
providing that the market itself is not reliant only on price mechanisms and the 
supply and demand of goods and services as the sole theoretical contrivances of the 
free market. These mechanisms have to be predicated on the requirement that every 
decision that is taken in a free market is gauged according to a ‘moral filter’, thereby 
eroding the pure neoliberal capitalistic claim that the market should be left to 
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regulate itself.
182
 The other reason for the Islamic economic system adopting a moral 
filter is so that the resources are allocated in a just, fair and equitable manner and not 
left solely to the mercy of market forces.
183
 According to Siddiqi, this moral filter 
will ensure that resources are allocated in such a way so that the necessities are 
catered for before the luxuries and thus basic distributive justice is ensured for the 
society.
184
 
According Keynes had observed that: 
the needs of human beings may seem to be insatiable…[T]hey fall into two classes: 
those needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation 
of our fellow human beings may be, and those which are relative ones in the sense 
that their satisfaction lifts us above or makes us feel superior to others. Needs of the 
second class, which satisfy the desire for superiority, may indeed be insatiable; for 
the higher the general level, the higher still are they. But this is not so true of the 
absolute needs.
185
  
 
By contrast, some Islamic jurists have categorised goods into the following classes: 
categories of necessities (daruriyyat), conveniences (hayiyyat) and refinements 
(tahsiniyyat) which would fall into Keynes' first class of needs.
186
 These may be any 
of the goods and services which fulfil a need or reduce a hardship and make a real 
difference in human well-being.
187
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Chapra goes further in making a distinction between ‘comforts’ and ‘luxuries’ (the 
second class of needs), believing that the latter are merely ‘goods and services 
derived for their snob appeal and make no difference to a person’s well-being’ and 
must therefore be placed at the very end of the hierarchical order so that resource 
allocation is made in a just and equitable way.
188
 
Galbraith refers to this second class of needs as ‘wants.’189 It is this classification in 
Islamic teachings that guides Islamic business ethics in determining which activities 
are to be allowed, which are allowed but discouraged, and those activities which are 
absolutely prohibited. This basic classification allows for the basic principles of 
Islam to be applied to the economic and business sphere of a Muslim’s life. This in 
essence is also the Maqasid of the classification of wants and needs under Islamic 
jurisprudence to ensure that focus is kept on materialistic aspects which are deemed 
necessary and materialistic aspects which are deemed merely luxuries so that at the 
Macro level the distribution of wealth is carried out justly.  
 
2. Objectives and aims of an Islamic economic and financial system  
Basing the Islamic economic system on the main principles of Islam and relying on 
the specific Maqasid al sharia for economic and commerce at a macro level means 
that the objectives of the modern day Islamic financial industry and what any 
Islamic financial institution should be normatively following at any given time can 
be consistently and certainly established. Below are some of these main objectives 
of the Islamic economic system: 
a. Achievement of falah (welfare) 
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 The first and the foremost aim of Islam is the achievement of falah (the well-being 
of the mankind in this world and in the next). The concept of falah can be derived 
directly from the Qur’an in the following passages: ‘Our Lord! Give unto us in the 
world that which is good and in the Hereafter that which is good, and guard us from 
the doom of fire…’190 and ‘establishing salat and just economic order of zakat and 
believing in the Hereafter’191 and ‘following the Messenger, honouring him, 
supporting him and following the Light (i.e. the Qu’ran) that was revealed to 
him.’192 Furthermore, ‘seeking the means to be in the good graces of Allah and 
striving hard in His way’;193 ‘striving hard with one’s life and wealth in the way of 
Allah’;194 ‘refraining from intoxicants, gambling and games of chance, sacrificing 
animals on stones i.e. altars of idols and idolatrous practices, and divining of the 
future by such means as arrows, raffles and omens’;195 and finally by ‘making the 
balance of good deeds heavier than the bad deeds’.196 
Thus, it can be seen from the Qu’ranic verses that the Islamic concept of falah is a 
very comprehensive, multi-layered concept as it refers to spiritual, moral and 
socioeconomic well-being in this world and success in the Hereafter. The first layer 
can be taken as the micro level; at this level falah refers to a situation where an 
individual is adequately provided for in respect of his basic needs, and enjoys 
necessary freedom and leisure to work for his spiritual and material advancement 
within the confines of the Islamic teachings. The second layer can be taken as the 
macro level, aiming at establishment of an egalitarian and successful society with a 
clean environment free from want and with opportunities for its members to progress 
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in socio-political and religious affairs.
197
 In short, at the macro level, Muslims hold 
that society should be working towards achieving a common and public good. This 
concept of welfare and the public/common good of the individual and society are not 
only restricted to economic prosperity but other equally important aspects as well 
such as moral, cultural and socio-political advancement.
198
 
The concept of falah (viewed strictly in the economic field) is an overarching feature 
of Islamic teaching regarding economics and business, principally referring to 
material well-being of the citizens of an Islamic state.
199
 The economic system of 
Islam, therefore, aims to achieve economic well-being and betterment of the people 
through equitable distribution of material resources and through establishment of a 
socially and economically just system.
200
 Nevertheless, the basic objective of an 
Islamic system remains the same, which has been clearly laid down by the Qur’an 
thusly: [b]ut seek with [the wealth] which God has bestowed on thee, the home of 
the Hereafter, nor neglect thy portion in this world, but do thou good as God has 
been good to thee and seek not mischief in the land, for God loves not those who do 
mischief.’201 Therefore, the concept of falah can be taken as the one main aim or the 
basic Maqasid that all other principles and teachings regarding Islamic injunctions 
about economics and business strive to achieve. The conceptual counterpart of the 
word falah in western teaching regarding economics and business can be loosely 
translated to encompass the concept of welfare (and to an extent socioeconomic 
welfare of society), something which can only be achieved through fair and 
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equitable distribution of wealth; enforcing policies and actions that lead to 
distributive (economic) justice for society.
202
 
Thus the Qu’ran says:  
[T]he Alms is meant only for the poor and the needy and those who are in charge 
thereof, whose hearts are to be reconciled: and free those in bondage, and to help 
those burdened with debt, and for expenditure in the way of God and for the way 
farer. This is an obligation form God. God is all knowing, all wise.
203
  
This particular verse shows that the Maqasid  of acquiring wealth in Islamic 
economics is to ensure that it is used for helping others (if one can do so) so that 
there is general prosperity in society and an increase in welfare of the people in that 
society.
204
 Consequently, this should remain as the main aim of a financial system 
espousing the principles of sharia and should be ensured via prudential regulatory 
and governance standards for all individual IFIs and stakeholders involved. 
b. Fair and Equitable distribution: justice (adalah) 
In Islamic teaching, if there was one principle to be considered the overarching edict 
regarding socioeconomic aspects, that one principle would be justice (adalah).
205
 
Islamic teaching views social and economic injustice as inherently abhorrent and the 
main focus of all schools of thought regarding economic and social policy in Islam 
tends toward the eradication of inequity, injustice, exploitation and oppression.
206
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This aim is considered absolute and impassable and must also form a part of the 
wider Maqasid al Sharia of all economic activities allowed by Sharia.  
However, there are two sides of the concept of justice in Islam - one is the concept 
of individualism whereby every man must strive for what he can (the Qu’ran itself 
says: ‘... no bearer of burdens can bear the burdens of another...[M]an can have 
nothing but what he strives for...’).207 The reason the Qu’ran is this clear about this 
particular feature is that it also aims to encourage each member of society to make 
an individual effort for their own betterment so that the whole society prospers. 
Conversely, Islam also propagates a very elaborate and demanding notion of social 
cohesion amongst people in society.
208
 Thus, if both of these supposedly opposing 
concepts of individualism and societal cohesion are combined, the Islamic 
socioeconomic model becomes very clear. According to the concept of justice 
(adalah) then, people may acquire wealth but must not use any immoral and/or 
illegal means like cheating or lying in doing so, this also means that man must not 
exploit an unwary or weaker party by virtue of his better bargaining position. 
Further, one must hold true to their words towards others, even if the other does not 
have the capacity to enforce a contract or agreement. This is because since a promise 
or contract made to another man is made in the presence of God himself, the 
breaking of such a promise and contract will amount to the cheating and betrayal of 
not only the other party but also of God.
209
 
 The Islamic principle of justice operates in every sphere of human activity, be it 
legal, social, political or economic. The Islamic economic system is in fact based 
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upon the principle of justice which governs all the basic aspects of the economy like 
production, distribution, consumption and exchange.
210
 
In the sphere of production, the Islamic principle of justice ensures that nobody is 
exploited by another and that nobody acquires wealth by unjust, unfair, unlawful or 
fraudulent means. The followers of Islam are allowed to acquire wealth only through 
just and fair means.
211
 Islam sanctions the right of every individual to earn his 
livelihood, acquire wealth, own property and live a comfortable life.
212
 However, it 
does not allow that people should amass wealth through bribery, corruption, 
embezzlement, stealing, gambling, trade in narcotics, exploitation, interest, fraud, 
hoarding, prostitution, malpractices in business, immoral professions or through 
other unjust and forbidden methods.
213
 
In the field of distribution, the Islamic principle of justice plays the most vital role. 
One of the greatest contributions of Islam as a social and economic system to 
humanity is the ensuring of just and equitable distribution of wealth among the 
people. Justice in distribution - commonly understood by reference to the concepts 
of economic justice, social justice or distributive justice - demands that economic 
resources should be distributed among the members of the community so that on the 
one hand the gulf between the rich and the poor should be bridged, and on the other 
everyone should be provided with the basic necessities of life.
214
 Islam discourages 
the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few and ensures its circulation in the 
community; not only through moral education and training, but also through 
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effective legal measures.
215
 It is to ensure this distribution of wealth that Islamic 
teaching accentuates by having established an elaborate system of sadaqat (charity), 
zakat (obligatory almsgiving) and voluntary almsgiving along with the laws of 
inheritance (which help to ensure the distribution of wealth among the larger and 
more affluent sections of society).
216
 This is why Islamic finance as an industry 
needs to cohesively incorporate the ideology of distributive justice, insofar as it is 
possible, into the industry’s dealings at the micro level, whilst the regulatory 
authorities and standard-setting bodies do the same at the macro level when devising 
regulatory and governance frameworks for IFIs. If this is undertaken, the industry 
can function in the true spirit of Islamic economic justice.  
 From a purely economic point of view the most important objective of the economic 
system of Islam is to distribute economic resources, wealth and income fair and 
equitably.
217
 This concept can be taken as a derivative of the falah principle, refined 
specifically to how falah (welfare) can be achieved in an economic system. It is on 
the basis of fair and equitable wealth distribution that Islam discourages the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the few and ensures its circulation amongst 
all sections of society. The Qur’an says: ‘[t]hat which Allah giveth as spoil unto His 
messenger from the people of the townships, it is for Allah and His messenger and 
for the near of kin and the orphans and the needy and the wayfarer that it becomes 
not a commodity between the rich among you.’218 
This means that, according to the Qur’an, wealth should not be allowed to 
concentrate in few rich hands, rather it should freely circulate among all the people 
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thus enabling the poor and destitute among the nation to also take benefit from it.
219
 
Thus, it is the primary objective of the Islamic economic system to bridge the gulf 
between the rich and the poor by modifying the distribution of wealth and economic 
resources in favour of the less fortunate. 
 This circulation of wealth can be achieved by: distribution of wealth in the form of 
zakat and ushr (Taxes on assets), voluntary distribution in the form of Sadkah and 
donations (Charity),
220
 and the distribution of property of a deceased person after his 
death (inheritance laws)
221
 or through more positive actions like investing into 
business ventures such as Musharakah (partnerships) Mudarabah (agency) or bay 
(sale),
222
, ensuring that wealth remains in circulation under all circumstances and is 
not hoarded. 
The jurisprudential reason for imposing this wealth tax on the rich can be traced 
back to the concept of khilafah (trusteeship, which will be discussed later) since the 
basic consideration is that the rich of the society are not the real owners of wealth , 
they are merely trustees, and the actual owner of all resources is God himself. Thus, 
as the trustees of the wealth in society the rich must spend in accordance with the 
terms set out by the ‘real’ owner. One of the terms of the trust bestowed upon the 
rich of the society is to use the wealth to help others who are in need of it.
223
 
According to Gillian Rice ‘[t]he word "zakah" means purification and as such, 
income redistribution is not only an economic necessity but also a means to spiritual 
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salvation ("…of their wealth take alms so that you might purify and sanctify." 
Qur'an 9:103)’.224 Therefore, economics is effectively integrated with ethics.225 
Another aspect of the concept of justice (adalah) in Islam is the prohibition on 
usurious dealing called riba 
226
 as has been discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter. This prohibition is predicated on the concept that usury leads to both unjust 
distribution of wealth and exploitation by a stronger party of a weaker party, thus 
leading to an extortionist attitude by the lenders and the hoarding of resources.
227
 
The concept of distributive justice forms the central ideology of an Islamic financial 
system to ensure that both society and individual actors in the state guarantee the 
well-being of the poor, whilst simultaneously balancing the societal point of view 
(the enforcement of zakat and charitable donations etc.) with the more individualistic 
approach. As a result, individuals are encouraged to earn a livelihood and be 
entrepreneurial in order to pursue economic goals whilst remaining within the 
ethical, moral and legal boundaries of Islamic teaching.
228
 Thus, it would not be 
wrong to say that the Islamic economic system is entrepreneurial, yet has very strong 
ethical and moral limitations, making it necessary that the regulatory and governance 
framework is able to balance these two positions at both an individual and industry 
level; something which neoliberal regulatory and governance regimes do not and are 
thus deemed unsuitable for devising a regulatory or governance framework for IFI’s. 
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c. Promotion of brotherhood and unity 
Another objective of the Islamic economic system is to establish brotherhood and 
unity among Muslims.
229
 The Qu’ran says:  
It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces to the East and the West; but righteous 
is he who believeth in Allah and the Last Day and the Angels and the Scripture and 
the Prophets; and giveth his wealth, for love of Him, to kinsfolk and to orphans and 
the needy and the wayfarer and to those who ask, and to set slaves free; and observe 
the proper worship and pay the Zakat.
230
  
Again, the Qu’ran enjoins upon its followers: ‘They ask thee, (O Muhammad), what 
they shall spend. Say: That which ye spend for good (must go) to parents and near 
kindred and orphans and the needy and the wayfarer. And whatsoever good ye do, 
Lo! Allah is aware of it’.231 Thus, by instructing  the wealthy to pay zakat and spend 
for their poorer parents, relatives, orphans and the needy, Islam lays the foundations 
of fellow-feeling, brotherhood, friendship and love amongst all the members of 
Muslim society (the Ummah).  
Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim writes: ‘Islam desires to mould the economic life of 
society in such a manner that antagonistic class divisions of millionaires and paupers 
shall not come into existence’.232 Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad in his book ‘Economics 
of Islam’ writes, after discussing the injunctions of the Qu’ran regarding prayer and 
zakat, that   
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[t]he brotherhood of man is not realised only by bowing together of the ruler and the 
subject, the lord and the peasant, the factory-owner and the wage-earner shoulder to 
shoulder before One God, but is established on a firm foundation even outside a 
mosque where the king and the lord and the factory-owner are made jointly 
responsible for the elementary necessities of life of the subject and the peasant and 
the wage-earner.
233
  
Mr. M. A. Mannan writes: ‘Salat (prayer) rouses the feeling of equality and 
brotherhood between the rich and the poor, the high and the low, and zakat puts that 
feeling of brotherhood on a firm footing by making the rich and the capitalists 
responsible for the maintenance of the poor and the needy.’234 Thus, it is clear that 
the achievement of brotherhood is another aim that the Islamic finance industry must 
strive to achieve and is in essence the extension of the Maqasid al Sharia of the 
Islamic economic system  
 
d. Achievement of Moral and Material Development 
The modern day economic system of Islam aims (the Maqasid ) to achieve a two 
pronged outcome: a material as well as moral development of the Muslim 
community.
235
 It achieves this objective through its system of taxation and fiscal 
management, particularly through zakat. The other way is through ensuring that 
financial intermediaries such as banks and financial institutions engage as many 
stakeholders as possible in financial and business activities through investments, 
sales and contracts.
236
 It is in this regard that it is felt that IFIs form a major part of 
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modern day financial and economic architecture for Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike, providing an alternative to mainstream interest free banking.
237
 
As already mentioned one major reason for instituting a system of zakat is to 
discourage the hoarding of wealth and encouraging its circulation. Those persons 
who possess hoarded wealth know that if they were to keep it, it would be consumed 
by zakat. Consequently, they would not keep it lying idle, rather they would forcibly 
bring it into circulation by investment or expenditure.  
Accordingly, such consumption and investment would then have a multiplier effect 
on the growth of the national income. Taxes like zakat are a progressive tax which 
means that they are levied only on those who can afford to pay a proportion of their 
wealth to those needier than them; when it is collected from the rich and given to 
those more deserving it spurs spending, this in turn pushes the economic engine 
forward and the wealth circulates.
238
 The Qu’ran perhaps refers to this situation 
when it compares usury and zakat and pronounces ‘[t]hat which ye give in usury in 
order that it may increase on [other] people’s property hath no increase with Allah; 
but that which ye give in charity, seeking Allah’s countenance, hath increase 
manifold’.239  It is thus argued that by analogy, the modern day Islamic finance 
industry ought to be carrying out the same ideological function of ensuring the 
circulation of wealth whilst maintaining the moral standards espoused by sharia and 
contemporary Islamic economic literature. Accordingly, as with the collection of 
zakat and other taxes, IFIs as an industry need to be regulated in such a way that the 
focus is on results and outcomes whilst also concentrating on the basic principles of 
Islamic economics and sharia. 
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At a philosophical level, zakat and a system of voluntary alms also helps in moral 
and spiritual development of Muslim society. The reason behind this seems to be 
embodied in the motivation of sacrifice; sacrificing one’s own need for the 
betterment of the society and others who are more needing, thus ensuring a just and 
equitable distribution of wealth.
240
 This is something which the conventional 
business concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), stakeholder theories and 
business ethics embody as well.
241
 Islam promotes sentiments of sacrifice, love, 
goodness of heart and mutual cooperation. The Qu’ran says: “[a]nd likeness of those 
who spend their wealth, seeking to please Allah and to strengthen their souls, is as a 
garden, high and fertile…’242. Payment of zakat and voluntary alms purifies the 
human soul of vices like greed, miserliness and selfishness, thus promoting a truly 
stakeholder oriented society wherein all persons (natural as well as artificial) are 
socially responsible. 
 
3.  Basic principles of Islam 
In perusing the main aims (the Maqasid) of the Islamic economic system, a major 
focus has to be on the basic principles of Islam and sharia so that a proper Islamic 
economic system is instituted in both substance and form. As Islamic finance is a 
part of wider Islamic teachings, which deal with the social and economic aspects of 
society and is governed by the basic principles of Islamic teachings in general,  it is 
imperative to understand how these basic principles effect the Islamic financial 
industry in modern times.  Furthermore, if a unified governance and regulatory 
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framework for the Islamic financial industry is to be determined, the basic principles 
of Islamic teachings will form an integral part of such an attempt. Some of the 
principles of the Islam, as laid down by the Qur’an and the sunnah, are discussed as 
follows. 
 
a. Tawhid 
One of the main features of Islamic teachings is the concept of tawhid (the unity of 
God), which also renders itself as an integral part of philosophy in Islamic laws 
regarding business and ethics.
243
  This is where the concept of the Tawhidi 
framework is derived from and thus forms a coherent ideological basis for the 
functioning of the Islamic finance industry. The basic premise of tawhid is 
predicated upon the symbolic relationship that man has with God and his creations, 
including other human beings.
244
 For Muslims relying on tawhid means, in essence, 
surrendering to the will of God and doing as one has been instructed by him and his 
revealed words through the Qu’ran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. 
The concept of pure surrender to the divinity of God is a common aspect in all 
monotheistic religions,
245
 whereas in Islamic teaching this goes further in 
elaborating this concept of surrender. Islam teaches man to apply Islamic edicts to 
all aspects of a man’s life; this includes his relations with other human beings 
because the relationship with the other human beings are considered an extension of 
man’s servitude to God himself.246 This can further be explained by looking to the 
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teachings of the Qu’ran and the Prophet Muhammad, which urge all human beings 
to deal with others in a fair and just manner.
247
  Therefore, Islam is itself a 
manifestation of unity (tawhid) because it provides a practical guide of doing things 
as between man and God and also between man and other human beings. It follows 
that tawhid in Islam can be seen as actually meaning that there ought to be a unity of 
ideas and actions in a person’s actions, existence and consciousness.248 This gives 
Islamic teaching relating to any particular subject a very practical outlook and thus 
encompasses both actions and intentions. Siddiqi explains that the fact that man is 
made accountable to God for all his deeds in Islamic teachings adds an additional 
factor of accountability and checks for the smooth running of society in accordance 
with set principles and values.
249
 Tawhid  also thus means that the relationships 
between human beings (inclusive of social and economic relations) is as sacred as 
the relationship between man and God.  
Gillian Rice states that ‘[i]n this sense, unity is a coin with two faces: one implies 
that God is the sole creator of the universe and the other implies that people are 
equal partners or that each person is a brother or sister to the other. As far as 
business is concerned, this means cooperation and equality of effort and 
opportunity’.250 
Hassanuzzaman has very clearly defined the relationship of ethics with the concept 
of tawhid in saying: 
 
Islamic ethics [are] expressed in terms of the immanent presence of God in earthly 
affairs of man. His (God’s) omnipotence imbues materially reality with normative 
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content. Both God’s law expressed in the Quran and the Sunna and the objective 
circumstances in which man must strive to obey them are divinely ordained.
251
  
There is thus a focus on both the divine nature as well as practical aspects of Islamic 
law. It is therefore argued in this thesis that Tawihid being the guiding principle of 
Islamic law and Jurisprudence can form the outline of what has been called the 
Tawihidi Framework for Islamic finance and economics
252
, which in essence 
encapsulates the idea that all economic and finance activity is taken as a religious 
duty as much as a commercial or business activity
253
 and thus all such economic and 
commercial activity must be in line with the basic principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence as defined under the Maqasid and Maslaha ideals. 
 
b. Trusteeship (khilafah)  
Another unique concept in Islamic teaching which affects traditions in economics 
and business is that of trusteeship (khilafah), which establishes that people are, in 
essence, considered as trustees of the earth’s resources on behalf of God himself.254 
This would mean that everything that humans own materialistically is actually the 
property of God and that man is to use these resources according to the directions of 
God. In Islamic teaching, trusteeship would also mean the use of resources by man 
in his capacity as a steward of God, thus allowing the use of the resources according 
to the teaching of the Qu’ran and the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad.255 From an 
economic point of view, this can be translated to mean that man is free to use the 
resources bestowed upon him, as long as there is no conflict between what he does 
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and the established Islamic edicts and principles espoused in the Qu’ran and the 
sunnah.
256
 Consequently, there is no prohibition on owning private property and no 
restriction of any economic initiative that one may desire to undertake, so long as 
there is recognition of the fact that prosperity and wealth creation is not an end in 
itself and is rather just a means towards a better, socio-politically just society.
257
 
Siddiqi is of the view that in Islam, if the intention is correct, then all economic 
activity can be given the status of worship.
258
 
 Another way of looking at the concept of trusteeship is to look at how resources 
may be disposed of. If it is done justly and fairly so that everyone’s interest is 
safeguarded and taken into account, it is considered the right way according to 
Islamic edicts and teachings. Islam is against any lavish spending and any wastage 
of resources; no one is allowed to waste the resources bestowed upon man by God as 
a trust.
259
 This concept of anti-conspicuous consumptions and sensible resource 
allocation has resonance in modern day environmental laws, stakeholder theory, 
CSR, western and Islamic business ethics as well as many other concepts in their 
respective corporate laws across the globe. This point shall be further elaborated 
upon in criticising the neoliberal profit maximizing approach to governance.
260
 
According to Gillian Rice, ‘[t]rusteeship is akin to the concept of sustainable 
development’, an assertion that is further explored by a study conducted by the 
UNDP which states that ‘[m]odels of sustainable development do not regard natural 
resources as a free good, to be plundered at the free will of any nation, any 
generation or any individual’.261 Thus, it is argued that this concept forms a major 
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ideological building block for an Islamic financial system both at the macro and 
micro level and must be taken into account when devising a regulatory and 
governance framework for Islamic financial institutions. 
 
c. Economic freedom  
Whilst Islamic teachings are focused mainly on societal well-being in the 
socioeconomic sphere, there is nonetheless very strong encouragement of the 
individual pursuit of economic interests. This individual freedom is backed by the 
assertion that every individual, according to Islam, is accountable for his actions 
done in this world.
262
 One would be rewarded for their good actions and punished 
for any evil actions in the Hereafter. It is this accountability for individual actions 
which forms the basis of every Muslim’s faith, meaning such accountability is 
rendered meaningless if the individual is not provided with reasonable freedom to 
act independently.
263
 Thereupon, Islam not only encourages individual freedom in 
the economic sphere, but makes it mandatory for all able-bodied men and women to 
carry out economically useful activities. Islam thus places the highest value on an 
individual’s freedom of action in every field of human activity such as social, 
political, economic, religious and moral acts. 
The Islamic principle of economic freedom means that an individual has been 
allowed the liberty by God to earn wealth, own it, enjoy it and spend it as ordained 
by Islamic teachings.
264
 It also allows freedom to adopt any profession, business or 
vocation to earn a livelihood, as long as these professions do not conflict with the 
basic moral, social, legal and ethical codes laid down in the Qu’ran and the 
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Hadith.
265
 The biggest restriction on this individual freedom is the conceptual and 
practical distinction between halal (lawful) and haram (unlawful) as laid down in 
the Qu’ran and the Hadith.266 In the field of production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption, only halal means are permitted. An individual remaining within the 
restrictions of halal and haram can therefore enjoy full freedom to earn and spend 
wealth as he likes.
267
 This concept is ideologically antithetical to neoliberal profit 
maximising norms in the financial and corporate spheres and accordingly would 
cause systemic governance and operational issues if the Islamic finance industry 
were to follow neoliberal norms. 
 Whilst no upper limit or ceiling is imposed on owning properties or holdings or 
profits, personal wealth is held captive by the compulsory taxation levied on those 
who can earn in the form of zakat (obligatory almsgiving). Besides the restrictions of 
halal, haram and zakat for Muslims, there is one more major normative constraint, 
dictating all economic activities (including but not limited to: the pricing of goods, 
ownership of assets, setting up businesses and curtailing monopolies) are carried out 
in order to safeguard the common interest of Muslim community and to pursue a 
common and public good to enhance happiness for the whole of society, an idea that 
can be traced back to the concept of Maslahaha.
268
 This pursuit of public good 
(Maslaha) and furthering the common interest of the Muslim community renders a 
conventional regulatory and governance framework incomplete for the purposes of 
an Islamic finance industry, the argument being that the Islamic finance industry 
needs to be regulated in a manner involving a principle based regulatory regime 
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which encourages maximum participation and welfare of the maximum number of 
stakeholders in society.
269
 The current en vogue conventional regulatory and 
governance paradigm lacks this particular aim and thus needs to be adjusted to cater 
for the Islamic financial industry. It is for this reason that an inquiry into the main 
pillars of the Islamic economic system, along with a consideration of the aims and 
the objectives (which have already been discussed) of an Islamic economic and 
financial system, is needed to better understand what principles and outcomes should 
be expected from a regulatory and governance framework for IFIs and whether those 
frameworks actually correspond to the Maqasid al Shariah and whether they are in 
line with the larger issue of Maslaha( public / common interest) for the society. 
 
4. Fundamental pillars of Islamic business and its economic model 
Before we discuss in detail the most important aspects of Islamic economic laws 
regarding the asset based trading and speculative trading in the next chapters, we 
also need to discuss the other vital pillars of Islamic economics that play an 
important role in formulating an Islamic economic system. Based on Islamic 
teachings and values, the Islamic economic model rests on five other basic pillars 
(excluding the three mentioned above: ban on interest, asset backed transactions and 
ban on speculation). First, the concept of property rights. Second, the obligations 
that derives from contracts and their enforceability. Third, the right to pursue 
individual economic aims. Fourth, the rules regarding attainment and distribution of 
wealth and fifth, the rules regarding risk sharing.
270
 This list of basic pillars is not 
exhaustive since the basis of Islamic economics and finance is the presence of one 
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main aim (the actual Maqasid Al Sharia); the attainment of socioeconomic justice in 
society through economic activity and any other such concepts that may facilitate 
that outcome.
271
 However, for the current thesis the five pillars will be discussed in 
context of how they further the Maqasid of attaining the socio economic justice.   
These pillars of the Islamic economic system are directly derived from the 
aforementioned overarching major principles of tawheed (unity of God), adallah 
(justice), khilafah (trusteeship) and the need for moderation in everything that a 
Muslim does
 
which determine the practical outcome of the Islamic economic 
system.
272
 They are inherently important for both ideological and practical purposes, 
since without proper understanding these basic principles of Islamic economics and 
finance, deriving a principle-and-outcome based governance and regulatory 
framework for IFIs is not possible. The following are the basic pillars of the Islamic 
economy. 
 
i. Pillar one: property rights 
The concept of property in Islamic economic thought is distinct from western 
economic and legal thought. In essence, western economic and legal thought dictates 
that property rights are associated with an exclusive right of possession, disposal and 
ownership of the property to the exclusion of all others.
273
 On the other hand, the 
concept of property rights under Islamic economic thinking (which is derived from 
the principle of khilafah) asserts that Allah is the ultimate owner of all property. 
Man has simply been given a right of possession and the right to create wealth and 
sustain himself through labour and utilisation of the property granted to him by God 
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in line with the rules laid down in Sharia.
274
 This does not mean that the state or a 
government has a direct right in the property of an individual,
275
 but rather the 
concept is more theological and meant as a religious obligation for man to use the 
property as directed by Sharia.
276
 As long as man is using property in line with the 
dictates of sharia, man continues to have a right over that property. This can be seen 
in practice through the application of zaka (obligatory wealth tax) on assets which 
are not being utilised.  
 There is another aspect of this principle of property, related to the ability of man to 
derive his share from the common pool of property, granted to him either through 
transfer and exchange or through his own creative labour.
277
 In essence, Islamic 
teachings lay out that work or labour determines an individual’s right over property, 
whether that be a right of possession or simple enjoyment of the benefits accruing 
from that property. So in sum, all property first belongs to the collective, and then to 
the individual only once they have either performed some form of work or have 
inherited the relevant property.
278
 It can thus be determined that work and labour are 
a prerequisite for having property rights, ensuring that property remains in use and 
wealth is circulated rather than hoarded. Otherwise, zakat is levied on such 
property.
279
 
This concept of property and labour is of direct relevance for the Islamic financial 
industry, since all Islamic financial activity has to be backed by real assets and is 
based on either a partnership model (musharakah), agency model (mudarabah) or a 
sale based transaction (bay). Thus, there is either labour or risk involved in an 
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investment that is part of a financial activity.
280
 The other very important aspects that 
can be ascertained from the concept of property are the rights of the collective; an 
economic activity in line with sharia has to be carried out for the greater public or 
common good of society and not only for individual gain.
281
 The individual who 
takes the risk or performs work on the property takes priority over others with regard 
to the returns from the investment or work. Before that, the property belongs to the 
collective.
282
 This completely conflicts with the neoliberal understanding of property 
and consequently it is argued that this( the difference in conception of property 
rights) is one of the main reasons that the shareholder primacy corporate governance 
model, as well as the profit maximising neoliberal regulatory framework, is ill suited 
to IFIs.  
 
ii. Pillar two: the obligation deriving from contracts 
In Islamic law, the importance of a contractual obligation cannot be overlooked or 
underestimated. It is probably one of the most strictly adhered to principles in 
shariah, specifically in the context of economic and commercial dealings called 
muamalat.
283
 The underlying theme of Islamic teaching regarding contracts is that 
all freely entered into contracts which have not been expressly prohibited by the 
sharia and which are not repugnant to the teachings of the Qu’ran and Hadith are 
allowed to stand and be enforced by a court of law.
284
 
 
iii. Pillar three: the right to pursue individual economic aims 
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Further deriving from the basic Islamic principle of economic freedom, one can 
assert that Islamic teachings do not restrict the individual pursuit of economic goals. 
The caveat is that these goals must be in line with the principles and teachings of 
sharia. The individual’s right to pursue economic goals is subsumed within the main 
body of rights and obligations defined in sharia.
285
 Thus, the individual is first and 
foremost charged with the obligation that he/she owes to God, nature, other human 
beings and then to himself.
286
 Once these obligations are fulfilled the individual is 
granted certain rights. One such right is the freedom to pursue economic goals 
within the limits prescribed by sharia.
287
 Only when this hierarchy of rights and 
obligations are fulfilled can the whole system truly be termed Islamic in letter and 
spirit.
288
 However, once the prerequisites of sharia are fulfilled the individual’s 
pursuit of economic goals is no longer a right; rather it turns into an obligation that 
man owes to himself and society as long as they possess the ability and capacity to 
contribute with labour or capital.
289
 It can hence be observed that Islamic teachings 
and ethics are actually pro-commerce and not anti-commerce, as is generally 
believed. The pursuit of economic interests is actually a part of the faith’s whole 
architecture as well as the socio-economic system under Islamic teaching and 
correspondingly encourages individuals to pursue economic interests for the welfare 
of both society and themselves.
290
 
 
iv. Pillar four: attainment and distribution of wealth  
                                                          
285
 Iqbal and Mirakhor (n 3) 
286
 This Can Be Related To The Stakeholder Theory In Modern Day Corporate Governance 
Literature. It Is Discussed In Detail In Chapter 7 
287
 M Kahf, A Contribution To The Theory Of Consumer Behavior In An Islamic Society In Studies In 
Islamic Economics,’ Ed By K. Ahmad. (International Centre For Research In Islamic Economics, 
King Abdul-Aziz University, Jeddah And Islamic Foundation, Leicester 1981) 
288
 Cizakca (n 218) 
289
 Cizaka (n 218) 
290
 Ghamdi (n 51) 
91 
 
Another of the pillars of Islamic economics is the concept of wealth and the 
subsequent use, distribution and disposal of it.
291
 Whilst Islam encourages man to 
utilise any resources given to him by God in a fair and just manner, the Islamic 
teachings regarding personal wealth go further in delineating how wealth is to be 
acquired and disposed of in a way that is beneficial to the individual as well as 
society.
292
 Wealth is considered to be a ‘good’ for both the individual and society, as 
it is prescribed that wealth is to be utilised for the benefit of both society and the 
community.
293
 However, there are very strict requirements that need to be met when 
earning wealth. For example, what methods can be employed to attain or dispose of 
this wealth, in what proportions and at what time? Such stringency has led to the 
highlighting of professions that are not permitted to gain wealth. Even within the 
professions that are so permitted, the details of how one must conduct their daily 
business in those professions is also highlighted and categorised as haram (not 
permitted), halal (permitted), discouraged but allowed, and recommended and 
allowed.
294
 This is probably one of the main features of modern day Islamic finance 
jurisprudence; Islamic financial institutions have Islamic scholars on their boards 
(the SSB) that decide whether or not to allow a particular transaction by relying on 
these principles. The roots of these principles are very well entrenched in fiqh 
(jurisprudence guided both by the Qu’ran and the Hadith of the Prophet 
Muhammad)
295
 and thus there is very little disagreement regarding these principles 
amongst the scholars, thus normatively bringing in much needed uniformity in 
practice and theory. 
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As discussed above, one very important part of the concept of wealth is that Islamic 
teachings are abhorrent to wealth being hoarded. Teachings of all schools of thought 
require that wealth be circulated by mandatory wealth taxes (zakat), investments 
(business activity) or charity. As has been seen, Islam encourages individuals to 
invest and give freely to the needy to meet this end. This is also one of the reasons 
why there is a very strict ban on charging usury (riba), since Islamic fiqh 
(jurisprudence) has asserted over and over again that usury leads to greed, hoarding 
and exploitation of the weak; all three go against the core teachings of Islam.
296
 In 
summary, the distribution of wealth is the main reason for the ban on riba (usury), 
forming the main stay of the Islamic financial system, and must be made the guiding 
principle for all stakeholders involved in the industry. 
 
v. Pillar five: risk sharing  
 Another pillar that derives its validity from the concept of wealth and justice 
(adalah) is risk sharing. This concept holds that a profit in a business transaction is 
only justified if there is a proportionate risk involved for the profit maker.
297
 Simply 
put, this means that one cannot be expected to make profits without there being any 
liability on his/her behalf.
298
 This concept forms a very important part of modern day 
Islamic jurisprudence regarding Islamic finance as all Islamic financial institutions 
are expected to ensure that they follow this principle whenever they create an 
economic opportunity. Whether this opportunity is gained through granting a simple 
loan or entering into a partnership with another entity, the risk is supposed to be 
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proportionate to the profit being derived.
299
 It follows that scholars like Mulana Taqi 
Usmani are adamant, on the basis of this entrenched requirement of risk sharing 
between the parties, when asserting that the Islamic financial industry must move to 
a more risk sharing based financial system where mudarabah ( agency contracts) 
and musharaka ( pure equity participation contracts) are the main methods of 
financial intermediation with a corresponding shift away from murabaha-based ( 
sale plus mark-up) financial activity, the latter leading to the distortion of risk and 
returns whilst also going against the basic aims of Islamic economic ideology.
300
 
 
5. Factors of production in the Islamic economic system. 
Islamic finance takes the view that a financial system has to be able to adhere to the 
principles of distributive equality for it to be sharia compliant in both letter and 
spirit.
301
 In order to establish such a system, there has to be an analysis of what 
actually contributes to the structure of such a financial system and which factors of 
production are deemed part of the financial system. Once this is determined, the 
overall efficacy of the corporate governance and regulatory model can be observed 
and subsequently scrutinised to determine whether the financial services and 
products being employed by Islamic financial institutions do in fact adhere to these 
principles.  
Factors of production in Islam can thus be determined while keeping in view the 
principles and rules regarding the distribution of wealth according to an Islamic 
business ethos.
302
 As we have discussed, the distribution of wealth has slightly 
different connotations in Islamic jurisprudence than in western economic systems 
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(both the pure capitalistic, neoliberal economic system and the more archaic socialist 
economic system).
303
 According to the Islamic traditions of distributive justice, there 
are two categories of subjects that must benefit from the distribution of wealth which 
may accrue from any economic activity both at the macro (state level) and the micro 
(individual or business level). These two categories are divided not only according 
to how much one contributes, but rather on pre-designated edicts espoused by the 
Qu’ran and the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad. Clearly, western and Islamic 
economic philosophy can be distinguished.
304
 Western economic philosophy 
(primarily, neoliberal pure capitalistic philosophy) only recognises those factors of 
production which contribute in economic or commercial terms, which means that 
particular segments of society with no intrinsic economic value are either not 
recognised in the overall balance sheet, or are recognized but disregarded because of 
their inability to contribute to the overall value by adding to the productivity of 
society.
305
 Consequently, people or ‘assets’ which have nothing to contribute 
economically are given no returns and are not a part of the wealth distribution 
mechanism.  
Adam Smith, the father of modern day capitalism and materialistic economics, 
called capitalism ‘the obvious and simple system of natural liberty’,306 which leads 
to the misnomer that an individual has the right to own private property and can 
pursue self-interest. Thus, the factors of production in capitalism can be divided into 
four categories: capital, land, labour and the entrepreneur.
307
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All of these factors have different meanings than they have in Islam and the fourth is 
not included at all in Islamic ethos.
308
  In capitalism, the entrepreneur is responsible 
for bringing together all of the other factors for the production and generation of 
wealth. He also has the right to own property and accumulate wealth in his hands. 
The emphasis is therefore on individualistic wealth creation and profit making 
through the ‘invisible hand of the market forces’, rather than allowing state power 
(society’s authority) to ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth.309 However, 
as we have observed previously, the Islamic conception of economics, wealth and 
property is very different from a materialistic understanding of these concepts.   
 According to Islam, the real wealth of societies lies with their people in general and 
not any one segment of society, whereas this is precisely the case in most neoliberal 
pure capitalistic societies like the USA, where almost 80 percent of the wealth is 
concentrated in the hands of the top 5 percent of individuals.
310
 
This leads to the unequal distribution of wealth and breeds discontent, leaving the 
fate of the less fortunate in the hands of those who hold the reigns of political and 
economic power rather than allowing the state to contribute towards helping the 
needier segments of society. An excessive obsession with the creation of material 
wealth can also obscure the ultimate objective of enriching human lives and as a 
result, humans are the ends as well as the means.
311
 Unless humans are motivated to 
pursue their self-interest within the constraints of economic well-being (the 
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application of the ‘moral filter’), neither the ‘invisible hand’ of the market nor the 
‘visible hand’ of central planning can succeed in achieving socioeconomic goals.312 
In fact, the profound and far-reaching difference between Islamic economics and 
materialistic economics is simply this: according to materialistic economics 
‘livelihood is the fundamental problem of man and economic developments are the 
ultimate end of human life’ whereas according to Islamic economics “livelihood 
may be necessary and indispensable, but cannot be the true purpose of human 
life’.313 
In an Islamic based distributive justice system, economic well-being thus becomes 
merely one of the aims of human endeavour and not the ultimate aim. This is 
reflected in the way Islamic economics views its factors of production.
314
 In simpler 
terms, it can be argued that Islamic economic and business philosophy functions on 
the understanding that the end goal is the achievement of a common good which can 
be determined not only through economic goals and targets, but through how well 
economic and business activity in general augments the overall welfare of the 
society (a concept discussed in detail previously).
315
 
 There are two broad categories for factors of production in Islamic economic 
philosophy.
316
 The first includes factors which can be said to have a primary right by 
virtue of having directly taken part in wealth production. These factors are then 
further divided into capital, (means of production which are fully consumed in the 
production process such as cash and other liquid items) land (means of production 
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which remain unaltered even after passing through the production process, such as 
buildings or factories) and labour (the human exertion of force by hand or mind).
317
 
The second category includes factors that can be said to have a secondary right, 
having had no direct part in wealth production but are nonetheless entitled because 
of the Islamic conception of wealth sharing; everything belongs to Allah and must 
be shared and given in the way of Allah.
318
 If these two factors of production are 
combined, they form a perfect, harmonious economic system. This is in contrast to 
pure socialism, where there is incentive for individuals to pursue their own 
economic goals (albeit within certain moral and ethical confines) and reward for 
labour and contribution towards an enterprise despite there being no pursuit of blind 
profit maximisation in addition to no social contribution towards society as a whole 
(as is the case in the neoliberal pure capitalistic movement).
319
 The Islamic system 
therefore provides all segments of society a conduit to greater access to resources 
and thus allows for a proper stakeholder oriented financial system.
320
 
Comparatively, under classical socialist economic theory only one factor of 
production is recognised: labour.
321
 All other factors are considered to be equally 
and collectively owned at the national level. Hence, the question of private 
ownership and right to profits (and wealth) does not lie with one individual, but 
rather the whole nation as one.
322
 This means that there is no incentive for any 
individual endeavours or pursuits, leaving the economic system stagnant. 
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According to Chapra, Islamic business and economic thinking recognises what 
socialism did not:  
 
The contribution of individual endeavour and the ability to earn a profit through that 
endeavour, everything was determined by the state without any differentiation 
between the actual output of individuals, creating a disincentive for those with more 
abilities and capital (both human and pecuniary) there by eliminating any chances of 
innovation, efficiency and enterprise. Islamic economics on the other hand 
encourages the individual enterprise for the sake of both the individual as well as the 
society. At the same time, Islam condemns the evils of greed, unscrupulousness and 
disregard for the rights and needs of others, which the secularist, short-term, this-
worldly perspective of capitalism sometimes encourages.
323
 
 
The ethos of an Islamic economic and business system therefore treads the ‘middle 
path’, where the individual profit motive is not the chief propelling force, with 
socioeconomic good also normatively guiding entrepreneurs in their decisions, 
without profit being deemed the only plausible end.
324
 At the same time, the Islamic 
economic system does not completely negate the individuality of man like the 
socialist system, instead creating a hierarchy between the different strata of society 
that makes the collective more important than an individual in the context of the 
distribution of resources.
325
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When it comes to economic freedoms and rights, Islam places a greater emphasis on 
duties than on rights.
326
 The wisdom behind this is that if duties (relating to justice 
and trusteeship, for example) are fulfilled by everyone, then self-interest is 
automatically held within boundaries and the rights of all are undoubtedly 
safeguarded.
327
 It is said that ‘[s]ociety is the primary institution in Islam, not the 
state’,328 further strengthening the argument that a regulatory framework designed 
for institutions handling Islamic finance must be based on a business model which 
encompasses its ethical norms and aims to achieve a common or public good 
through ensuring distributive justice for adherents of the system. This argument 
could further be used to argue in favour of the establishment of a self-regulating 
framework for IFIs in countries which do not recognise sharia as a valid source of 
law. This would allow local IFIs and the Muslim community (scholars, customers, 
and banking experts) to work in conjunction with the guidelines laid down by the 
IFSB and AAOIFI to determine a result-oriented regulatory framework which fulfils 
all the religious and governance requirements of Islamic finance keeping in view the 
issue of Maslaha as a guiding principle. Chapra further argues that ‘in order to 
create equilibrium between scarce resources and the claims on them in a way that 
realises both efficiency and equity, it is necessary to focus on human beings 
themselves, rather than on the market or the state.’329 Thus, an economic system 
which caters to as many categories of stakeholders as practicable can embody a true 
Islamic economic and business ethos. Consequently, the aim of the regulators should 
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be to ensure the development of a true stakeholder-oriented regulatory framework 
which can facilitate the operations of the Islamic financial industry and which is 
successively in line with the Maqasid al sharia. 
It is therefore argued that since neither neoliberal nor Anglo-American corporate 
governance models can satisfy the ethical and jurisprudential requirements for 
institutions handling Islamic financial instruments, there is a dire need to rethink the 
whole regulatory mechanism in place in Islamic and non-Islamic countries alike.
330
  
The regulatory mechanism, as will be argued in the final chapter of this thesis, needs 
to be modified to ensure that it specifically caters to the stakeholder-oriented nature 
of the Islamic financial industry within those jurisdictions which allow IFI’s to 
operate as an alternative financial intermediary to conventional financial institutions. 
 
6. The Islamic moral economy and its effects on Islamic financial industry.     
 It has also been argued that the specific categorization of the Halal and haram and 
the surrounding ideological debate along with the substantive prohibitions of Riba 
and Gharar as well as the tenets of  contract law and business ethics principles  can 
be well amalgamated and are indeed  reflected in the Islamic moral economic 
framework as suggested by Mehmut Asutay.
331
 The Islamic moral economic 
framework argument as put forward by Mehmut Asutay, predicates on the argument 
that the Islamic financial industry is a sub set of the overall Islamic economic 
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framework, and should emulate the ethos of Islamic moral economy.
332
 It is thus 
argued in this thesis that despite being extremely important and relevant, the Islamic 
moral economic framework can only be properly followed and adapted in a perfect 
situation where there is an endeavor at the state or the jurisdiction level to adapt the 
Islamic economic model by legal mechanisms,  for example in countries like 
Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, where the states have declared Islam as the state 
religion of the country and thus the state apparatuses like the Judiciary and the 
legislature as well as the central bank and/ or financial regulators are able to 
understand and formulate such laws which allow the economic framework to be 
adapted to Islamic law and ethos. However in more secular jurisdictions, arguing for 
a macro level economic shift to an Islamic moral economy may not be practical or 
indeed possible.  It is in light of this practical and conceptual difficulty of 
amalgamating Islamic moral economy with a secular legal and economic system, 
that it is thus argued that Islamic financial institution are better suited to follow a 
more stakeholder oriented (which in essence does reflect the Islamic moral economy 
principles) governance mechanism which has an established presence in other  
jurisdictions like the USA, UK and the EU countries and at the same time it 
embodies some of the most important ethical and business practices of the Islamic 
economic model and thus augers well for the normative ideals that IFI’s would want 
to incorporate in their working at both the macro level as well as micro levels. 
7. Conclusion 
Having ascertained the basic principles and pillars of Islamic economics, law, 
business ethics and finance from both traditional as well as contemporary literature, 
and having established that Islamic economic and finance norms are very different 
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from the norms of neoliberal profit maximising theories and practices, this chapter 
lays the ground work for the rest of the thesis to be moulded around the important 
aspects of Islamic economic principles. It is therefore asserted, basing on the basic 
principles and norms of the Islamic economic system ,that a regulatory and 
governance framework based on the ideological foundation of neoliberal theories is 
ill-suited for the Islamic finance industry. To establish a fitting governance and 
regulatory framework would require concentration on the basic principles and 
ideological foundations (the Maqasid al Sharia) of Islamic finance and economics 
both at the macro level (international as well as national standard setting bodies and 
regulators) and the micro level (the industry and the individual). Accordingly, it 
shall be argued in the next chapters that a thorough knowledge of the basic 
principles of Islamic finance would allow policy makers to solve specific corporate 
governance and regulatory issues that the modern Islamic finance industry is facing 
or may potentially face because of being regulated and governed under the same 
regimes as conventional banks and corporations. These regimes are unable to cater 
for the specific requirements of the Islamic finance industry. It follows that a move 
towards a more tailored governance and regulatory framework needs to be 
undertaken if Islamic finance is to remain true to its ideology and principles. For this 
purpose, a principle-and-outcome based regulatory framework needs to be devised 
which is meta-regulatory in nature. 
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CHAPTER 4. WESTERN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
THEORY: THE PROFIT MAXIMISATION PROBLEM 
 
1 Introduction 
Having established the basic parameters of Islamic financial architecture in the 
previous chapters, we will now examine the effects of traditional neoliberal 
corporate governance theory on the working of IFIs and how the contemporary 
corporate governance theory is indeed ideologically incompatible with Islamic 
finance principles. This chapter will deal with the fundamentals values of the 
neoliberal shareholder primacy theory by extrapolating the historical as well as 
economic development of the Neo liberal ideals.  This chapter shall also establish 
that, due to the ideological contrast of the Islamic finance literature and neoliberal 
corporate governance theory, any endeavour to govern or regulate the Islamic 
finance industry by the principles and practices espoused by the neoliberal theory 
will create systemic problems for IFIs. The major aim of this chapter is to try to 
establish a  lack of synergy between the traditional theories of Islamic 
finance/commerce and the more modern corporate governance theories in their 
present forms following the famous Berle and Means restatement of 
corporate/managerial theory in ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’.333 
The discussion will centre on deciphering the similarities and differences between 
the neoliberal corporate governance theory, and the principles and rules derived 
from Islamic finance literature in the previous two chapters. 
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2. Ownership and control: a historical perspective of the twenty first century 
corporation 
The rise of the large public corporation in the late 19
th
 century spurred a debate 
surrounding the legitimacy of a new form of legal entity called the corporation, with 
dispersed freely transferable shares, limited liability for investors (shareholders) and 
a separate legal identity from its owners (investors).
334
 The initial debate 
surrounding this new legal mechanism in the early 18
th
 century was predominantly 
concerned with the fundamental concepts of a limited liability incorporated legal 
entity, how it functioned and how the state was expected to control it. In light of 
scepticism surrounding the corporate form, the governments and judiciaries of both 
the UK
335
 and the USA  pondered uncertainly over the best methods of keeping such 
corporations in check, resulting in a debate regarding the most suitable methods of 
regulating and governing the modern day corporation. One contemporary issue was 
the reconceptualization of the ‘share’ as a tradable commodity from a simple ‘joint 
stake’ (stock) in a partnership. This reconceptualization led to the confusion 
surrounding the ‘shareholders’ as the joint ‘owners’ of a company,336 leading in turn 
to further confusion surrounding the legal status of the ‘share’ itself as a property 
right in the company
337
. This meant that the concept of limited liability and a 
business existing as a separate legal entity seemed inconsistent to the en vogue 
norms to many academics and practitioners of the early eighteenth century because 
historically, members of a business partnership were always jointly and severally 
liable for the entire debt of the business and not just for their own investments.
338
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The above uncertainties led to a contemporary problem which formed the basis of 
modern day corporate governance debates, the effects of which have resonated 
globally in the corporate sphere. The problem faced by the legal and business 
community fundamentally was the confusion in defining the managements’ 
relationships with shareholders and subsequently with the company.
339
 This 
ambiguity emanated from the dually misunderstood conceptualisation of 
shareholders as the owners of a company (as the main equity contributors), and 
managers as trustees to the shareholders and not the company itself.
340
 From a 
corporate governance point of view, a source of confusion is that managers have 
historically been thought to be the trustees for the shareholders acting as a 
collective.
341
 This conceptual misunderstanding, like many others, has historical 
roots. This particular relationship was borrowed from the law of trusts, as this was 
thought to be the most convenient method of defining the relationship between the 
company and the management. This paradigm of managers as trustees for 
shareholders is still prevalent in modern company law
342
 and has had a lasting effect 
on corporate (governance) theory, despite innovative restrictions by both legislatures 
and judiciaries. This is evidenced by the fact that directors of a company (as a part of 
the management) still owe a fiduciary duty to the company (which is a historical 
remnant of the initial trustee relationship).
343
 Unfortunately, these sources of 
confusion have been dealt with haphazardly throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
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centuries, due to the judiciary
344
 and the legislature responding in piecemeal fashion 
to problems as and when they arose, rather than proactively determining the 
conceptual parameters of corporate theory. This has led to many ‘phantom’ concepts 
lingering in today’s Anglo-American corporate governance debates.345 
Consequently, Anglo-US law and theory seem to represent that the best 
manifestation of the manager/company/shareholder relationship is to be found in the 
neoliberal oriented ‘agency theory’.346   This can be seen in the numerous attempts 
made by international and national standard setting and regulatory bodies to define 
‘corporate governance’.  
These definitions outline the kind of confusions that still plague today’s corporate 
governance debates. In setting out the theme of the modern day corporate 
governance debate, the World Bank’s contextual definition states that: ‘[c]orporate 
governance has only recently emerged as a discipline in its own rights, although the 
strands of political economy it embraces stretch back through centuries’.347 
One of the major contributors, and an industry leader in the UK in the sphere of 
business and corporate governance, has said that: 
Governance is a word with a pedigree that dates back to Chaucer and in his day the 
word carried with it the connotation wise and responsible, which is appropriate. It 
means either the action of governing or the method of governing and it is in the latter 
sense it is used with reference to companies….A quotation which is worth keeping 
in mind in this context is: “[h]e that governs sits quietly at the stern and scarce is 
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seen to stir.” It appeals to me because it suggests that governance need not be heavy-
handed. The governor should be able to keep the corporate ship on course with a 
minimum use of the tiller.
348
 
The definition offered in the UK Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance, whilst possessing the advantage of brevity, leaves a lot to 
be desired: ’[c]orporate governance is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled.’349 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines 
corporate governance with reference to the objectives of a corporation:  
[C]orporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation and spells 
out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing 
this, it provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performances.
350
 
Furthermore, in 2004 OECD defined good corporate governance as:  
[P]rovid[ing] proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives 
that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring. The presence of an effective corporate governance system, 
within an individual company and across and economy as a whole, helps to provide 
a degree of confidence that is necessary for the functioning of a market economy. As 
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a result, the cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use resources more 
efficiently, thereby underpinning growth.
351
 
So in essence, we can say that the institution of governance provides a framework 
within which the social and economic life of all corporations is included and should 
not be taken in a narrow sense. Companies that follow good corporate governance 
practices generally perform better in both the short and long-term, enjoy a larger 
customer base, are more responsible in the community that they operate in and tend 
to have a loyal base of employees and suppliers. However, this is all dependent upon 
which form of corporate governance the company adheres to. On the one hand, if it 
is focused on a shareholder/profit maximisation approach, then there is a chance that 
the company is more attuned towards ‘short termism’.352 Whilst on the other, if the 
corporation is oriented towards stakeholders and social responsibility, shareholder 
satisfaction may be put at risk because of the apparent neglecting of short-term 
benefits in favour of the long-term benefits associated with other stakeholders (such 
as employees), the society, their customer base, using materials that are responsibly 
sourced and taking care of the environment.
353
 
Another way to understand corporate governance is that it is not - and should not be 
- limited to the concerns of the firm. Rather, it has wider implications for society at 
large insofar as it provides incentive and performance measures to achieve business 
success (i.e. it can act as a bench mark against which the economic success is 
measured).
354
 It also provides the necessary accountability and transparency to 
ensure an equitable distribution of the resulting wealth, which can be indicative of a 
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healthy economic system and a great indicator for the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the state’s economic and social policies.355 According to Sir Adrian Cadbury: 
‘corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals and also between individual and communal goals. The aim is to align as 
nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society.’356 
Hence, it can be seen that the conceptual understanding of corporate governance has 
more to do with internal and external corporate relationships and the subsequent 
designation of those responsible for doing so. Additionally, it lays down the 
limitations and extent of the management’s powers, as well as the rights and 
obligation of other stakeholders.
357
 The current corporate governance theory 
therefore takes the form of a multitude of concepts in attempting to explain what a 
company is, what is the role of shareholders, and what are the managers’ main 
duties. As regards the latter, are duties owed only to the shareholders, or may other 
stakeholders have rights in the company? If so, what kind of rights, how should the 
corporation best be regulated, who should regulate it, what is the legal standing of a 
‘share’, what does holding a share entail and what rights are attached to it?358 These 
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are some of the main points that need to be dealt with in a corporate governance 
debate, since it may provide an explanation of the unsuitability of the Anglo 
American corporate governance model – ideologically and conceptually – to the 
basic ethos( the Maqasid) of the Islamic finance industry. This may also clarify why 
contemporary (and less orthodox) corporate governance models based on 
stakeholder theory and CSR initially started as viable and sensible concepts but were 
soon pushed aside by the more dominant neoliberal free market political movement, 
which gained hegemony over both the theory and practice of corporate governance. 
 
3. Berle and Means and ‘corporate power and control’: an evolutionary 
Corporate Governance view 
By the time of the great depression in the USA in the 1930s, the limited liability 
corporation had established a firm foothold in the business world, annals of judicial 
thinking, legislative acumen and a respectable presence in academia. It was this 
rampant use of the limited liability corporate form for business during the great 
depression that led to a revival of the aforementioned scepticism in the minds of 
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policymakers.
359
 However this time, the scepticism had a different focus: the debate 
was not related to the usefulness of the corporation as a method of investment 
(indeed, there was agreement both in academia and more generally that it did indeed 
facilitate investment, help to spread wealth and risk, and provide alternative forms of 
investment).
360
 Rather, the scepticism was focused on the problem of controlling the 
corporations without losing investment attraction. This resulted in serious questions 
surrounding the control of the management of companies and the subsequent loss of 
control of the actual ‘owners’: the shareholders.361  Thus, the modern day corporate 
governance debate began.    
Historically, one can trace that the means of production in the United States 
economy of the 1900s were highly concentrated in the hands of the largest 200 
corporations. However, at the end of 1929, only 11 percent of the 200 largest 
corporations in the United States were still controlled by incumbents with much 
reduced ownership interest.
362
 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means in their seminal 
work on the United States corporate economy, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property’, identified an increasing trend towards separation of ownership and control 
in modern publicly held giant corporations.
363
 They recognised an extensive 
concentration of economic power in large corporations and the shift in control of 
these corporations had moved from shareholders to managers. Further, they argued 
that large industrial economies ultimately produced ‘a fragmentation of shareholding 
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and a shift in power from shareholders to senior managers with specialized skills.’364 
This shift developed because of the increasing technological needs of large 
corporations, which necessitated the raising of capital by selling stock to vastly 
dispersed shareholders.
365
 
Since the American legal doctrine provided that those who owned ‘property’ 
possessed the rights and power to use it for their own benefit, Berle and Means’ 
separation thesis called into question the functioning of the legal system upon which 
the private enterprise economies have been built. Further, they pointed out that 
corporate enterprises - in addition to having become free from the control of 
corporate owners - had also acquired sufficient power to become liberated from the 
market forces of competition as well.
366
 They concluded that much of the economic 
theory pertaining to the functioning of the marketplace, which served as a rationale 
for the free enterprise market economy, had been rendered obsolete by the 
accumulation of immense power in the hands of corporate managers with very broad 
discretion.
367
 This provocative thesis generated ongoing debate among economists 
and legal realists as well as within various institutional frameworks. 
The technological advancement during the late 19th century required the 
construction of transcontinental railroads which far exceeded the capital means of 
any single individual.
368
 Thus, railroad companies were compelled to raise capital 
through a large number of small shareholders and needed to hire specialised officers 
to manage their far-reaching operations. Due to the scattered nature of small 
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individual investors, power over corporate affairs shifted to management.
369
 The 
process of decreasing block holding and the subsequent relatively little block 
holding in today’s United States economy has had important consequences for 
corporate governance in the Anglo-American context. At present, the corporate 
governance structure in the Anglo-American model allows shareholders to elect 
directors, who are made responsible with managing the affairs of the corporation.
370
 
However, the directors delegate their authority to managers, who actually operate 
and manage the corporation. The only functional powers that the shareholders retain 
in the contemporary Anglo-American corporate governance regime is the right to 
vote to elect members of the board of directors and to approve certain fundamental 
transactions like mergers or sale of corporate assets through that vote.
371
 This has 
changed significantly with the rise of the institutional investor, but shareholders 
remain powerless in the current governance architecture, with actual power lying 
with the management and thus raising serious governance concerns.   
It was Berle and Means’ thesis372 that prompted the polarisation of opinion regarding 
the social and economic role of the contemporary firm.
373
 Berle and Means were of 
the view that because of the dispersed nature of modern shareholders and the powers 
of the modern manager, it followed that managers’ powers to use the firm to further 
their own interests must be controlled. It was this anxiety surrounding management 
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power that prompted Berle and Means to assert that ownership and control no longer 
rest in the same hands,
374
 and this is what lies at the heart of the mainstream 
corporate governance debate today. Berle and Means’ assertion that the managerial 
hegemony should not become absolute paved the way for the stakeholder point of 
view and the socially responsible corporation.
375
 Here, the corporate governance 
debate divided into two main themes based upon the separation thesis.
376
 Firstly, it 
was stated that the best way to control the corporation is to make the management 
responsible to the shareholders only - thus arose the shareholder primacy argument 
(a correlated theory being the agency theory).
377
 The justification of such a move 
was that shareholders ought to be considered primarily because they are ‘residual 
owners’ of the corporation’s assets and also because shareholders - being the least 
protected out of all the stakeholders
378
 - need protection and empowerment in the 
company. This view has persisted and thrived in neoliberal political ideology,
379
 
with emphasis on allowing the corporation to be regulated through pure market 
forces and a focus on profit maximisation by the corporation in the shape of 
increased shareholder value.
380
 This ascendency of neoliberal free market profit 
maximising ideals have led to waves of deregulation and has allowed the corporation 
to hijack whole economies and act irresponsibly by focusing on purely profit 
maximisation taking unnecessary risks, leading to systemic failures.
381
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The second theme emanating from the separation thesis was the surge of socially 
responsible corporations,
382
 manifested in the CSR movement and the stakeholder 
oriented corporate governance model.
383
 Although it was not explicitly stated by 
Berle and Means, most academics adopted the view that they were opposed to the 
company being run solely in the name of the shareholder because (according to 
them) this would give rise to managerial abuse of power. Accordingly, it is argued 
that this was a motivating factor in their reliance on corporations being run in a 
socially beneficial manner.
384
 One may have expected that the implementation of the 
socially responsible firm would be the logical extension of this debate, but it was not 
to come to fruition because of the political ascendancy of the finance model under 
the garb of neoliberal capitalism.
385
 According to Blair, to understand the divergent 
points of view there are three questions that must be answered: who and what is the 
corporation? What goals should it have? And whose interests should it serve?
386
 
The majority of the literature in the corporate governance debate focuses on the last 
question, but it is imperative to our discussion of this question that the first two 
questions are explored first. To begin, we shall explore the theoretical basis of the 
constitution of a corporation.  
4. Corporate theory: a brief introduction 
The law has historically had difficulty providing an adequate definition of a 
company. Initially, it was deemed to be an extension of the property rights and 
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freedoms of association and contract on the part of the property owner.
387
 Any one 
position of ‘what a company is’ can be defended by recourse to different theories 
that emphasise the importance of complex relationships that form the company.
388
 It 
can also be stated that the majority of theories that highlight one aspect or another of 
the corporation’s existence are direct reflections of the hegemony of the political 
system within which the corporation works and thus these theories have an 
immediate consequence for the corporate governance and regulatory debate 
surrounding the modern day corporate form.
389
 It is noteworthy that the same goes 
for IFIs, since most IFIs are incorporated with limited liability and dispersed 
shareholding in the jurisdictions within which they operate and come under the 
purview of the general corporate law regime of that jurisdiction, while 
simultaneously borrowing concepts from Islamic legal and economic theory. It is 
this mixed form that raises both practical and theoretical regulatory and governance 
conundrums for IFIs and thus raises the question of whether IFIs can be regulated by 
the same standards as other financial institutions. If not, a regulatory framework 
must be devised that allows for the implementation of universal Islamic ideals and 
principles, as well as maintaining jurisdictional regulatory standards. 
Particularly problematic from a corporate governance and regulatory point of view is 
that a company is considered a legal fiction - a creation of law - whereas the people 
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running it are real.
390
 The fiction theory essentially says the legal person has no 
reality, mind or will of its own; it only exists because the law chooses to allow it to 
and is therefore ‘an artificial, intangible and invisible being’391 and a mere creation 
of intellect.
392
 Building on the fiction theory is the concession theory, which posits 
that despite its legally fictitious status, the state has allowed the corporation as a 
concession to the individual investors as a means to pool resources. It should be 
borne in mind that historically, the original joint stock companies (which were the 
predecessors of modern corporations) were given grants by the state to be set up 
incorporated. These grants were given because the companies were set up to serve 
the public interest.
393
 Thus, under the ‘concession theory’ the corporation owes its 
existence to a special concession from the state and therefore, by logical extension, 
the state has the right to regulate the corporation as a stakeholder.
394
 In essence, the 
concession theory – despite admitting it is a legal fiction - considers the corporation 
to be a separate entity from its owners. Accordingly, the corporation owes a duty to 
the state and not solely to the individuals who provide equity to the corporation.
395
 
Another prominent theory is the real entity theory, which has its foundations in the 
nexus of contracts theory. The real entity theory considers the corporation as a real 
thing (‘a social fact with an actual living nature’)396 and not a merely juristic 
opinion. It further states that when individuals come together to form a corporation a 
new personality arises which has a ‘distinct sphere of existence and a will of its 
                                                          
390
 R Coase ‘The Nature Of The Firm.’ (1937) Economica 4,386-405 
391
Trustees of Darmouth College V Woodward (17 US) 4 Wheat 518 At 636, Per Marshall CJ. As 
Quoted In J.Lowry And A.Reisberg, Pattet’s Company Law: Company Law And Corporate Finance’ 
(4
Th
 Ed. Pearson Education Limited, England. 2012) 58 
392
 Ibid J.Lowry and A Reiesberg  58 
393
 A Chandler, The Visible Hand Cambridge (Harvard University Press 1977) 
394
 C W Hill and T M Jones ‘Stakeholder-Agency Theory.’ (1992) Journal Of Management Studies, 
29: 131-154 
395
 Ibid Blair 1995 
396
 Lowry and Reisberg (n 371) 58 
118 
 
own’,397 the law merely recognises the association and does not necessarily create 
it.
398
 The nexus of contract theory, as a corollary of the realist theory, states that the 
corporation is nothing more than a manifestation of the pooled resources of, and 
contractual bonds between, private individuals as stakeholders.
399
 The argument is 
that the corporation is nothing more than a nexus of contracts between freely 
consenting entities and therefore is a wholly private enterprise.
400
 In sum, this nexus 
of contract theory states that a corporation is indeed a real factual entity and not a 
fiction and as a result has a legal personality of its own, being separate and distinct 
from the members running it.
401
 
The historical development of the law and the current form of the modern day 
corporation is a mixture of the concession and nexus of contracts theories. The 
existence of the right of individuals to form corporations is in support of the 
concession theory view.
402
 There is also evidence of the nexus of contracts theory 
being utilised in modern day company law and corporate governance. An example is 
the definition of the article of association of a corporation as being a contract inter se 
as well as a contract between the company and the members.
403
 
All of these theories have thus contributed to the current shape of both company law 
and the corporate governance debate. Understanding these theories is also very 
important from the regulatory point of view, since different theories support 
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different forms of regulation.
404
 If one is to accept simply that the corporation is 
nothing but a nexus of contracts, then the resulting regulatory environment would be 
a ‘soft touch’ light regulation approach, whereby only the very basic issues are 
regulated by the state, the rest being left either to self-regulation by the industry or 
regulation through market forces.
405
 The shareholders would be the main 
stakeholders whose interests will need to be taken into account by the management, 
who would have no duty to take into consideration any other stakeholders. This is 
the model that is preferred by neoliberal thinkers and policy makers.
406
 On the other 
hand, if we accept the corporation is a concession given by the state to facilitate 
investment, then we can justify a more invasive regulatory regime. Since the 
corporation is conceptually no longer considered a private entity (having more of a 
‘public body role’ under the concession theory), it therefore owes a duty to take into 
consideration the interests of other stakeholders like society in general, employees, 
customers, the environment etc.
407
 It is thus argued that a governance framework 
which is based on a neo liberal ideology of deregulation and profit maximization of 
the shareholders is ill suited for an industry like the Islamic finance industry, since 
profit maximization as the only goal fails to satisfy the ideological norms of Islamic 
finance and economics. Consequently, a regulatory framework which allows for the 
enforcement of the principles of Islamic finance as asserted by sharia is a more 
suited framework for IFIs. 
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5. The influence of the neo liberal thinking on judicial understanding of the 
corporation 
Since corporations were economic and social necessities of their time, the question 
of what a corporation/ company was and for whom it was run was not explored until 
the late nineteenth century. Even then, the conception of a company was in a 
transitional state in the sense that the company was legally recognised as being run 
for the profits of the shareholder. In the landmark case of Dodge v Ford motor Co in 
1919 the court categorically held that the corporation was owned by the shareholders 
and consequently they could force directors to pay out the profits to them. The 
courts held that ‘a business corporation is organised and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that 
end’.408 This decision was lauded by the chancellor of the state of Delaware as 
embodying the ‘property conception of the corporation.’409 This property conception 
of the corporation is associated with the Chicago school of law and economics 
(which can further be attributed to the Neo liberal ethos), and states that a 
corporation is a ‘nexus of contracts’ through which the various participants arrange 
to transact with each other.
410
 In essence, the shareholders are seen as residual 
claimants to the assets of the company, and the managers are deemed to be obliged 
towards shareholders, as mere agents. Hence, it is argued under the Anglo US 
corporate governance theory that the managers ought not to be concerned with 
pursuing the interests of other stakeholders. Allen remarks that under this view of 
the corporation ‘the rights of the creditors, employees and others are strictly limited 
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to statutory, contractual and common law rights.’411 This would mean that the rights 
of other stakeholders are external rights and are not to be taken as inherently a part 
of the corporation itself. This is a point of view which cannot be reconciled with the 
Islamic stance regarding property and the societal aspect of the forms of business 
and thus makes it ideologically incompatible with the Anglo US corporate 
governance theory.   
The debate prompted by Berle and Means’ view of the corporation and the 
relationship between the shareholder and managers (over whether the corporation is 
a ‘social entity’) has become a much wider debate, between the proponents of 
shareholder value maximization and those of the shareholder theory.
412
 Berle and 
Means wrote in 1932 that ‘the American corporation had ceased to be a private 
business device and had become an institution’.413 Votaw also alluded to the same 
understanding of the corporation, describing the modern corporation as a 
‘constellation of interests rather than the instrument of the acquisitive individual.’ 
This shows how the perception of the role of the management has changed from 
managers being aggressive, profit and power seeking individualists to now being 
more diplomatic and statesman-like professionals. This view of the corporation is 
called the ‘social entity conception’, which states that the purpose of the corporation 
is ‘not individual but social’.414 Allen went on to describe that in the 1960s and 
1970s the corporation’s role was that of an institution where the interests of the 
shareholders, the main equity contributors and that of other constituents (the other 
stakeholders) have to be balanced. He also went on to assert the view that ‘no single 
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constituency’s interest may significantly exclude others from fair consideration by 
the board.’415 
 According to Blair,
416
 it was only in the 1960s and the 70s that the corporation 
started becoming more socially responsive and responsible, and that may be one of 
the reasons that it hasn’t been deemed necessary to impose legal sanction on such 
accounts of public benefit and public responsibility. This shows that in the 1960’s 
and the 1970’s, the idea of a corporation was still based on it being a social entity, 
but that soon changed with the ascendency of the Neo Liberal mode of economics 
and law.  
 
6. The Neo liberal ascendancy   
The beginning of the 1980s saw a shift back towards the shareholder primacy 
version dominated by neoliberal political and economic thought. The main reasons 
for this shift were the rise of global competition, the internationalisation of financial 
markets and the emergence of hostile takeovers.
417
 The increase in the takeover 
market shattered the adequacy of the long term conception for the company, which 
became irrelevant for outlining the corporate environment, which was a direct result 
of the rise of the neo liberal policies.
418
 This economic shift was supplemented by a 
legal shift which saw the courts recognising that the only view that managers are 
obliged to consider is that of shareholder value maximization; as long as the value of 
the share is increasing, the managers are deemed to have performed their duties.
419
 
According to the American Law Institute the managers are only obliged to take into 
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consideration other stakeholders interests when ‘competing courses of action have 
comparable impact on shareholders’.420 This was reflected in the decision of 
Paramount Communications Inc. v QVC Network Inc.,
421
 with the court iterating that 
the ‘directors had to act on an informed basis to secure the best value reasonably 
available to the stockholders’. This was so despite the earlier decision of Paramount 
Communications v Time Inc.,
422
 which held that the company was to be run not 
solely for the benefit of the shareholders but the management should also take into 
account the interests of other stakeholders. This perfectly demonstrated the short 
term/long term distinction, with the court in the latter case preferring the view that 
the directors are to reject or accept the offer of a takeover looking primarily at the 
short term increase in the value of the shareholder,
423
 whereas in the earlier case the 
court did accept that the directors could take into account the long term strategic 
goals of the company as well as the interests of other stakeholders.
424
 Therefore, 
with divergent case law authorities on the issue, the law remains unclear and it is yet 
to be seen which way a court would rule if a stakeholder attempted to enforce their 
rights.
425
 This has also proven problematic in the UK, where section 172 of the 
Company Act 2006 actually lists other interests that the directors must take into 
account when coming to a decision regarding the company’s functions. There is also 
judicial authority that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company and must act 
in the interest of members as a whole.
426
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Even though the law may still be in limbo as to whether the stakeholder rights are 
actually enforceable, policy statements in the US (and to a certain extent in the UK, 
even though there is some movement for a change in the academia) are clear that the 
corporation is to be run primarily for the shareholder. One of the major reasons for 
such shareholder primacy is that it is widely accepted that the shareholders are likely 
to be the least protected of all stakeholders relative to their investment.
427
 This 
theory of shareholders having a residual claim has been reflected in the works of 
Bebchuk.
428
 One may justify this approach by viewing the shareholders as owners 
who are thus entitled to control the corporate resources and ensure that they are 
being used for their benefit.
429
 Furthermore, it may be said that the shareholders are 
the best people to hold the management accountable,
430
 along with the 
aforementioned argument that the shareholders are the residual claimants.
431
 These 
points of view have formed the core of the shareholder theory and are followed 
religiously by adherents of the shareholder primacy theory in both academia as well 
as policy. This shareholder value maximisation point of view is manifested in the 
shape of ‘agency theory’ as well as the separation thesis. 
 
7. Agency theory and the separation of ownership and control. 
The underlying agency theory argument emanates from the economic theory of the 
firm as expounded by Berle and Means.
432
 The classic economic theory perceived 
the firm as an entity with a single minded commitment to the maximization of 
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profits for the shareholders, with internal affairs of the firm also being regulated by 
market activity. As a result, market forces dictated how the firm should be run and 
under this particular theory it was solely to make profits.
433
 
The agency theory explains the firm as a nexus of contracts among individual factors 
of production.
434
 The crux of the agency theory problem is how to separate 
management and finance because the managers in a firm help raise finances from 
investors (the shareholders) in order to put them to productive use and so are in 
control of that finance. The financiers (shareholders) on the other hand need the 
managers to manage their investments and generate returns on their funds.
435
 The 
nexus of contracts in this regard explains that the financiers and the managers sign a 
contract that specifies what the managers are to do with the funds and how returns 
are divided between them. The biggest issue in this relationship is that of residual 
control: who gets it?
436
 With whom should the right to make decisions vest? Should 
it be the shareholders since they are the ones who have provided the capital, or 
should it be with the managers who actually exercise control over the daily affairs of 
the company?
437
 
Historically speaking, it is the managers who have retained the power to take 
decisions. The problem with this is that mangers must be prevented from pursuing 
their own interests and from misallocating resources, whilst still allowing them to 
induce and encourage more investment.
438
 This is the classic corporate governance 
problem.
439
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The agency theory looks to resolve this problem by proposing that shareholders have 
paramountcy in the firm because not only are they the owners, but also residual risk 
takers. According to Fama, under the nexus of contracts theory, the ownership of the 
firm is not of relevance.
440
  The agency theory contends that the shareholders are the 
principals in whose interest the corporation should be run because the shareholders 
are the residual claimants
441
 and the only category of economic actors who make 
investment without any contractual guarantee of a specific return.
442
 
Since the ideological basis of the agency theory is the self-interested utility 
maximising motivation of individual actors, it is assumed that the relationship 
between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) will be problematic 
because the managers may be pursuing their own interests rather than those of the 
shareholders as is originally envisaged. The other important basis for the agency 
theory’s eminence in the corporate governance debate is the trend of managerial 
hegemony. This means that the CEOs of the modern day company have become so 
powerful that they have rendered the board of directors impotent, undermining the 
shareholders and their ability to affect affairs.
443
. This unabated power of the CEOs 
allows the risk that they will base their governance on interests other than profit 
maximisation. Thus, the shareholders are no longer the ones in control of the firm 
and their interests are no longer considered primary. Rather, the CEOs decide how 
and where the profits of the company are reinvested, as well as how much 
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compensation they are to receive.
444
 This power of reinvestment that the CEOs have 
acquired means that they are no longer dependent solely on the shareholders for the 
provision of the capital for the running of the firm. This independence means that 
the shareholders are rendered not only powerless but also - to an extent - useless.
445
 
So in reality, rather than the boards being in control of the management, it is the 
management who is in control of the board. 
According to Jensen and Meckling, the conventional agency theory also states that 
since both the principals and the agents (the shareholders and the managers) are 
looking to maximise utility, there are inevitably going to be conflicts of interests and 
when faced with such a conflict, the agent may not always act in the best interest of 
the principal.
446
 One of the more important outcomes of the management not abiding 
by the conventional roles of agents is the rise in the ‘agency cost’.447 In most agency 
relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding 
costs (pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary) and these will be called the agency 
costs.
448
  These agency costs can be calculated as the sum of the monitoring 
expenditure by the principal, plus the bonding expenditures by the agent, plus 
residual costs. The monitoring expenditure can be defined as:  
the cost that the principal will incur in order to ensure that the agent does not deviate 
from the aim of maximizing the value and the utility of the principal, the Bonding 
expenditure can be defined as the costs that the agents (management) will incur to 
guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal 
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(shareholder) or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if the agent does 
take such actions.
449
  
It follows that the residual cost can be defined as the dollar (or equivalent currency) 
of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to this divergence.
450
 
Thus, it can be seen that the corporate governance issues relating to the agency 
relationship are not restricted to the question of whether they are ethical practices 
but are practically manifested in the actual pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs which 
directly and indirectly affect the overall performance and value of the company.
451
 
In line with the profit maximising aims and objectives of the corporation, Jensen and 
Meckling have categorically stated that in pursuit of profit, any expectation of a firm 
being socially responsible is an absurdity since: 
‘the private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a 
nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence 
of divisible residual claims on the assets and the cash flows of the organization 
which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting 
individuals.’452 
Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling stated that the ‘firm is not an individual and the 
personalisation of the firm implied by asking questions such as what should be the 
aim of the firm or does the firm have a social responsibility is seriously 
misleading’.453 The firm is then the sum of a collection of complex relationships (i.e. 
contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labour, material and 
capital inputs, and the consumer of outputs. Therefore, we must take into account the 
agency costs prevalent in the firm to decide how to structure the contractual 
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relationships between the principal and the agent in a way that provides proper 
incentive for the agent to maximise the principal’s welfare given that uncertainty and 
imperfect monitoring exists.
454
 
This demonstrates that in the neoliberal theory of corporate governance there is no 
place for other stakeholders and the only aim of the corporation is to act as the 
facilitator between the principal’s investments (the investors/shareholders) and the 
agent’s (the management) capacity to manage that capital.   
Building on this, one of the most important underlying questions concerning the 
corporate governance debate is the conundrum of how managers have the authority 
of making decisions in modern firms, but have no liability in the outcome and are 
not affected monetarily by such decisions.
455
 In other words, how are managers the 
main decision makers when they are not risk takers themselves? This means that the 
opposite is true for the shareholders: they are the risk takers but have no say in the 
decisions of the firm. It is this dichotomy of risk allocation and the decision making 
process that has been the focus of Fama and Jensen.
456
 
Fama and Jensen have established a correlation between the residual claim and the 
decision-making process to justify giving the managers the authority and the 
legitimacy to make decisions without having to take any extraordinary risks.
457
 They 
claim that since an organisation is the nexus of contracts, it is these contracts that 
combine with the external legal requirement to determine and specify the rights of 
each agent in the organisation. It is by virtue of this central contract that the 
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organisation specifies both the nature of the residual claims and the allocation in the 
steps of the decision process among agents.
458
 
Therefore, the relationship that Farma and Jensen have established between the 
nature of residual claim and the allocation of decision-making is that the separation 
of residual risk bearing from decision management leads to decision systems that 
separate decision management from decision control. Furthermore, the combination 
of decision management and decision control in a small amount of agents leads to 
residual claims that are largely restricted to those agents.
459
 
Eisenhardt, on the other hand, relies on the agency theory itself to justify the issue of 
‘risk sharing’ that arises when the agent and the principal have different attitudes 
towards risk.
460
 The agency theory is regarded in terms of the different ‘goals’ and 
attitudes towards risk of both the agent (management) and the principal 
(shareholders). Eisenhart has used two streams of agency theory to justify how and 
when the principal and the agent may have different goals.
461
 He first uses the 
positivist agency theory to focus on identifying the situation in which principal and 
agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describes the governance 
mechanism that can be used to curb such behaviour of the agents. His first finding is 
that if the interest of both the principal and the agent are aligned by means of an 
outcome-based contract, the chances of a conflict of interest is less than (for 
example) increasing the firm ownership of the mangers as it may decrease the 
chances of them working for self-interested goals.
462
 Secondly he emphasises the 
importance of informational availability within the firm to ensure that the agents do 
not act in their own interests. This can only be achieved when the principal has the 
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information to verify the agent’s behaviour, providing the principal with the chance 
to actually reduce the cost of monitoring the agent, ensuring that the agent will be 
more careful about his actions. 
He then focuses on the normative principal agent theory, asserting that information 
systems are positively related to behaviour-based contracts and negatively related to 
outcome-based contracts.
463
 Therefore, the information systems tend to work better 
in an environment where the contracts are based on the behavioural aspects of the 
agent rather than the outcome. This kind of a scenario may occur where, for 
example, the board of directors are not as well versed in the financial aspects of the 
company and the management takes certain decisions or work towards certain goals 
which the board of director may not understand. In such scenarios, it is better for the 
principal to be able to monitor the behaviour of the management rather than the goal 
that they may be alluding to.
464
 
In summary, Eisenhart shows us that the agency theory may provide solutions to the 
issues surrounding the agency problem itself, insofar as it explains how the principal 
and agent can be made to cooperate on certain aspects of decision making. It also 
shows how the risks and the decision making process may be streamlined 
compatibly with the relationship of the managers and the shareholders and their so-
called division of labour.
465
 
 
8. Conclusion 
In view of the neoliberal ascendancy, the regulatory debate surrounding the Islamic 
financial industry needs to be assessed in the light of the fact that the Islamic finance 
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industry is unique in its nature; it embodies principles set out by the Qu’ran and 
Hadith of the Holy prophet Muhammad, and is normatively to be regulated by 
sharia (the Islamic law). With that in mind, and our earlier discussion of the agency 
cost argument focusing on the interest of the shareholders only, it can be seen why 
corporate governance and the regulatory framework needs to be specifically tailored 
to cater to the nature of the Islamic finance industry with a stakeholder and CSR 
orientation. Regulating the IFIs in any other way is likely to lead to serious systemic 
and reputational risks to the industry. Another important aspect in relation to IFIs is 
the issue of the added agency costs in the shape of the sharia supervisor boards 
(SSBs), and the question of how to credibly incorporate this issue into the modern 
day corporate governance debate. This is because the existence of SSBs upsets the 
conventional paradigm of the agency relationship between the shareholders and the 
managers, in that the SSBs form another layer of a mandatory advisory body in the 
IFIs, with their advice being integral to the running of the IFI as proper ‘Islamic’ 
institution.  Another aspect that needs to be catered for is the concept of ‘property’ 
and the subsequent ‘ownership rights’ that are deemed to be integral to the 
conventional corporate governance framework, which are distinctly different in the 
context of the Islamic financial industry. In Islamic economics and finance literature 
all property belongs to the God almighty and man is seen as a mere trustee of that 
property, enjoying only limited ownership rights over any assets. Assets belong first 
to the collective social group (society, tribe, country etc.) and then to the individual, 
meaning that the concept of ‘residual ownership’ of the shareholders is alien to 
Islamic finance literature. This makes Islamic economics and finance ‘stakeholder 
and socially oriented’ rather than ‘profit maximising’ per se. Islamic teachings 
regard profit as positive thing, encouraging entrepreneurship and profit making, but 
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categorically stating that profit is seen as a means to a greater social end and not as 
an end in itself, which is the antithesis of the neoliberal profit maximising ideology.  
Since Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) generally operate in an increasingly 
international environment, the need for corporate governance and a specifically 
tailored regulatory framework which caters to the basic ideology of the Islamic 
economic model needs to be formed in a manner which may be applicable across the 
industry internationally and not restricted to Islamic countries. In order for that to 
happen, it is argued that a two-tiered principle based meta-regulatory framework 
which provides for the specific corporate governance and sharia compliance 
prerequisites of the Islamic financial industry needs to be instituted with the help of 
the major standard setting bodies i.e. the IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board)
466
 
and the AAOIFI (Accounting and Audit Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions).
467
 
It is also imperative that such a framework considers that many jurisdictions will not 
accept sharia. This makes it difficult for the IFIs to operate and enforce the rules and 
principles that are of importance to the industry, i.e. the legal and ethical principles 
of sharia regarding finance and commerce. In light of this systemic issue of the non-
acceptability of sharia, a uniform regulatory framework needs to be instituted which 
is acceptable to both Islamic countries as well as other secular countries.  
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CHAPTER 5 BUSINESS ETHICS, CSR AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
  
        1.  Introduction 
In this chapter, we will establish the similarities between Islamic finance theory, 
conventional business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR) theory in 
addition to exploring the alternative corporate governance stakeholder theory (which 
is discussed in the next chapter) as a possible practical manifestation of the Islamic 
business ethos that has its ideological underpinnings in business ethics and CSR 
literature. Thus, we will move towards establishing that the stakeholder theory is the 
correct approach to corporate governance in the Islamic finance industry. 
 
2. Business ethics and CSR: the historical context 
One of the most viable attacks on the neoliberal conception of the market and the 
corporation comes from the business ethics school of thought. This school of 
thought forms the philosophical background to the stakeholder theory and CSR, 
making a case for further development of the stakeholder theory and CSR on the 
basis of the argument that the stakeholder theory and CSR actually reflect the 
practical realities of normative ethical concepts. This relationship between business 
ethics, CSR and the stakeholder point of view has been described in the following 
terms:  
a stakeholder approach grounded in ethical theories presents a perspective of 
corporate social responsibility in which ethics is central. This represents clear 
135 
 
progress in the understanding of the integration of ethics into strategic management. 
In fact, there is a connection between strategic thought and ethical reasoning.
468
 
On the other hand, the business ethics philosophy also directly targets the conception 
of the agency theory, stating that one of its drawbacks is that it does not take issues 
of ethics into account when comprehending the overall corporate strategy at both the 
macro and micro levels.
469
 The agency theory concentrates solely on profit 
maximisation which renders ethical issues as peripheral and less important.
470
 Issues 
of ethics can be well-amalgamated into the corporate sector only through the 
stakeholder point of view, which encourages different stakeholders to be a part of 
the corporate strategy both at the macro- and the micro-level.
471
 
Historically, the movement for CSR can be traced back to the debate between 
Berle
472
 and Dodd,
473
 who stated that at the heart of the corporate governance debate 
lies what has popularly become known as the ‘agency problem’ or the ‘agency 
debate’. As seen in the last chapter this debate essentially asks whether management 
is obliged to take into account the interests of stakeholders other than the 
shareholders. One of the foremost proponents of the modern day Anglo US 
corporate governance theories Berle said that corporate powers are ‘powers in trust 
for shareholders and nobody else’.474 In response, Dodd wrote that in essence: 
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‘The business can be classified as private property only in a qualified sense and that 
the society and its other stakeholders may demand that the business be carried out in 
such a way which promotes other stakeholder interests even if that would mean that 
the proprietary rights of the owners are curtailed.’475 
Hence, Dodd laid down what some claim is the ideological foundation of modern 
day CSR and the stakeholder theory. In response to this, Berle further elaborated and 
said that making the managers responsible to multiple parties would render them less 
answerable than if they were made solely responsible to the shareholders.
476
 This 
seminal debate thus forms the crux of the basic corporate governance debate about 
managers’ responsibility towards shareholders and other stakeholders. The basic 
question can then be formulated in the following terms: are the managers responsible 
only to the shareholders or are they obliged to take into account other stakeholders’ 
interests too? Furthermore, if they are to be made responsible to other stakeholders, 
what mechanisms can facilitate this? These questions have been answered by CSR 
and stakeholder proponents in detail through the growing number of academic works 
and practical codes
477
 being produced by both the legal and the business 
communities.
478
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However, it is Freeman who in his book Strategic Management
479
 gave the concept 
of stakeholder management a formal recognition as a practical form of corporate 
governance system.  The stakeholder concept basically seeks to answer the argument 
of in whose favour should the corporation be run and sets out what constitutes a 
‘stakeholder’ in context of a company. According to Freeman, the stakeholders are 
‘those groups which make a difference’480 or more formally: ‘[a] stakeholder in an 
organization is any group or individual who can effect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives.’481 The term ‘stakeholder’ in the 
context of a company/ firm encompasses a wide range of stakeholders that may not 
be usually understood as being of significance under the Anglo US corporate 
governance theory.
482
 Thus a good definition of a stakeholder that encompasses the 
ideological theme of the stakeholder theory is ‘any group or individual that can be 
influenced by or can itself influence the activities of the organization’.483 
Friedman and Miles have argued that the most common way of classifying 
stakeholders is to ‘consider groups of people with a distinguishable relationship with 
corporations: shareholders, customers, suppliers and distributors, employees and 
local communities’.484 Some writers, like Dill, take an alternative approach and look 
at the stakeholders as an integral part of the business rather than as outside players, 
thus giving them a legitimate say in the company’s affairs.485 
Freeman believes that the pertinent question is ‘how can executives in corporations 
begin to understand and manage in the external environment which they currently 
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face?’486 Simply put, how can organisations configure themselves and take actions to 
align themselves with the external environment, regulatory or otherwise? 
Corporate social responsibility, like the stakeholder point of view, argues that the 
corporation does not exist solely to provide returns to the shareholder. Rather, they 
must serve a larger social purpose which would mean that the corporation should be 
managed in a socially responsible way.
487
 This view is the one that has given rise to 
the issues surrounding the CSR debate which basically says that the corporation 
exists to create wealth for the society and not solely for the shareholder. In addition, 
the role of the directors and mangers is to see that the firm maximises wealth 
creation only after they have considered the social responsibility of the corporation 
as opposed to the shareholder primacy or agency point of view.
488
 
Votaw also alluded to the same understanding of the corporation, describing the 
modern corporation as a ‘constellation of interests rather than the instrument of the 
acquisitive individual’. This view of the corporation is called the ‘social entity 
conception’ stating that the purpose of the corporation is seen as ‘not individual but 
social’.489 
Another aspect of the CSR conception is the relationship between the corporation 
and the government. According to Freeman, this interaction outlines the 
environment that the modern day corporation has to function in.
490
 This inclusion of 
the government as a stakeholder is fundamentally important for the basis of the 
regulatory debate in modern day corporate governance literature.    
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The literature on CSR has widely influenced the stakeholder debate as enunciated by 
Johnson, according to whom ‘social responsibility in reference to firms concerns the 
balancing of a multiplicity of stakeholder interests’,491 and Davis, who said that 
‘social responsibility begins where law ends’492 which in essence meant that social 
responsibility is something that is above and beyond the normal legal relationship in 
the company that included taking into consideration other stakeholders.  
On the other hand, the business ethics school of thought relies on another very 
important concept; that of the ‘common good’. This is as much a part of business 
ethics as it is an economic theory. It is thus argued that this concept of common 
good has a resonance with the basic concepts of the business ethos and the 
fundamentals of the economic framework of Islamic finance. The concept of 
common good can also be extended to formulate the basis of another concept; that of 
‘public good’ as is used in the context of financial regulation literature and therefore 
the idea of a ‘common good’ can also be analogised with the ideals of Maslaha ( 
public benefit) as enunciated in Islamic jurisprudence. The use of the ideals of 
Maslaha as an analogous concept with ‘Common good’ ideals will form a very 
strong basis for using the stakeholder theory as the main governing theory for 
modern day Islamic financial industry both in operational terms as well as regulatory 
terms. 
This idea of common good has been borrowed from the political domain, and an 
analogy can be drawn between how the same principle of working towards a 
common good applies to the corporation as much as it applies to the state and the 
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government.
493
 The fundamentals of the ‘common good’ concept emanate from the 
writing of Thomas Aquinas,
494
 who introduced the concept of common good as 
being something that binds a sovereign leader and constrains him/her from acting 
only in his own interest. Aquinas states that his office or duty is to further the 
common good such that the government does not exist to further the self-interests of 
those governing. This concept when transposed to the modern day corporation then 
reads as meaning that the purpose of the corporation is not to merely further the 
goals of the owners or managers, but rather it has to work to further the goal of a 
common good that extends to benefit a wider array of stakeholders.
495
 The idea of 
the common good also furthers the idea of office in the political arena and the moral 
nature of the idea of power. The idea of the office - and hence power - is thus 
bounded by the fact that both power and office are to be used to further the common 
good for society as a whole. 
One of the aims of the ‘common good’ is the furtherance of the concept of 
distributive justice, which is a central theme that can be found in Islamic finance 
literature.
496
 Distributive justice can simply be defined as ‘concerning the fair, just or 
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equitable distribution of benefits and burdens’.497 In economic terms, the resultant 
wealth and benefits accruing from any financial activity should be distributed 
amongst society such that justice is done to all segments of it. To reiterate, this 
concept of distributive justice forms the back bone of economic and social fabric of 
society from an Islamic point of view.
498
  It can be argued that distributive justice 
from an economic perspective forms the main normative concept of any financial 
system, since it lays down what a financial system should strive to achieve. It can 
also be argued that for a financial system such as Islamic finance, the regulation of 
financial activity has to be carried out in line with the aim of furthering the common 
good or Maslaha (public good), as a well regulated economic system would go a 
long way in furthering the basic aims and objectives (the Maqasid al Sharia) of 
Islamic economic principles.
499
 
It must also be mentioned here that although there is no generic corporate 
governance theory of Islamic finance, these three concepts of stakeholder theory, 
CSR and business ethics have ideas that overlap with the business ethos and 
fundamentals of Islamic finance. For this reason and for the purpose of this thesis, 
the concepts of stakeholder, CSR and business ethics will be used interchangeably. 
However, as a corporate governance theory, the stakeholder theory will be asserted 
as the singular theory which is appropriate for the Islamic finance industry as a 
whole both managerially as well as in a regulatory context. 
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3. An ethical and ‘socially responsible’ corporation critique of the neoliberal 
model and the suitability of the stakeholder theory for contemporary IFIs 
The origin of the word ethics can be traced as far back as Plato and Aristotle, when 
the Greek philosophers used to use the word ethika to describe their own studies of 
Greek values and ideals.
500
 It follows that business ethics form a part of a wider 
philosophical debate surrounding ethics, economics and law, the crux of which is the 
following question: why have ethics in business in the first place? This debate is 
represented by the ideological differences between the proponents of the 
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance idealists versus the shareholder primacy 
proponents in the conventional corporate governance literature.
501
 It has greater 
significance for the Islamic finance industry for reasons that we have already 
explored; namely that Islamic finance is built on the basis of a moral and ethical 
system of economics and financial intermediation.
502
 
Business ethics have two aims according to Zimmerli and Assländer, the first being 
that they ‘attempt to expand the concept of economic rationality by means of ethical 
consideration concerning economic action’ and the second being that ‘by outlining 
the basis of economic theories and questioning their relevance, they also act 
prescriptively by formulating and justifying ethical criteria which economic action 
must meet’.503 
Western academics, like Islamic philosophers and jurists, have argued that ethics 
provide the basic rules of an ethos, but that those rules are not limited to that ethos. 
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This makes ethics a much wider concept than morality itself, since ethics not only 
reflects the ethos of a particular community, but rather transcends national and 
cultural boundaries, reflecting more universal concepts by devising what is 
universally right and wrong.
504
  This assertion then brings us to a central dilemma of 
contemporary business ethicists in the form of the ‘rational choice theory’, which 
presumes that an economically rational man will always act for his economic self-
interest and that is the motivation behind all his actions.
505
 This idea of an 
economically rational man has been a central theme in the debate between those who 
follow business ethics, reflected in the ideology and practices of CSR and 
stakeholder theory and those who follow the neoliberal ethos. This debate has been 
perpetual since the time of Adam Smith,
506
 who believed that economic rationality 
(economic self-interest) was the motivation behind all economic activity.  
 
4. The failure of the economically rational man and the shattered illusion of 
Neoliberal logic 
The debate surrounding the selfish (or otherwise) motivation of man is, however, 
much older than Adam Smith. Indeed, contemporary economists who follow the 
rational choice theory trace this idea as far back as Plato.
507
 The ancient 
philosophers, just like the Islamic philosophers and jurists, were actually concerned 
with deeper philosophical questions than merely trying to solve the economic choice 
conundrum of man. However, to answer this question in this thesis requires the 
asking of two other questions: why would corporations or their owners ever act in 
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the interest of anyone but themselves? And why should a corporation be more 
socially responsible if their sole duty is towards their stockholders?
508
 The answer to 
these can only be logically deduced once it is proven that following CSR or the 
stakeholder theory leads to some kind of financial or other equally important 
incentive, since according to the rational choice theory the pursuit of profit is the 
sole motive to act for any rational person (including a corporation).
509
 The economic 
rational choice theory also fails to prove why the corporation would ever act 
benevolently. These questions raise serious doubts about the underlying suppositions 
of the rational choice theory as well as the neoliberal theory, as the rational choice 
theory is the predecessor of the neoliberal economic ideals in both politics and 
economics.
510
 
The answer can be divided into two strands. The first strand accepts the supposition 
that the only motivation for a rational person is economic, then goes on to prove that 
to follow CSR and the stakeholder theory makes economic sense, which culminates 
in the long-term versus short-term profit debate,
 511
 a discussion we have had in the 
previous chapter while discussing the origins of the modern corporate form. 
 The second line of argument begins by rejecting the supposition that there is such a 
thing as an economically rational man (person or body) who is in possession of the 
relevant information about the market. This argument has been put forward by the 
likes of Donald Wood,
512
 Mitnick
513
 and Arrow
514
 in their criticisms of the 
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neoliberal school of economics. On similar lines as academics in Islamic finance,
515
 
these criticisms put forward by western academics point to the inevitability of ethics 
creeping in as value judgements of senior managers as an indispensable part of 
making business decisions since the perfect conditions that the neoliberal school of 
economics presume for a rational economic judgement are neither available nor 
possible.
516
 The role of value judgements of the management in the corporation have 
to be taken in context of the fact that many managers may not pursue pure economic 
goals such as profit maximisation at the cost of other ethical goals like the welfare of 
its employees.
517
 Thus, the assumption by the neoliberal school that economically 
rational persons never act benevolently is being proven wrong in the current 
economic climate where many CEOs and managers are pursuing goals that may go 
against the pure economic interests of their own company.
518
 Examples of this 
include the pursuit of environmental goals on a voluntary basis, even at the risk of 
incurring higher operational costs than their competitors, and pursuing ethically 
sound business practices like positive discrimination towards female employees or 
those with a more diverse racial background.
519
 These practices seem to be clear 
instances in which the rational choice theory fails to establish itself as the sole theory 
explaining the behaviour of rational persons. This is even more pronounced in the 
Islamic finance literature, where it is not only inevitable that such considerations 
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will creep into managements decisions; such considerations are regarded as  
important factors in the decision-making process, since to neglect this would be 
incompatible with the fundamentals of Islamic finance literature and become both 
practically and conceptually redundant.
520
 
 Secondly, the neoliberal school of thought has wrongly presupposed that rationality 
is based on information that is perfectly and uniformly available throughout the 
market.
521
 The economically rational man’s eventual decision to pursue any course 
of action will tend to be misguided as he will never be in possession of information 
as to what the other economically rational players will do in the market. 
Furthermore, the quantity and quality of information available in the market makes it 
nearly impossible for any economically rational person or body to digest it in its 
entirety. This informational asymmetry in the free market economy is a significant 
hurdle for the neoliberal claim that economic rationality is the best and the sole 
motivation for any person to act.
522
 It is thus argued that it is not only ethical but also 
legally and pragmatically necessary that information is made available as a matter of 
right to the whole of society so that accountability as well transparency is ensured by 
all the stakeholders. This can only be done once corporate governance is geared to 
be more stakeholder-oriented and not only limited to shareholder interests.
523
 
Zimmerli and Assländer have pointed out this barrier, stating that 
this discrepancy between “economic reality” and the reality which the individual 
faces in the actual situation where the decision is made implies that if we take the 
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concept of economic rationality as a measure for decisions, then it is in fact 
impossible to be fully informed. The concept of economic rationality unrealistically 
assumes that the individual is fully informed. However, full knowledge cannot be 
acquired, due to the individual’s limited capacity to absorb information and the 
transaction costs of procuring it.
524
 
Popper adds that ‘economists who base their theories on market success are facing 
the problem that it is impossible to be fully informed of future events. Thus, action 
always takes place in conditions of partial ignorance and uncertainty’.525 
From the above two arguments, we can see that even if all other variables in 
economic decisions remain constant, the fact that it is impossible to predict what the 
other market players will do will make the ‘rational’ economic decision ironically 
very irrational. Building upon this, such ‘partial ignorance and uncertainty’526 makes 
it difficult to justify the economic rationality of the market decisions which are void 
of any ethical influence, since these decisions will not lead to the best possible 
results as propagated by neoliberal economists. This lack of knowledge on the part 
of individual players, combined with the fact that rational choice theory fails to take 
into account benevolent acts that are not profit-driven, makes a compelling case for 
decisions being made in accordance with ethical principles rather than second 
guessing the practices of other players in the market.
527
 
Donald Wood,
528
 when quoting Akerlof, points out some of the false assumptions 
underlying the neoclassical economic theory. The major false assumption that he 
brings attention to is the tendency of people to act irrationally (i.e. contrary to their 
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economic interests). This means that the neoclassical theory relies on the false 
pretext that people will not serve their own interest and instead let things be handled 
by the markets, which would be desirable because people in power would not exploit 
the markets. This clearly does not represent the realistic position where people do 
frequently exploit their positions for reasons of self-interest. This is one of the 
reasons why Islamic business ethics do not revolve around the economic rationality 
of man and attributes all financial and economic decisions and actions as being in 
the domain of the collective as embodied in the set principles and sharia.
529
 
Another example of this false assumption can be seen in the works of Jensen, who 
says that ‘in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized 
when each firm in an economy maximizes its total market value’.530 This leads 
readers to believe that in a perfect competition, firms will pursue only the interest of 
increasing their values and no one would be pursuing any economic self-interest. 
One of the biggest flaws of this statement by Jensen and other writers who propagate 
the shareholder theory is the oversight of the behavioural flaw of human and 
organisational irrationality. This distorts the underlying assumption of the 
shareholder theory of the managers’ benevolent intentions when given unabated 
power in a corporation.
531
 
This neoliberal conception of a perfect market is something that cannot be 
reconciled with her ethos of an Islamic economic system. Despite the recognition by 
Islamic finance literature of  some aspect of private property and the freedom to 
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pursue economic interests,
532
 there is no place for the assumption that markets are 
the best resources allocators for the society,
533
 and therefore Islamic rules have laid 
down certain basic parameters which are essential at both the macro- and micro-
levels. Some of these parameters are the ban on riba and gharrar, which in simple 
terms means a ban on interest and speculation (or future trading). This alone is 
sufficient to negate any similarities between the Islamic finance theory and modern 
financial theories since modern economic systems are built on the concepts of 
lending on interest and speculating, which are two aspects which allow the modern 
day banking/financial industry to thrive and thus create debt.
534
 The other major 
aspect of Islamic financial thought that is not compatible with modern conventional 
financial practice is the concept of having any economic activity that is divorced 
from real asset, which forms the basis of Islamic financial intermediation, and is not 
something which is taken into account in conventional financial systems which work 
on creating wealth from debt.
535
 In Islamic financial literature, such a practice is not 
allowed and is against the precepts of sharia and therefore illegal. 
Another reason why the shareholder theory fails is that the problems associated with 
agency, incentive, control,
536
 asymmetrical information and distorted knowledge
537
 
are so well entrenched into neoliberal economics that there is very little room to 
improve at the corporate level without improvement at the macro-level. Stone is of 
the view that since it is not possible to control all externalities surrounding the 
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corporation, the underlying assumption of the shareholder point of view cannot be 
accepted at face value.
538
 
In the national meeting of the Academy of Management in 2007, an ‘all academy’ 
symposium on the future of stakeholder theorising in business was held; writers 
from across the USA gathered and delivered their short papers on the ongoing 
stakeholder debate and the criticisms of the conventional shareholder theory.
539
 
Presented at this symposium, Donald J Wood’s paper quoted George Akerlof, the 
president of the American Economic Association, as criticizing in very open terms 
the current economic and the social structure.
540
 Phillips’ works added that the 
current ability of the government to intervene has been curtailed to such an extent 
that the government is completely powerless to do anything about corporate abuses 
and market manipulation, and that this can be attributed to the fact that neoclassical 
ideology was allowed to take precedence over the other political ideologies in the 
economic sphere.
541
 It was this prevalent neoclassical political and economic 
approach that led to the downfall of the economic system, specifically the failure and 
the spate of scandals in the financial and the corporate sector. According to Sen
542
 
and Wood et al:
543
  ‘whereas globalization has brought many good things, it has also 
led to the dominance of the MNC, a form of corporation which has no master, and 
has contributed greatly to the income inequities, dire poverty, human rights abuse, 
environmental degradation and so much more’. Ehrenreich asserted that ‘the free 
market economy works best for the extremely rich and powerful but not for anyone 
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else’.544 George Lakoff says that ‘the Chicago school neo classical economics is 
actually a socio political agenda based upon values that emphasis self-reliance over 
community health, discipline over nurturance and suffering consequences over 
creating opportunities’.545 
The ongoing debate surrounding the ethics of commercial strategies based purely on 
profit maximisation and the interests of shareholders has become increasingly 
relevant in recent years following numerous corporate collapses and scandals. Many 
of the aspects being called into question are global, such as the concentration of 
power in the hands of multinational global players, the legitimacy of European and 
American companies’ business practices in the Third World and the way that 
companies deal with their customers and competitors. There are, however, also 
internal aspects that are in need of review such as staff management, corporate 
decision-making structures and commercial objectives. 
In addition to this, there is growing criticism of the economic and materialistic 
nature of our values and thinking.
546
 One reason for this is that economic theories 
are based mainly on the construction of models and this seems to be an increasingly 
unsuitable method of describing ‘reality’. Another reason is that the limitations of 
economic solutions are becoming ever more apparent.
547
 
It is thus argued that to counter this particular practice of determining economic and 
financial policies which are devoid of value based concepts, issues of ethics can only 
be successfully amalgamated into the overall corporate sector through looking to the 
stakeholder and the CSR perspective, which encourages different stakeholders to be 
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a part of the corporate strategy both at the macro and the micro level.
548
 It does this 
whilst also making the corporation more socially and ethically aware and 
responsible.
549
According to Walther  Zimmerli and Michael S. Assländer: 
Because business and entrepreneurial action is determined by economic constraints, 
the economic decision-making process is dominated by the need to ensure stability 
and growth while aiming at making a profit, consolidating market position and 
constantly increasing shareholder value. This demand for economic rationality 
dominates other aspects of economic action.
550
 
Following from this, the CSR literature pursuant to business ethics ideals takes as 
the starting point of their critique of the neoliberal theory Milton Freidman’s article 
in the New York Times which stated that the only social responsibility of a 
corporation is to increase profits for its stockholder.
551
 Friedman was responding to 
the vastly growing and important conception of CSR, which on Earth Day in April 
1970 became a verifiable concept in business and legal circles, forever to be etched 
into Anglo-American business practices.
552
 The ensuing confusion of what a 
corporation stood for in the 1970s and the 1980s was perfectly summed up by 
Professor Lawrence Mitchell: 
[N]o institution other than the state so dominates our public discourse and our 
private lives.... [C]orporations make most everything we consume. Their advertising 
and products fill almost every waking moment of our lives. They give us jobs, and 
sometimes a sense of identity. They define communities, and enhance both our 
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popular and serious culture. They present the investment opportunities that send our 
children to college, and provide for our old age. They fund our research. Individually 
and collectively, though, large corporations' presence may also harm us:  They 
pollute our environments. They impoverish our spirits with the never-ending 
messages of the virtues of consumerism. They provide a living, but often not a 
meaning. And sometimes they destroy us; our retirement expectations are unfunded, 
our investment hopes are dashed, our communities are left impoverished. The very 
power that corporations have over our lives means that, intentionally or not, they 
profoundly affect our lives.
553
 
According to Freeman,
554
 the social movements of the 60s and the 70s compounded 
with other such liberal movements like civil rights, consumerism and women’s 
rights to give rise to the socially aware and responsible corporation. The academic 
movement was led by Post
555
 and complemented by the likes of Sethi,
556
 Votaw
557
 
and Preston.
558
 The movement can be seen as still continuing strong in both the 
stakeholder-oriented and the CSR literature. 
The literature on CSR has widely influenced the stakeholder debate. According to 
Johnson ‘social responsibility in reference to firms concerns the balancing of a 
multiplicity of stakeholder interests’.559 Additionally, Davis enunciated that ‘social 
responsibility begins where law ends’,560 which in essence meant that social 
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responsibility is something that is above and beyond the normal legal relationship in 
the company that includes taking into consideration other stakeholders and not 
merely existing fiduciary duties. 
The amount of influence that a corporation has in a given economy has grown 
exponentially, as has the number of stakeholders in a given corporation. This has 
resulted in the modern corporation becoming more of a social institution rather than 
a pure economic institution. This change of character has also forced changes in 
methods of governance.  
Thus if examined closely, the CSR and stakeholder forms of governance are the 
practical implementations and manifestations of the much wider business ethics 
school of philosophy.
561
 Another important contribution by the business ethics 
school has been to directly target the conception of the agency theory and the 
finance model of governance that has been dominated by the shareholder primacy 
conception. The shareholder primacy model, as already discussed, posits that the 
corporation’s sole aim is to increase the overall income for the shareholders at all 
costs. Therefore, the business ethics and CSR models state that one of the major 
flaws of the agency theory is that it does not take into consideration issues of ethics 
when dictating the overall company and corporate strategy at both the macro- and 
the micro-level.
562
 The agency theory, according to business ethics proponents, 
concentrates solely on the profit maximisation of a company which renders ethical 
issues as merely peripheral.  
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External stakeholders can influence organisational survival and prosperity since they 
often view CSR programs as a measure of the trustworthiness of an organisation.
563
 
Thus, CSR initiatives tend to increase the relationship of trust between the business 
and the community, and this can translate into economic and social benefits in the 
form of a more loyal customer base, less stringent regulations, less public relations 
issues, less legal claims and a more effective marketing strategy
.
 
It is also acknowledged that whenever a company implements CSR policy, ethical 
issues will inevitably arise. However, instead of taking this particular issue as a 
drawback, the organisation can methodically work through these issues and 
convince the major stakeholders of their viability and win approval of the regulatory 
bodies.
564
 This, in turn, will result in lower monitoring costs and thus be 
economically feasible for the corporation in the long run. 
Porter and Kramer put the issue of long-term versus short-term profits into 
perspective by emphasising that companies have to change their focus towards the 
social setting in which they act and interact because ‘[e]conomic, social and 
environment goals with a long-term perspective are not independent or in conflict in 
spite of the fact that they can be contradictory in the short-term.’565 
Levine also highlights managing risks as a main benefit of CSR in the short-term:  
[w]hy implement a CSR program? In short, to manage risks and to ensure legal 
compliance, since companies may be exposed to a variety of legal and reputational 
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risks if they do not have adequate social compliance or corporate social 
responsibility/sustainability programs in place.
566
 
CSR is defined as ‘a program of actions taken to reduce externalised costs or to 
avoid distributional conflicts. It is an institution that has evolved in response to 
market failures, a Coasian solution to some problems associated with social 
costs’.567 Thus, CSR can be looked at ‘as an effort to take actions which reduce the 
extent of externalized cost’.568 On the other hand, Beltratti emphasised the 
importance of CSR by highlighting the weaknesses and shortcomings of the 
shareholder model and the agency theory: ‘CSR is an attempt to escape profit 
maximization in the recognition that agency problems and incomplete contracts 
undermine the basic idea of shareholders supremacy.’569 
Keeping the stakeholder point of view as the main focus, Koehn has defined 
corporate governance as ‘the art of governing in a principled fashion so as to 
maximize the welfare of the company and its relevant stakeholders’.570 He further 
added that  
[t]he agency problem involved in corporate governance would thus be better 
addressed not only with legal safeguards and economic incentives, but also with 
trust building institutional practices, governing well would thus ultimately mean 
acting in a trust worthy fashion. No company will ever succeed in the long run if it is 
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not trusted by its customers, employees, suppliers, advisors, shareholders and other 
important stakeholders.
571
 
This assertion shows the importance of having good ethical practices in running a 
corporation, which helps to build a strong case for justifying the stakeholder and 
CSR method of governance. 
Koehn’s assertion regarding businesses being run on a relationship of trust can be 
construed as an attempt to reconcile the characteristics of ethics into business. Virtue 
has been used interchangeably with ethics by philosophers like Aristotle, who wrote 
that ‘[e]thics deals with the whole range of manifestations of virtue, from “fine 
actions” to “character”- which enable a state’s citizens to aspire to the good life’.572 
The philosophical debate surrounding the fulfilment of man’s desire in society asks 
the question: are ethics enough to ensure happiness or fulfilment in a society?  
Sisson has argued that although ethics play a major role in the life of humans, 
external or material goods play an equally important part and so ethics without an 
external motivator like economics/commerce are meaningless.
573
 
Confirming this, writers like Freeman have also argued that ‘ethical issues are as 
much a part of economic and business as accounting, finance, marketing and 
management’.574 This statement supplements his assertion that the separation 
thesis
575
 as understood by academics is ‘bankrupt discourse’, meaning that the 
conception of business as amoral is wrong. Another way to look at the separation 
thesis is from the point of view of the agency theory, which would presumably take 
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the following stance: the management of the company is to be concerned with only 
the profit maximising function of the company at all costs, ignoring or rejecting all 
other claims whether ethical or not. Conversely, the stakeholder theory holds that 
rather than there being one goal of a business (profit maximisation), there are a 
multitude goals of which profits are merely one. Other goals include the pursuit of a 
common good, building a relationship of trust amongst the stakeholders and 
establishing a sound crisis management policy that would affect many stakeholders 
and society generally, whether direct or indirect. 
 The purposes of both virtue and business activities in a society are therefore similar, 
i.e. to pursue human fulfilment and happiness and eventually to pursue the common 
good for society in general.
576
 Thus, the immediate objective of a corporation is to 
provide the conditions that make the acts of virtue possible so that pursuits of goals 
such as the common good and formation of sound crisis management policies for the 
stability of the financial system are facilitated, keeping in view all relevant 
stakeholders.
577
 This is similar to the point of view in Islamic business ethics 
regarding trusteeship (kifalah) where the interests of the society are given 
precedence over that of the individual and thus in the long term the individual is 
benefited as part of the collective.
578
 The individual is taken as a trustee for the 
economic resources that he owns as the vicegerent of God and subsequently of 
society, revealing a major similarity between the stakeholder standpoint and the 
Islamic theories.
579
 
Therefore, ethics and economy are dependent upon each other. Sisson has argued 
that based on the Aristotelian teachings ‘all economic activity (firms, corporations) 
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should function under the guidance of ethics, which is the practical science of acts of 
virtue (which is considered to be supreme human excellence)’.580 He then continues 
by stating that ‘the economy has as its mission to facilitate the practices of virtue or 
ethics by establishing favourable material conditions amongst the citizens of a 
state’.581 As espoused by the concept of falah in the Islamic business ethics 
model,
582
 the pursuit of profit cannot be taken as the end in itself for any model. This 
‘end’ is the fulfilment of human happiness and pursuit of common good for the 
society, which cannot be achieved without the presence of ethics. Building upon this 
particular argument, it can be seen why the shareholder model of corporate 
governance fails to fulfil these requirements and why the stakeholder model and the 
CSR model of corporate governance are the best possible models of corporate 
governance for all IFIs as will be observed in the next section. 
 
5. The Stakeholder theory and its suitability for Islamic financial institutions 
The stakeholder theory addresses the argument of regarding the question of in whose 
favour the corporation should be run. But the underlying issue with the concept itself 
is the matter of defining who is to be considered a stakeholder.  Having discussed 
the different views on who should or should not be included as a stakeholder for any 
organisation, the only definition that is satisfactory theoretically as well as 
practically is that given by Thomson,
583
 and subsequently endorsed by Freeman,
584
 
where the stakeholder concept denotes ‘those groups which make a difference’, or 
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more formally: ‘A stakeholder in an organization is any group or individual who can 
effect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.’585 
By using this particular definition of a stakeholder, the manager will see different 
groups involved directly or indirectly with the organization as having a stake in the 
organisation. The stakeholder concept will therefore denote legitimacy by 
demanding that managers give due weight to the concerns of these groups in order to 
positively affect the direction of the organisation.
586
 This would more clearly define 
what managers should spend in terms of time and resources on these stakeholders 
without any regard to the appropriateness of their demands. This results in giving 
legitimacy to the demands of all stakeholder and not only the shareholders.
587
 
Freeman and other academics that support the stakeholder theory as a corporate 
governance model have provided their endorsement because they are of the view 
that the consequences of not adopting this approach may very well lead to the 
company suffering from legal action, regulation compliancy costs and damaging 
regulation and the loss of market share to foreign competitors who can satisfy 
stakeholder needs.
588
 This shows how important the integration of the stakeholders is 
in running an efficient and successful company both strategically and legally.
589
 The 
other point that is made clear is the role that the government plays if stakeholders’ 
concerns are not taken into account. A very strong case of regulating corporations by 
the government and quasi-government agencies can be made under the stakeholder 
approach because the government is also considered a stakeholder due to the 
direct/indirect effects of their policies. Consequently, the overall policy that the 
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government would implement for the business environment will have to reflect these 
stakeholder concerns and ensure compliance with those policies by the 
corporations.
590
 
This has been seen in the recent financial crisis when governments exercised 
minimal intervention in supervising important industries like banking and financial 
services. This non-interventionist role of governments led to banks being run merely 
for profits and ‘projected’ (artificial and superficial) profits manufactured by 
unethical practices.
591
 As long as the bank’s financial situation on paper was strong 
and the shareholders were getting dividends, there was no inquiry into the way those 
profits were being made. Government agencies declined to intervene until the 
collapse was all but inevitable. This non-interventionist policy led to the downfall of 
the wider economy simply because banks and other financial institutions have 
become such an integral part of the economy and their failure had a domino effect 
on other industries.
592
 Thus, Freeman and other academics who propagate the 
stakeholder theory as the principal strategic and planning practice for the modern 
corporation - whether a bank or otherwise - are right to do so. Their assertions are 
valid because the inherent risk of making firms accountable solely to shareholders is 
very high.
593
  One of the reasons for the antagonism towards the company being 
responsible solely to the shareholders is the belief that they may not be interested in 
anything other than their share prices going up. Further, they may also be 
underqualified to absorb and decipher all of the complex information regarding the 
market, thus increasing the chances of the managers running the corporation for their 
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own whims and wishes, again bringing doubt to the hypothesis of the rational 
shareholder.
594
 
One of the primary advantages of using the stakeholder concept to govern IFIs is its 
roots in an ethical ideology which is expected in business dealings. As proposed by 
Domènec Melé and Manuel Guillén: 
 
[a] stakeholder approach grounded in ethical theories presents a perspective of 
corporate social responsibility in which ethics is central. This represents clear 
progress in the understanding of the integration of ethics into strategic management. 
In fact, there is a connection between strategic thought and ethical reasoning.
595
 
According to Freeman, the term ‘stakeholder’ must be able to encompass a wide 
range of potential claimants.
596
 As previously discussed, any individual or group 
who may affect or who may be affected by the actions of the organisation shall be 
considered a stakeholder. According to this definition, it must also be taken into 
account that the concerns of such a group or individual should not be neglected as 
they may negatively influence the achievement of an organizations goal. Building on 
this concept of stakeholder, a strategic management point of view will thus take into 
account the capability of an organisation to manage the relationships with its specific 
stakeholder groups in a practical or action-oriented way.
597
 
As already discussed, it was Freeman whose seminal work popularized the 
stakeholder concept from a mere afterthought to a plausible theory for management 
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and policy.
598
 Freeman was of the view that the business environment globally has 
always ‘dealt with non-market stakeholders’ with the internal and external changes 
taking place especially post-WWII, within Anglo-American corporations.
599
 With 
globalisation taking its stride, the simple explanation of the firm as merely a 
resource conversion entity was no longer appropriate. According to Freeman, the 
internal changes that have changed the face of the business environment include 
those relating to owners, customers, employees and suppliers.
600
 The interaction of 
these and other factors (internal and external) necessitates a change in policy at the 
management and governmental level. The external changes that Freeman refers to 
are the expansion of federal, state and local government business-related activities. 
Increases in foreign competition, consumer activism and the growth of special 
interest groups like unions, environmental protection groups and gun control groups 
have also played a significant role in shaping the way that the firm is looked at from 
a stakeholder’s perspective.601 These changes all require a revamp of the current 
strategic and policy-based decision-making processes to integrate stakeholder theory 
into firms’ overall structure not as outsiders but as integral parts of the process. 
It can be said that there are three levels at which we can divide an organisation as far 
as its ability to manage its relationship with the stakeholder is concerned.
602
 This 
will give a better understanding of how and when to interact with a particular group 
of stakeholders. These are set out as follows: 
The first level is the rational level;
603
 the most basic level on which it is decided 
which groups and individuals can actually affect or be affected by the organisation 
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achieving a particular purpose. Hence, there is a need to identify specific 
stakeholders on this first level. This analysis will be detailed as regards the particular 
influence of a group and how that influence may arise.
604
 This strategy will be 
important from both a managerial and a legal point of view, thus the overall strategy 
will have to take into account the underlying legal relationships between the 
company and the stakeholders and how these relationships may be influenced 
adversely or positively.
605
 The other issue is deciphering what constitutes a “stake”. 
Freeman considers any influence, whether monetary, political or social, as 
sufficient.
606
 There is also a further category of stake which may be seen as a middle 
ground between the traditional conception of stake as equity and Dill’s definition of 
a kibitzer, called the ‘market stake’ by Freeman.607 
The other definition of ‘stake’ that Freeman has offered is characterised by means of 
the power or influence that the stakeholder has over the organisation. This ‘power’ 
can be divided into three further types of powers; namely voting powers (owners 
have this), economic power (customers and suppliers) and political power (the 
government).
608
 These categories are not mutually exclusive because according to 
Freeman, these powers and players overlap each other’s boundaries and may 
interfere with each other’s powers without awareness that they are doing so. But 
from a managerial or organizational point of view these differences may be vital for 
developing strategy. This is specifically true for the investment account holders 
(IAHs) in the IFIs who are major stakeholders, being investors and depositors, but 
have neither the protection of the traditional depositors nor the authority of the 
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traditional shareholders.
609
 This leaves them vulnerable to the abuse of power by 
management, which in essence means that IFI need to establish such a legal 
framework and governance structure where by the IAHs are given adequate power 
and authority. Thus it is even more important for IFIs to focus on a corporate 
governance model which is stakeholder-oriented.
610
 The drawback of this particular 
level is that there may actually be a problem when the stakeholder perceptions are 
not in line with those of the organisation. This introduces the need to explore other 
levels of analysis. 
The second level is the organisational/process level.  In order to manage their 
relationship with stakeholders, the management will generally rely on set procedures 
and patterns, and these procedures will give us a better understanding of which 
processes are actually more useful.
611
  This level of interaction between the 
management and stakeholders is vital to IFIs’ governance model because of their 
inherent nature of having a diverse range of stakeholders being involved in their 
operation including, inter alia, normal depositors, IAHs, shareholders, employees 
and the SSB.
612
 Some of these stakeholders - being unique to the Islamic finance 
industry - require more attention because of the number of stakeholders that are 
involved an IFI are more than their conventional counterparts, thus making it even 
more imperative for IFIs to be governed via a stakeholder model of governance.
613
 
The third level is the transactional level.
614
 This tries to explain how managers carry 
out transactions with the stakeholders, how managers interact and what resources 
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they allocate towards that interaction. At this level, managers will be carrying out 
many different types of transaction with different stakeholders, and these 
transactions will result in many tangible strategic and managerial decisions being 
taken accordingly. For example, the more common transactions would be with the 
government, employees, the media and the consumers, all of which will determine 
how the company will react to different issues. In the case of an IFI, there will be 
additional categories of stakeholder like the SSB, IAHs and the two-tiered regulatory 
bodies (one for regulating the sharia aspects and another for regulating the normal 
functioning of an IFI as a corporation). Thus, this level of interaction between the 
IFI and the concerned stakeholders will be an important feature of the stakeholder 
model of governance.
615
 
According to Freeman, a good company would be expected to understand this 
interaction process and adapt accordingly.
616
 For example, when a significant 
amount of consumers become unhappy about a certain aspect of a company or its 
product, the company which responds well to that particular group of stakeholders 
will be considered a success. Similarly, an organisation that understands and 
responds accordingly to the demands or reservations of the stakeholder map as a 
whole will be more aware of the external environment of the company. 
Freeman also notes that the problem with understanding and implementing the 
stakeholder philosophy is not an external one, rather than there being problems with 
the stakeholders the actual battleground lies within the company.
617
 It is the lack of 
managerial understanding of the stakeholder concept and its likely implications on 
the business environment as a whole that leads to the lacklustre interaction with the 
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stakeholders. Also, so long as managers remain ignorant to this issue, the business 
community as a whole will remain stagnant and unresponsive to changing practices 
both externally and internally. This is even more pronounced for the Islamic 
financial industry, wherein managers have to be aware of the dual nature of the 
entity and have to respond accordingly. In essence, this means that the management 
will have to take decisions which will be acceptable by the shareholders and create 
wealth whilst also complying with the sharia precepts and focusing on the societal 
needs of a number of stakeholders.
618
 
 Furthermore, Freeman was of the view that the best way to implement the 
stakeholder approach is by means of ‘voluntarism’ since the change has to come 
from within.
619
 One major concern for Freeman was that the cost of other means of 
implementing this approach are too high as there are many stakeholders involved 
and to cater for all of them externally is next to impossible. Freeman asserted that 
the only solution is that managers become aware of the stakeholders around them 
and act accordingly.
620
 Instead of trying to hide from the impending issues, they 
should voluntarily embrace and work with them and incorporate them into their 
strategies and day to day dealings. It is thus argued that in such a case, a meta-
regulatory framework with a mixture of both voluntarism as well as some 
enforcement powers by a supranational regulatory authority is the most optimal way 
of regulating IFI internationally. 
Friedman and Miles argue that the most common way of classifying stakeholders is 
to ‘consider groups of people with a distinguishable relationship with corporations: 
shareholders, customers, suppliers and distributors, employees and local 
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communities’.621 Another issue, according to Friedman, is whether the stakeholders 
are to be confined to those that are crucial for the achievement of corporate 
objectives, or if they include any entity that is directly or indirectly affected by the 
company’s operations or actions. The latter definition may be too wide, as it may 
result in difficulties identifying whether a particular individual is a stakeholder, since 
the effects of a business in modern economies are widely felt.  However, from an 
Islamic finance point of view, corporate objectives should normatively be towards 
contributing to societal wellbeing and achieving distributive justice. Consequently, 
the list of potential stakeholders has to be longer than those accepted by 
conventional financial institutions.
622
 
Thus, Freeman and Bowie (and Reed in his works with Freeman) have divided this 
definition further into two different parts: the wide definition (which encompasses 
all those indirectly and directly affected by the workings of a corporation) and the 
narrow definition (which focuses on the distinguishable legal relationships that a 
company may have with its core stakeholders).
623
 Accordingly, for IFIs, the 
categories of stakeholders falling within both these classifications are the IAHs, the 
SSB, the employees,
624
 the depositors, the shareholders, the regulators,
625
 their 
customers
626
 and if extended slightly further society as a whole may also form a 
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group of stakeholders that the IFI owes a duty to indirectly and directly under the 
sharia rules.
627
 
Another area of concern in the definitional debate is the unclear role of the 
managers. Some writers have considered them as stakeholders but others have 
treated them more significantly and considered them as the main focal point of the 
organisation.
628
 The significance of the role of managers in this debate cannot be 
underestimated and it is very important to actually distinguish what the managers do 
in the corporation in general. The role of the managers has to be viewed from the 
perspective of the stakeholders as to how they manage their relationship with them 
i.e. how well they cater to the needs of the stakeholders and how well they integrate 
them into their vision of the company and the corporate policy.
629
 It is thus argued 
that management of the IFI has to be stakeholder-oriented, not only for the economic 
benefit of the IFI but as a matter of legal and religious duty as espoused by the basic 
principles of Islamic economics.
630
 
Another important factor for defining the stakeholder is to identify which of them 
have a fiduciary relationship, and accordingly those who are owed fiduciary duties 
may be classed as primary stakeholders and those who aren’t are classed as 
secondary stakeholders.
631
 
Donaldson and Preston have distinguished between influencers and simple 
stakeholders.
632
 However, there may be an overlap in this distinction; there may be 
some who influence the corporation and have no stake (such as the media), whilst 
                                                          
627
 Naqvi (n 156)  
628
 Jensen and Meckling (n 349) 
629
 Freeman (n 459) 
630
 M U Chapra and H Ahmed, Corporate Governance In Islamic Financial Institutions (Islamic 
Development Bank and Islamic Research and Training Institute. Jeddah 2002) 
631
 A L Friedman and S Miles, Stakeholders: Theory And Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2006) 
632
 Donaldson And Preston (n 362) 83 
170 
 
similarly there may also be some who may have a stake but no influence (such as job 
applicants), and then there may further still be those who are both stakeholders and 
influencers like the stockholders.
633
 
Another justification for employing the stakeholder concept as the underlying ethos 
is based on the premise that all stakeholders provide a source of capital implicitly 
and explicitly by means of the different services and activities that they carry out. 
Blair, Etzioni, and Schlossberger present this justification in their defences of why 
stakeholders should form an integral part of the company.
634
 This is most pertinent 
for the IAHs in an IFI who do actually contribute capital for the IFI but are 
overlooked as being owed a legal duty as understood under conventional law. This is 
why IFIs need to have a structure in place which caters to this particular class of 
stakeholders specifically.
635
 
 Blair has stated that the current conception of shareholders as capital providers for 
businesses is a concept that has its roots in history, dating back to when corporations 
were involved in setting up railway lines and operating canals.
636
 It was in these 
scenarios that the initial investors were relied upon for initial investment and thus 
they were the largest stakeholders in the corporations’ operations. According to 
Blair, this conception of the stakeholder is now redundant as investment has moved 
away from being reliant upon capital intensive wealth generation to the 
incorporation of more intangible assets, where the ‘skills and the ability of the 
workforce and the ability of the organization as a whole to put those skills to work 
for customers and clients’ is now considered investment as much as capital 
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contributions.
637
 Thus, the validity of the shareholders having a legal and moral 
claim based on their capital contribution is no longer as certain, further weakening 
the viability of the shareholder primacy view.  
Schlossberger has gone a step further, propagating that all businesses have a 
fiduciary duty towards stakeholders, not because of any underlying social or implicit 
contract, but because stakeholders are a type of shareholder that has invested capital 
in the business.
638
 This is so because all businesses have two types of capital; 
‘specific capital’ and ‘opportunity capital’ (this is well-suited for the Islamic 
banking model of IAHs and shareholders), the latter of which is attributable to the 
stakeholders, rendering them a shareholder of sorts whilst the former type is 
conventional equity capital attributable to shareholders and partners. This 
‘opportunity capital’ is provided by the society as a whole by way of material 
infrastructure, educational systems, monetary systems, policing and also the 
infrastructure of knowledge. Schlossberger argues that this capital is present and 
available to all businesses and whether they exploit it or not is up to them, but that 
since society does in fact provide these facilities they are to be considered a category 
of shareholders regardless.
639
 
 Following from this argument, ‘society is a shareholder in every business venture, 
though not the same type of shareholder as stockowners’.640 Thus, every stakeholder 
is simultaneously a sort of shareholder and every business venture in a capitalist 
nation is both privately and publicly owned concurrently.
641
 This means that 
corporations ‘have the same kind of fiduciary obligation to society as to 
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stockholders’.642 This can, in strategic and policy terms, be read as saying that the 
responsibility of the corporation to take into account the interest of non-stockholding 
shareholders is not merely a responsibility and a constraint on the corporation and its 
management; rather, it is a part of the ‘corporate objective’. Hence, according to 
Friedman and Miles,
643
 the compelling nature of this argument by Schlossberger lies 
with its provision of that ‘a criterion for deciding on what degree of ownership is 
required of government’.644 Thus, this idea is based on the concept of property 
ownership, which cannot be considered an absolute right that allows one to do as 
one pleases at the detriment of others. Furthermore, it becomes a part of the 
governmental obligation to establish a variety of public/private ownership 
relationships and the more public the business is, the heavier it will demand 
opportunity capital and then consequently the higher the obligations are to the 
opportunity investors.  This idea of individual actors not having an absolute right in 
property ownership is very similar to the idea of property ownership in Islamic 
finance literature and draws a very apparent parallel to the Islamic financial ethos,
645
 
giving the idea of stakeholder theory credence in both Islamic literature as well as 
conventional corporate governance literature.
646
 It can then further be argued that 
IFIs need to be governed under a stakeholder-oriented model and not the en vogue 
neoliberal shareholder primacy model. 
6. Stakeholder Theory and ethics: legal duties vs moral duties 
Freeman refused to accept there was any singular stakeholder theory; rather, 
stakeholder theory is merely a genre.
647
 This view of his is motivated by what he 
                                                          
642
 Schlossberger (n 614) 62 
643
 Friedman and Miles (n 464) 
644
 Schlossberger (n 614) 
645
 For a detailed discussion refer back to chapter 2 of this thesis 
646
 M U Chapra, Islam and The Economic Challenge (Leicester, The Islamic Foundation 1992) 
647
 Freeman (n 368) 
173 
 
calls ‘pragmatism’ as this then ‘leads to one of many ways to blend together the 
central concepts of business with those of ethics’.648 It was Freeman who took the 
stakeholder concept from being a simple discussion point to a practical strategy that 
could be employed both at the company and the state level. Thus, Freeman can 
easily be called the ‘father’ of the modern day stakeholder concept. 
Since Freeman’s conception of the stakeholder is normative, spelling out how 
corporations should be governed and how mangers should act, it can be argued that 
the stakeholder theory encompasses the normative ethical/moral question. It does so 
by defining the relationships between all the stakeholders and how they are managed 
ethically, keeping in view the requirements of society in general, and thus translates 
theory into practice by giving concrete suggestions as to how to go about 
implementing these ethical standards.
649
 
According to Freeman, one of the major reasons of the scepticism about business 
ethics is the fact that the managers in the corporation are deemed to be agents of the 
company and this makes business ethics a part of a broader question of agents’ 
responsibility to companies in general. This also helps us understand what kind of a 
duty is owed to the company by the managers.
650
 This posits the question whether 
this agency relationship of the managers with the company as a whole overrides 
other moral rules and issues like the responsibility of the managers towards the 
larger stakeholder community, as opposed to being focused purely on increasing the 
value of the company stock.
651
 
Since the morality or ethics of a company can be taken to mean the aggregate of its 
individual actors like the managers and stockholders, the question that can then be 
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asked is: what does a company aim to achieve? Or more deliberately, as Goodpaster 
and Donaldson have asked, what is the nature of corporate responsibility?
652
 The 
answer according to the neoliberal economist and agency theory proponents is 
simply ‘to increase its profits as long as it stays within the rules of the game.’653 But 
for business ethics, CSR and stakeholder proponents the answer is completely 
different. They take profit maximisation as one of the aims of the corporation and do 
not consider it as the end in itself. For them, the end is the common good of the 
society, whereby corporations consider their social and ethical responsibilities 
whenever taking actions and pursuing strategies; something which is resonant in 
Islamic finance literature. 
 Friedman’s point of view is based on the rational choice theory, which states that all 
rational human beings will make choices which will further their own interests, 
which in the case of the company and its stock holders and managers is to maximise 
the value of the company.
654
 The rational choice theory has already been proven to 
be based on the wrong presumptions by writers like Wood,
655
 Mitnick,
656
 Arrow,
657
 
and Zimmerli and Assländer.
658
 The argument given by the neoliberal proponents 
against the stakeholder and business ethics point of view is this: why should or why 
would a stockholder/investor put in money to benefit someone else like the other 
components of society (the ‘indirectly affected stakeholders’)? One of the counter 
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arguments to this rational choice theory comes in the shape of the Integrated Social 
Contract Theory (the ISCT) as proposed by Donaldson and Dunfree.
659
  
ISCT has its roots in the writing of Thomas Hobbes, who said that people tacitly 
consent to join together in societies and at least tacitly agree to laws and regulations 
on their behaviour, so that they can live in harmony and achieve their own ends in 
relation to others.
660
 Donaldson and Dunfree have taken this to mean that there are 
basic moral norms or ‘hyper norms’ that govern all social relations at both the 
macro- and micro-level.
661
 Like all other segments of society, these norms are 
practiced at the company level as well. At the micro-level, however, there are free 
moral spaces in this regard which are to be fulfilled by the said organisation in line 
with macro-level norms. So long as the macro- and micro-level norms do not 
contradict each other, they will be acceptable.
662
 
This can then translate to mean that at a company level the rational choice theory is 
not an absolute statement and ought to be qualified by norms both at the macro- and 
the micro-level. So, if a profit maximising company is not meeting its ethical and 
moral obligations it will no longer be an acceptable justification for acting in any 
particular fashion as is deemed necessary by the management of the company.
663
 
However, according to Freeman even this conception of the ISCT does not 
completely solve the conundrum that faces the legal and business community at the 
micro-level. Accordingly, it is ‘the stakeholder theory that bridges the gap by 
eliminating the macro/micro distinction’664 and it is argued that for an industry based 
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on moral and ethical aspects like the Islamic finance industry, the stakeholder model 
for corporate governance is the best available. This is so because it fulfils all criteria 
of the Islamic economic and business ethos as well as providing modern IFIs with an 
acceptable mode of operation in all jurisdictions. 
Stakeholder theory brings in the dual concept of values and morality working in a 
practical environment; something that both the individual moral point of view and 
the agency theory cannot offer. The agency theory focuses purely on one facet of the 
whole agent principal relationship of maximising profitability and value, whilst on 
the other hand the moral/ethical point of view only focuses on the values and 
normative issues of ethics regarding what a company ought to do without touching 
upon the practical aspects of the business environment.
665
 As Freeman puts it,  
Stakeholder theory, by calling attention to the variety of roles that can be occupied 
by individuals all of whom have a moral stake in the organization, can thus provide a 
framework for understanding and explicating the possibility of conflict of values, of 
loyalty, of commitment and of interests.
666
   
This stakeholder theory also then goes on to counter the argument that the 
corporation is ‘soulless’, by stating that the business or at least their managers 
behave in a way that safeguards the soul of the corporation.
667
 Thus, the corporation 
is given a value-laden soul which would and should take into account moral and 
ethical issues whenever conducting business. Clarkson has said that even though the 
concept of CSR is a good idea in theory, it is unworkable on a voluntary basis as the 
corporation cannot be expected to act benevolently unless they are either forced to or 
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the corporation sees a benefit in it for itself.
668
 Thus, CSR and stakeholder policy is 
only effective if combined with the regulatory and legal framework for enforcement. 
Otherwise, the idea becomes worthless apart from as a marketing tool. The best 
solution is therefore to combine the two solutions of having meta-regulations for 
enforcing CSR and the stakeholder concept. 
The underlying idea of the firm being a ‘soulless’ corporation was the pretext to the 
stakeholder debate’s importance in both managerial and legal literature on the 
company. The alleged lack of the ‘soul’ in a corporation has been filled in by the 
value laden stakeholder concept, which is a moral theory regarding values being 
attributed to non-living beings. In this context, values are attributed to the company 
by virtue of the managers’ value judgements.  
The stakeholder theory as promulgated by Freeman thus affirms the Islamic point of 
view regarding business activity having a moral and ethical foundation, at the same 
time questions the separation thesis by removing the distinction between descriptive 
roles of all the stakeholders, preferring to attribute normative roles to them (the 
stakeholders).
669
 The stakeholder theory also asserts that all stakeholders have an 
intrinsic value in running the company and therefore also removes the distinction 
between the moral/ethical and practical aspects of business.
670
 These two aspects of 
the stakeholder theory can thence be taken as arguments supporting the notion that 
the stakeholder theory is indeed the best method of reconciling the moral/ethical 
aspects of the company’s working with the practical aspects.671 This assertion will 
hold true at both the macro- and the micro-level for the Islamic finance industry as 
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encompassing the value laden concepts that are embodied in the sharia rules 
regarding finance and economics.   
It is also asserted that another important question needs clarification. That is, ‘what 
is the role of the company?’ This can best be answered by the help of the stakeholder 
theory. Freeman and Evans state that ‘the very purpose of the firm (and thus its 
managers) is to serve as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder interests’, which is 
similar to the concept of financial intermediation in Islamic finance literature.
672
 
This therefore serves as a solid foundational theory for the governance of Islamic 
financial institutions.  Freeman then continues by saying that ‘[i]t is through the firm 
that each stakeholder group makes itself better off through voluntary exchange. The 
corporation serves at the pleasure of its stakeholders and none may be used as a 
means to the ends of another without full rights of participation of that decision’.673 
This is also a notion which forms the basis of financial intermediation in Islamic 
financial literature, where business entities are deemed to be vessels through which 
the two main purposes of distributive justice are served. The first is the involvement 
of as many stakeholders as possible and the second is the discouragement of 
hoarding and interest-based transactions by encouraging society to form partnerships 
between those who have resources and those who have the ability to manage and act 
as agents (partnerships or the musharaka and mudaraba form of contracts). This 
way the wealth is circulated amongst society and hoarding and speculation are 
discouraged.
674
 
This statement shows that all stakeholders not only have a moral claim but also a 
fiduciary and legal claim on the workings of the firm and thus the collective morality 
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of the all the stakeholders involved in the process of decision-making in the 
corporation forms what may be termed the ‘morality’ of the corporation.675  It is this 
morality that would give rise to the ethical standards that the corporation decides to 
implement, and thus answers sceptics who question the role of ethics in business. It 
is thus inevitable to have ethics in a business no matter the size of the corporation. 
Once it is established that the company owes fiduciary and moral duties to other 
components of society, it becomes easier to ensure compliance by outlining the 
standards expected. The contribution of the stakeholder literature in the field of 
corporate governance cannot be underestimated, since it clearly establishes and 
highlights any and all relationships that may exist between a firm and its partners.
676
 
Furthermore, the field of CSR the stakeholder theory has contributed in two different 
ways; the first being the fact that stakeholder theory defines and outlines the 
importance of information channels in the relationship and secondly, the stakeholder 
theory highlights the importance of the role of the stakeholders in the corporation by 
conceptualising information as a crucial element allowing the organisation to 
manage its relationships.
677
 
On the other hand, in conventional corporate governance literature it was the major 
concern about the big corporation being run from mere profits that prompted the 
government(s) and academics alike to respond with a requirement that the 
corporation be run not solely for the economic benefit of the stockholder, but that 
the corporation should be more socially responsible and consider a wider range of 
stakeholders when deciding upon a course of action.
678
  Hence, the concept of the 
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stakeholder was born alongside the requirement that corporations act in a more 
socially responsible way. This is the reason that the stakeholder and CSR literature 
have somewhat similar underlying themes and ideas that are at times used 
interchangeably. Both derive their philosophical roots from the business ethics 
literature and are thus suitable governance and regulatory frameworks for the 
Islamic financial industry. 
 
7. Common good and the stakeholder theory 
Taking its cue from the domain of morality and religious ethics, Argandona has 
furthered the conceptual understanding of the stakeholder theory in light of what he 
calls the ‘common good’ concept, which according to him is the only economic 
concept that is based on religious rather than philosophical values.
679
 This concept is 
associated with natural law and Christian theologians like Saint Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas. In drawing an analogy between this theory and the debate 
surrounding corporate governance, it is argued that the common good of the 
company ought to be to create the condition that will enable its members to achieve 
their personal goals. This means that the company will have achieved its own goals 
when the stakeholders achieve their respective personal goals. The common good 
obligations of the company extend ‘from the common good of the company itself to 
that of the local community, the country and all human kind, including future 
generations’.680 Under this theory, stakeholders seem to provide a transmission 
mechanism of different routes whereby company obligations move from the good of 
the company itself to that of society at the macro-level.
681
 Again, according to 
Argandona, ‘to the extent that the company develops its common good, all will have 
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a share in it (although in different ways and different proportions)’.682 Thus, the 
common good doctrine seems to propose the idea of social and distributive justice. 
Even though this idea of common good is a worthy manifestation of what a 
corporation should strive for, there are some difficulties when trying to translate 
theory into practice and this difficulty is seen clearly in the debate between the 
proponents of the stakeholder, business ethics, CSR and those that prefer 
shareholder primacy. To translate this concept into practice, many things may 
require clarification. For example, what is the underlying concept of common good? 
Does this concept transcend national boundaries? How many people in a society 
need to be considered before concluding that common good has been achieved?
683
 
These are the kind of arguments that can only be countered by a system of regulation 
and intermediation which can categorically take into account the moral, ethical and 
religious values of business.
684
 It is consequently argued that the only plausible and 
pragmatic answer can come from a stakeholder-oriented approach towards 
business.
685
 
 To further this argument, writers like Murray have asked a further question about 
the role of the corporation, the answer of which will determine how the corporation 
is to be run.
686
 The question that he poses is whether we should look at an 
organisation such as a corporation or a bank ‘as a social organism meeting human 
needs of the many (society)’687 or as ‘an impersonal mechanism for financial 
processing, creating wealth for the few’.688 These questions can be used to define 
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and outline the corporate governance debate and resolve the issues surrounding the 
stakeholders and the CSR debate. Business ethicists like Collier and Roberts have 
argued for an interrelation between ethics and corporate governance issues, and state 
that ethics form an integral part of the corporate governance debate.
689
 They further 
say that in the corporate governance debate the role of the stakeholder theory is 
indispensable because it is the stakeholder concerns that answer the questions raised 
in the context of managerial decision-making. 
The interplaying role of corporate governance and ethics in practice ensures that 
managers take decisions that minimise risk and maximise opportunities for both the 
business and society. The business managers’ ethical decisions thus aim to increase 
value for both, and this solves one of the major conflicts in the modern day 
corporations; between a company making profits and acting responsibly towards 
society and its non-investor stakeholders (or in short, the pursuit of common good). 
The government also plays a significant role in ensuring that these corporate 
governance issues are well addressed and issues pertaining to ethics are taken into 
account by enforcing regulation and laws.
690
 Sternberg summarises the argument by 
saying that business ethics are essential for good corporate governance because it is 
of value to all corporations big and small, since it is valued by all the stakeholders 
involved in these corporations and as a result good corporate governance actually 
helps in the pursuit of common good at both the macro- and the micro-level.
691
 
Even though common good is a moral/ethical concept, it is wrong to assume that 
there is no uniform answer to what common good is in a society. For business 
ethicists and stakeholder proponents, the answer is simple: the achievement of 
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distributive and socioeconomic justice
692
 by a system whereby wealth and other 
social benefits are distributed uniformly.
693
 ‘Uniformly’ here does not necessarily 
mean that all people will have the same amount of wealth or benefit, but rather that 
the financial system should have such mechanisms whereby no one category of 
stakeholders are any worse off because of another category of stakeholder.
694
 For 
example, the shareholders of a corporation should not become better off at the cost 
of any other stakeholder e.g. the environment or the general public.
695
 In other 
words, the profit making of the corporation has to be kept in perspective of 
improving the external environment in which the corporation works.
696
 This aim is 
the manifestation of the Islamic financial ethos as well, and it is argued that 
stakeholder theory being based on business ethics and CSR theories is actually a 
manifestation of Islamic finance’s basic principles and ideology and thus they are 
completely compatible.
697
 
It follows that the idea of common good is a moral constraint on all offices, 
including those of the managers,
698
 and the misuse of this power causes friction 
partly because of the failure to coordinate the self-interests of all the individual 
players in the organisation. This aggregate coordination is an example of how the 
stakeholder theory intends to look at the role of the managers, such as a role which 
involves the resolution of all conflicts of interest amongst the stakeholders involved 
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in a particular decision.
699
 This decision-making process lies at the heart of the 
stakeholder theory, since it shows that no decision is taken to benefit one category of 
stakeholders at the cost of another. Following this, the managers are no longer to 
pursue profit maximisation of stockholders if that pursuit is in contradiction to the 
welfare of any other category of persons like creditors, employees, the environment 
and the community at large.
700
 
Viewed from another angle, we see that the pursuit of the common good renders the 
managers as agents not merely for the shareholders but rather for all of the 
stakeholders thus making them fiduciaries of the entire firm and its stakeholders.
701
 
As a fiduciary, the duties of disclosure and loyalty are owed towards the corporation 
as a whole and not only to the shareholders. This duty of the manager is greatly 
distorted when he works only for the economic benefit of the shareholders.
702
 The 
sole pursuit of profit is the main reason for the rejection of the agency and 
shareholder primacy theories by the stakeholder theorists as well as the business 
ethics school, who believe that the pure pursuit of profit by managers has led to 
many corporate governance and regulatory failures in the recent past.
703
 Thus, it can 
be argued that the idea of the common good demands the inclusion of the ‘public 
good’(Maslaha) in the interests of those who have the power to decide (the 
regulators and policy makers) and this should form the basis for regulatory 
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framework for an industry like the IFI which is based on religious and moral 
principles.
704
 
It is therefore argued that the stakeholder model of corporate governance is a 
practical manifestation of business ethics and CSR philosophies and is strongly 
opposed to the self-justifying ends of pure profit making of corporations as 
supported by the shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance. These 
philosophies are in line with the ethos and aims of Islamic finance (Maqasid al 
Sharia) and business and are the most suitable models for the Islamic financial 
industry.  
 
8. Conclusion: Business ethics, the Stakeholder theory and the pursuit of 
Common good as part of the regulatory conundrum for IFIs. 
Sociological and economic researchers who propagate the concept of CSR draw an 
analogy between the social and economic controls prevalent in society to ensure 
adherence to social norms so that the rights of the individual are not violated. Within 
the corporate context, the concepts of CSR and the stakeholder theory ensures a 
basic level of participation for all the stakeholders in the company according to their 
respective stakes. These checks, enforced by the stakeholder theory, form a very 
important ‘antidote to the toxic effects of the pursuit of economic self-interest’705 
and at the same time address most of the false neoliberal presumptions built into the 
shareholder model. Furthermore, Donna Woods summed up the arguments by 
stating that  
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In this era of globalization, it is imperative that we all hold corporations accountable 
for meeting their economic goals in socially responsible and ethical ways. Capitalist 
business is the most efficient way we know of to organize an economy, but free 
markets, without any government intervention or countervailing powers, are not the 
most effective way to achieve societal goals such as environmental sustenance, 
human rights and justice. Corporation that cannot earn profits legally, ethically and 
responsibly do not deserve to survive, nor can our planet afford for businesses to 
continue to treat their stakeholders as just another ‘environmental factor’ to be 
‘managed’.706   
It is this line of argument that resonates with the Islamic finance jurisprudence, 
espoused by both contemporary and traditional writers, that propagates an ethical 
and social conception of financial intermediation with principle-based checks and 
balances proposed by religious writings. This social and ethical conception of 
financial intermediation can be furthered practically by a principle-based meta-
regulatory framework that caters for the stakeholder ideals at the international level 
to ensure proper compliance with sharia principles (Maqasid) for all IFIs. 
It is thus argued that the value laden concept of a stakeholder-oriented corporate 
governance framework is logical as well as imperative for IFIs. This is further 
necessitated by the operational paradigm and unique features of modern IFIs in the 
shape of the SSB as an additional supervisory body, having a class of 
investor/depositors (IAHs) who are both investors akin to conventional shareholders 
as well as categorised as depositors, having to work within religious and moral 
values that underpin the operational as well as ideological basis of the industry. 
Rather than having shareholders as the sole owners, the Islamic finance industry 
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needs to take into account a wider range of stakeholders when operating as financial 
intermediaries; this is in line with the conceptual fundamentals(Maqasid) of Islamic 
economics such as falah (the wellbeing of society), adalah (justice), the promotion 
of brotherhood and unity, economic freedom and distributive justice. Consequently, 
promotion of the principles of Islamic finance via modern IFIs requires a regulatory 
framework which can cater to the stakeholder nature of IFIs whilst remaining true to 
the religious ideals of maqsad sharia (the objectives of sharia). It is argued in the 
later chapters that these goals and aims can only be achieved if a principle-based 
meta-regulatory framework is instituted, which allows some operational freedom to 
individual IFIs but also maintains a compliance mechanism whereby the 
stakeholders involved are assured that Islamic financial institutions are actually 
‘Islamic’ in both substance and form, thereby maintaining the essence of Islamic 
economics and finance’s social and ethical outlook. 
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CHAPTER 6 MODERN DAY IFI PRACTICES AND FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
1 Background  
The next two chapters of this thesis are concerned with the application of sharia 
rules to the modern day IFIs, with a focus on the three basic modes of financial 
intermediation: mudarabah, musharaka and murabahah contracts. These form the 
basis of all other financial instruments used by modern IFIs and therefore these three 
contracts will be viewed from the perspective espoused by the Islamic finance 
literature and it will be questioned whether the use of these three forms of 
intermediation contracts, as practiced by modern day IFIs, are true to Islamic finance 
ideals (Maqasid al sharia of financial intermediation). In addition, the corporate 
governance and regulatory problems presented by these modes of intermediation 
shall be assessed to see whether their current use is in line with the stakeholder 
nature of the Islamic finance ethos. The other aspects that will be looked at include 
the issues surrounding the sharia supervisory boards (SSB) and the different 
categories of account holders that modern IFIs have. These aspects of the SSB and 
the account holders are particularly important from the corporate governance point 
of view as these two unique features (amongst others) merit a purely stakeholder-
oriented corporate governance mechanism. It is asserted that the current practice of 
IFIs is anything but stakeholder oriented, rather they – due to the dual reasons of 
international competitive pressure and a vacuum in the regulatory compliance and 
enforcement framework - have succumbed to the neo liberal shareholder-oriented 
model of corporate governance. This poses a systemic regulatory and governance 
risk for the IFI as an industry, especially to the stakeholders involved, and thus a 
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positive effort is needed to ensure that IFIs move towards a stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance model (both in theory and in practice) to hold true to the 
ethical and moral ideals ( the Maqasid ) of financial and economic Islamic teachings. 
 
2. Introduction 
The modern day IFI relying on the aforementioned principles
707
 of Islamic finance 
and economics utilises traditional sharia-compliant contracts making them unique in 
international financial and banking circles. This uniqueness is compounded with the 
fact that in recent time both Islamic finance as a whole and IFIs in specific have 
become increasingly popular in Islamic countries and non-Islamic Jurisdictions alike 
such as the UK, other European countries and Africa.
708
 This chapter looks at the 
most commonly used contracts which form the basis of financial intermediation in 
modern day IFIs as well as other unique features like the presence of the sharia 
supervisory boards, the Islamic window operations and the presence of investments 
account holders which are not present in conventional financial institutions. 
The bases of modern day Islamic financial institutions are the basic partnership 
forms applying profit and loss principles called mudarabah and musharaka. In 
simple terminology, the mudarabah relationship between the bank and its 
stakeholders works in the form of a partnership whereby the investing party is called 
the Rab-ul-Mal (the owner of capital) and the other party is called the mudarib (the 
agent – although similar in certain aspects to the western concept of commercial 
agents, the relationship is not the same agency relationship as understood in western 
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commercial law).
709
 This relationship can be structured in different ways to ensure 
that most needs of modern day banking are met while being compliant with the 
sharia principles relating to economics and finance. According to Vogel and Hayes, 
two principles are paramount: firstly, that the return on capital cannot be fixed and 
thus must be made a as a proportion of profits; and secondly that capital (and not 
labour) is liable to the financial risks of the venture.
710
 There are three basic methods 
of financial transactions that are used in modern day Islamic banking practices to 
form the core of financial intermediation: bay al murabaha (sale contracts), 
mudarabah (agency or trustee financing) contracts and musharakah (partnership) 
contracts along with their respective variations.
711
 
 
3. The two-tiered mudarabah and islamic window operations 
The modern day Islamic financial industry works on the basis of two models: the 
two-tiered mudarabah and the two windows model. There is also a third model of 
financial intermediation; the Islamic window that is predominantly established in the 
conventional financial institution.
712
 
 
a. The two tiered model 
The two-tiered mudarabah is the most commonly used model of Islamic financial 
intermediation.
713
 Here, based on the traditional mudarabah contract(s), the IFI 
accepts the deposits from depositors (the Rab-ul-Mal) as investments, acts as a 
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mudarib (agent) and on the basis of a profit and loss sharing contract invests the 
deposits into different investment schemes. Thence, the investors (depositors) are 
given back a pre-designated portion of profit if and when the IFI makes it.
714
 
However, it has to be remembered that there is no guarantee of any safeguard for the 
profits or even the basic deposit, since a guaranteed sum would amount to riba and 
gharar and render the operation non-compliant with sharia.
715
 In the same IFI, a 
second tier mudarabah is executed, this time between the IFI as the provider of 
finance (the Rab-ul-Mal) and the entrepreneurs who take out funds to invest under a 
contract of mudarabah with a fixed percentage of return on profits of the IFI. In this 
way, the IFI is able to balance its risks and returns while maintaining compliance 
with the Sharia based contracts.
716
 Based on the two-tiered mudarabah model of 
Islamic banking, the IFI’s has three types of account holders: current account 
holders, unrestricted investment account holders (UIA) and restricted investment 
account holders (RIA).
717
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THE TWO-TIERED MUDARABAH MODEL figure 1 
 
b.  The two window model 
The second model is called the two windows model. Here, the IFI divides its 
operation into two windows; one meant for pure demand deposits with no 
investment activities and the other is purely intended for investment purposes.  The 
demand deposit works on the basis of  amanah (trust/safekeeping) and is thus 
backed by a one hundred percent demand deposit reserve at all times.
718
 This means 
that the IFI cannot touch this particular fund for anything because the deposit 
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Islamic financial institution 
belongs to the depositors and not to the IFI. The IFI may however charge fees for 
this service of safe keeping and that is where the IFI covers its costs.
719
 The second 
window is meant as a pure investment window and the depositors place their capital 
with the prior knowledge that the IFI will be utilising the funds for investments in 
other projects which may bear risks and profits. Therefore, utilising funds for 
investment purposes ensures that the IFI may diversify their investments and make 
profits for themselves as well as the depositors.
720
 Again, it has to be asserted that no 
fixed return is promised to the depositors of the investment accounts, as this would 
be akin to riba and gharar.
721
 The utilisation of traditional Islamic contracts as a 
means to enhance profitability and compete with traditional banks has been a great 
success story for the IFI, though there are some governance and regulatory issues 
that still need to be addressed. 
 
 
SIMPLE TWO WINDOW MODEL figure 2 
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c. The Islamic window operation 
The third model utilised by certain conventional financial institutions is to use either 
of these two models and open what is called an Islamic finance (or banking) window 
in their banks, where depositors wishing to utilise Islamic finance have the chance of 
choosing the Islamic window rather than the conventional interest bearing 
facilities.
722
 These Islamic windows create certain systemic and ideological sharia 
compliance issues, the most important of which is the issue that the Islamic window 
model commingles resources and effectively eliminates any distinction between the 
conventional interest bearing funds and the sharia-compliant profit/loss funds.
723
 
This criticism has prompted most conventional banks to open a sharia-compliant IFI 
as a subsidiary rather than operating a separate window within the same bank, which 
cannot legally commingle funds from the two different operations since the 
principal/parent and subsidiary are distinct legal entities in the eyes of the law.
724
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THE ISLAMIC WINDOW OPERATION figure 3 
 
It has to be emphasised that by utilising the aforementioned three models as 
operational models for IFIs, modern day Islamic banking can both be profitable and 
sharia-compliant as well as being able to attract customers who want returns on their 
deposits (investments) from the IFI whilst still adhering to sharia-compliant 
methods of financial activity.
725
 
Another noteworthy aspect to be remembered is that the practice of utilising the two-
tiered or two windows mudarabah is allowed jurisprudentially because of the risk 
sharing between the customer (the Rab-ul-Mal/ investor) and the IFI (the 
mudarib/agent) and vice versa, an aspect which we have seen to be an integral part 
of any economic activity if it has to be in line with sharia.
726
 The risk shared here is 
that the initial capital investors (depositors) and the returns are commensurate with 
the risk of loss that an investment may face.
727
 This risk of loss is borne by both the 
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initial depositors and the Rab-ul-Mal (the owner of initial capital) in relation to their 
investments in the IFIs (the mudaribs or the agents), and the banks themselves when 
they act as the Rab-ul-Mal (investors) and invest with other customers (agents or 
mudaribs) in the form of capital investment.
728
 As a result, this simple yet effective 
mechanism has helped the Islamic finance industry to be able to compete with 
conventional banks as well as being sharia-compliant. However, the workings of 
these three basic models for Islamic financial intermediation have their own 
corporate governance and regulatory issues which will be discussed in the next 
chapters. 
Having explained the basic two-tiered mudarabah, it must be mentioned that modern 
day IFIs have developed almost a whole range of financial instruments and products 
on the basis of contracts that are deemed permissible under sharia. These contracts 
and instruments can be used to fulfil the needs of modern day commercial and 
consumer banking and are thus able to compete with conventional banks in many 
instances.
729
 These financial instruments can be categorised in many different ways. 
For example, these can be categorised as participatory and non-participatory 
instruments (which signify the role of the economic agents in the contracts), type-
based contract categories like transactional, intermediation, financial and social 
welfare contracts
730
 and subject matter based categories of contract such as contracts 
of exchange, investment, security and charity.
731
 Whichever method of 
categorisation is used, modern day IFIs primarily use the following financial 
instruments, with many overlaps between subject matter, modes of participation and 
the types of transactions. The most important and frequently utilised ones are 
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mudarabah, musharakah, murabahah, bay ( sale contracts of different types), ijarah, 
salam and rahn.
732
 Most of the contract forms and instruments are agreed upon 
amongst scholars, but where differences arise, there is a fear of ‘sharia arbitrage’; an 
issue of governance which will be dealt with in the next chapters. 
It is therefore pertinent to understand the basic workings of the three most 
commonly used financial intermediary contracts in modern day IFIs to better make 
sense of the working of modern day IFI’s. 
 
4. Mudarabah 
The mudarabah contract is considered a special kind of partnership between the 
investor and the entrepreneur or agent, where one partner (the investor or the owner 
of the capital) gives money to another (the agent) to invest it in a commercial 
enterprise.
733
 The investment comes from the first partner who is called a Rab-ul-
Mal (the economic agent with the capital) whilst the management and work is the 
exclusive responsibility of the other, called a mudarib (an agent), who then manages 
the money given to him under a trust relationship.
734
 The mudarabah transaction can 
actually be historically traced back to the Prophet Muhammad himself, who acted as 
an agent of his wife Khadija’s business,735 even though there seems to be no explicit 
or implicit acceptance of this kind of a contract in either the Qu’ran or the Hadith. It 
is however understood to have been practiced widely in Arabia before and during 
the time of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), and has thus been accepted as valid.
736
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There are also some instances where the companions of the prophet used this 
contract and the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) accepted the working.
737
 
Another Arabic term used for mudarabah is that of ‘qirad’ which also signifies the 
capital being given to an entrepreneur for undertaking any economic activity.
738
 The 
mudarabah is further subdivided into two different types: al mudarabah al 
muqayyadah (restricted mudarabah) and al mudarabah al mutlaqah (unrestricted 
mudarabah).
739
 
Based on the two-tiered mudarabah model of Islamic banking, modern IFIs offer 
three types of accounts: current accounts; unrestricted investment accounts and 
restricted investment accounts.
740 
 The current accounts are basic deposit accounts for customers, and are based on the 
relationship of amanah (safe keeping) under the sharia jurisprudence and are simple 
demand deposits.
741
 These accounts are always well capitalised and the IFI have no 
right to utilise any money from these accounts; they are to act as simple guardians of 
them. The depositors have no restrictions as to when and how much they want to 
withdraw from these accounts and thus these types of accounts hardly poses any 
major issues. 
On the other hand, the restricted and unrestricted investment accounts are a unique 
feature of the Islamic financial industry and work on the basis of restricted or 
unrestricted mudarabah contracts and must be discussed in further detail to 
understand their working and the resulting governance issues. 
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a. The restricted mudarabah 
In the first kind of mudarabah - the restricted mudarabah - the Rub-ul-Mal as the 
capital investor specifically restricts the freedom of the agent with regard to the 
particular kinds of business, the particular place for business or both of these things 
that the agent (the mudarib - in this case the IFI) may invest the capital of the 
investor in, thus restricting them as agent of the entrepreneur to only those specific 
wishes. In such a case, the mudarib shall invest the money in that particular business 
or place only.
742
 The repercussions for the mudarib for not complying with the 
wishes of the Rab-ul-Mal can be very risky in legal terms if the wishes of the 
investor are not adhered to (this will be discussed in more detail below), since under 
the restricted mudarabah the investor can hold the agent liable for any monetary loss 
that may accrue because of non-adherence to specific instruction.
743
 
 
b. The unrestricted mudarabah 
In contrast to this restrictive form of contract is the unrestricted mudarabah (al 
mudarabah al mutlaqah). Here, the Rab-ul-Mal allows full freedom to the mudarib 
to undertake whatever business he deems fit within the permissible form under the 
sharia rules.
744
 This difference between the restricted mudarabah and the 
unrestricted mudarabah are very significant because in the unrestricted variant the 
mudarib is only to contribute his labour and time into the economic activity and 
there is no financial obligation on his part even if the venture loses money,
745
 
whereas in the restricted form the mudarib may be held liable if he deviates from the 
specific wishes of the investor.  
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So in essence, the only risk the agent is taking is that of lost time and effort, the only 
exception being where the Rab-ul-Mal can prove that the loss caused to the 
endeavour was directly attributable to the negligence or intentional act of the 
mudarib.
746
 
These exceptions become very narrow when the agent is in a restricted mudarabah, 
and the burden on the investor becomes less; all he has to prove is that the mudarib 
did not adhere to the specific directions that had been set out for the contract.
747
 In 
case of an unrestricted mudarabah, the agent has the freedom to deal with the capital 
of the investor in a way he deems fit (insofar as they remain within the bounds of 
sharia). The Rab-ul-Mal cannot usually interfere in the mudarabah contract after the 
investment has been handed over to the mudarib,
748
 except in order to oversee their 
activities and in very exceptional circumstances work with the mudarib if he 
allows.
749
 The reason for this division between the two roles is to conceptually sever 
the mudarabah contract from the musharakah contract. The latter is actually a 
partnership contract and the roles of the contributing partners are very different from 
those espoused in a mudarabah contract.
750
 
 
c. Conditions for a valid Mudarabah and possible governance issues 
The mudarabah contract, as with other contracts under sharia, has to comply with 
certain conditions that make the agreement valid.
751
 One of the basic contractual 
principles that the modern day IFIs utilise is the rule that the Rab-ul-Mal (the 
investor) may contract with more than one mudarib (agents) in a single transaction, 
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and the conditions of the mudarabah contract will apply to both of the mudaribs 
similarly.
752
 
With regard to the types of investments that can be made by the Rab-ul-Mal, there 
are some differences in opinions amongst the Hanafi scholars and the other schools 
of thought.
753
 The Hanafi scholars opine that the only acceptable form of investment 
can be in liquid form, whereas the others deem other forms of investment acceptable 
as well.
754
 In modern practice, there seems to be no restriction as to the different 
types of investments that can be made. The only requirement is that the assets need 
to be evaluated properly according to the existing indices, and if the evaluation is not 
properly carried out, a mudarabah contract is deemed to be invalid.
755
 
Despite the wide range of freedom available to the mudarib in dealing with the 
capital that has been given to him, there are some other restrictions that apply 
generally to the mudarabah contract.  One major restriction is that the mudarib 
cannot, without the consent of Rab-ul-Mal, lend money to anyone else.
756
 This 
freedom of dealing by the mudarib with the investment of the Rab-ul-Mal is 
restricted also by the provision that the mudarib may do all that is normally, 
customarily and necessarily done in the course of that business.
757
 Anything that is 
above and beyond the normal course of business must be approved by the Rab-ul-
Mal before being undertaken.
758
 There are also other restrictions for the mudarib; he 
is not authorised to keep another mudarib, a partner or mix his own investment in a 
particular mudarabah without the consent of Rab-ul-Mal.
759
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The other necessary condition for rendering a mudarabah valid is that both parties 
agree, at the beginning of the contract, on a definite proportion of the actual profit to 
which each of them will be entitled.
760
  In this regard, it is pertinent to mention that 
the sharia is silent in what proportion(s) should be prescribed between the parties. 
Nonetheless, it may logically be inferred that the underlying theme of this contract is 
the freedom of the contracting parties to enter into favourable terms for each of them 
so long as the terms are in line with the principles of the sharia.
761
 The parties can 
share the profits in equal proportions, and they can also allocate different 
proportions for the Rab-ul-Mal and the mudarib.
762
 However, in allocating these 
proportions of profits, the parties cannot provide for a set amount like a lump sum or 
a pre-designated percentage of the initial capital as that would amount to riba.
763
 The 
only proportion that can be agreed upon is that of the profit that is made over the 
initial capital. However, the parties can agree to set different proportions in the event 
of different situations. For example, the Rab-ul-Mal can specify that if the mudarib 
decides to work in line of business A the portion of the profit will be different than if 
he decides to work in line of business B.
764
 
Furthermore, if the business has incurred losses in some transactions but has gained 
profit in others under the management of the mudarib, the profit shall be used to 
offset the loss at the first instance and then the remainder, if there is any, is 
distributed between the parties according to the agreed ratio. This gives the mudarib 
a chance to overcome certain losses.
765
 In the same stead, the mudarabah contract 
cannot specify any specific salary or guaranteed remuneration to the mudarib apart 
                                                          
760
 Usmani (n 691) 37 
761
 Ghazi (n 693) 
762
 Mezan Bank Guide (n 719) 104 
763
 Iqbal and Mirakhor (n 692) 
764
 Usmani (n 691) 33 
765
 Diwany (n 711) 164 
203 
 
from the agreed proportion of the profit as determined at the start of the contract, 
thus differentiating the mudarabah contract from the normal agency contract.
766
 
Another major underlying feature of the mudarabah contract is that once the 
contract is validly executed the Rab-ul-Mal has very limited rights to interfere in the 
working of the mudarib so that unless and until the Rab-ul-Mal has very serious 
apprehensions (such as serious misconduct or fraud) regarding the workings of the 
mudarib, he cannot interfere directly into the operations of the contract, essentially 
leaving him with little control over his investment.
767
 The rationale behind this rule 
is simply to allow the mudarib to work freely and earn his proportion of the profit 
which has been decided upon.
768
 The other major reason for this restriction is that if 
the Rab-ul-Mal is allowed to interfere unnecessarily in the workings of the mudarib, 
the contract starts to look more like a pure equity partnership (the musharakah) and 
not a mudarabah. Thus, it has been deemed necessary to have conceptual clarity in 
dividing the responsibility between the Rab-ul-Mal and the mudarib.
769
 However, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, such a distinction actually causes corporate 
governance problems in the modern day IFI and consequently poses a serious risk to 
their operation. 
Keeping in view these specific conditions as derived from the traditional and 
contemporary literature, we will also see how these specific rules have a direct effect 
on the working of modern day IFIs, since these conditions dictate the different kinds 
of operation that they may undertake, as well as stipulating very clearly which 
contracts are permissible under the mudarabah type of financial intermediation.  
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d. Termination of mudarabah 
The legal ramifications for the rules regarding the termination of the mudarabah 
contract are something that may cause some disconcertment for modern businesses 
and legal practitioners. This is because, according to the Hanbali, Hanafi and Shafi 
schools of thought, a mudarabah contract can be terminated at any time by either of 
the two parties,
770
 arguably bringing about some uncertainty in the working of 
modern day financial markets and raising serious governance and regulatory 
challenges. The only condition required for such a termination to be effective is to 
give notice to the other party.
771
 However, the Maliki scholars take a more pragmatic 
and practical approach when they say that once the mudarabah contract becomes 
operational, the notice of termination is no longer effective if given unilaterally 
because the financial burden of such a cancellation would be unduly harsh for the 
mudarib.
772
 This perspective has allowed IFI practitioners to bring in the required 
certainty into the institutions’ operations. 
It is asserted that when terminating a mudarabah by notice in the middle of its 
operation, the issue is raised of partitioning the remaining assets. According to 
Mulana Taqi Usmani  
[i]f all assets of the Mudarabah are in cash form at the time of termination, and 
some profit has been earned on the principle amount, it shall be distributed between 
the parties according to the agreed ratio. However, if the assets of the Mudarabah 
are not in the cash form, the mudarib shall be given an opportunity to sell or 
liquidate them, so that the actual profit may be determined.
773
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Thus, it can be seen that the rules surrounding the termination of the mudarabah has 
far-reaching repercussions both financially and legally for the Rab-ul-Mal as well as 
the mudarib. It may also be asserted that these rules could even have a systemic 
negative impact on the whole Islamic finance industry, as the accompanying 
uncertainty is going to drive away many potential investors and depositors. 
Accordingly, it is argued in the next chapter that regulators have to address this 
issue. 
As noted above, the practice of mudarabah is far from devoid of problems and these 
issues, when looked at in the context of modern day IFI practices, raise systemic 
governance and regulatory issues which can only be addressed by a regulator who 
looks to the principles of sharia( the Maqasid al Sharia), when determining the rules 
and regulations for the Islamic finance industry at a macro level. In turn, this raises 
the question of whether a national regulator who has no expertise in matters of 
sharia can ever be able to effectively implement a regulatory framework which 
allows for IFIs to work as sharia-compliant financial intermediaries. Thus, in the 
next two chapters a normative principle-based regulatory framework is suggested 
and it is argued that a stakeholder-oriented corporate governance approach may 
allow the Islamic finance industry to overcome some of the aforementioned 
problems. 
 
5. Musharakah 
The other type of contract that forms the basis of Islamic financial products in 
modern day IFIs is musharaka financing. In essence, this is partnership financing 
206 
 
that is used as an equity participation contract.
774
 Under this form of partnership 
contract, both profits and losses are shared according to a pre-determined formula. 
This forms the second type of basic financial instruments that are predominately 
used in modern day Islamic banking.
775
 The origin of the traditional musharakah is 
derived from the Hadith: ‘Allah will become partner in a business between two 
Mushariks until they indulge in cheating or breach of trust.’776 Musharakah is a 
word of Arabic origin which literally means sharing.
777
 The word is actually a 
derivative of the basic form of partnerships used in the pre-Islamic business 
environment called Shirkah (which if literally translated also means sharing). 
However, the legal and actual effects of the word musharakah are a combination of 
the word Shirkah and the intermediation contract of mudarabah discussed earlier.
778
 
Such a combination forms a common characteristic of different financing contracts 
which contrast intermediation based contracts.
779
 The musharakah is an extremely 
fluid and multipurpose form of investment that is based on very basic principles 
which are compatible with the rules on profit and loss sharing and risk division 
between participants in a business venture.
780
  It is probably the rawest form of a 
financial contract that can be easily moulded and tweaked as and when required.
781
 
In today’s complex business and financial environment, it could be held to simply 
mean a joint enterprise in which all the capital and labour contributors share the 
profit or loss of the joint venture according to their contributions. It is a simple, 
albeit idyllic, alternative for interest-based financing, potentially having had a 
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significant impact insofar as it can be said to have allowed the modern day Islamic 
financial industry to provide suitable alternatives for more conventional interest-
bearing finance.
782
 The musharaka, because of its simplicity and ease of use, has the 
advantage of having far-reaching effects on both production and distribution for 
general consumers and for stakeholders of the Islamic financial industry.
783
 
However, despite its advantages, there is some scepticism surrounding their use due 
to the fact that musharakah may leave the capital contributors open to the risks of 
moral hazards and adverse selections.
784
 
In modern banking practices, the musharakah conceptually embodies the 
relationship between the bank and the customer as an agreement to combine their 
financial resources to operate and manage a business undertaking as expressly laid 
out in the contract’s terms and conditions.785  The importance that is attached to the 
musharakah contract (despite the possible risks attached to it) stems from the fact 
that Islam has only laid down basic principles for the musharakah relationship, 
leaving any other details to be worked out by the parties involved., provided that the 
terms and conditions do not breach sharia principles( the Maqasid al Sharia). 
Therefore, the musharakah can be used to cover most modern day financial needs.
786
 
According to Taqi Usmani, the importance of musharakah, as an embodiment of the 
basic principles of shari-based finance and a practical alternative to interest-based 
financing, is that 
[i]n the modern capitalist economy, interest is the sole instrument indiscriminately 
used in financing of every type. Since Islam has prohibited interest, this instrument 
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cannot be used for providing funds of any kind. Therefore, musharakah can play a 
vital role in an economy based on Islamic principles.
787
 
 
6. Types of Musharakah 
Since the term musharaka derives from the concept of Shirkah (partnership), it is 
believed that musharakah can by analogy be extrapolated from its basic form to 
encompass the different kinds of Shirkahs (partnerships or joint ventures).
788
 
However, in the interests of conceptual clarity, the current discussion will be 
confined to the type of Shirikah that is most frequently referred to in the context of 
Islamic modes of financing called Shirkat-ul-amwal (mutual partnerships). The 
connotations of the term musharakah itself are more limited than the term Shirkah 
which is more commonly used in the Islamic jurisprudence.
789
 Thus, to clearly set 
out the context of the term musharakah with reference to Shirkah, the basic types of 
the latter need to be distinguished. In the terminology of Islamic fiqh, the Shirikah 
has been divided into two kinds: 
i. Shirkat-ul-milk: The joint ownership of two or more persons in a particular 
property. The underlying legal principles are the joint ownership of any kind of 
property which could have come into existence either by mutual consent or by 
automatic operation of the sharia principles and Islamic jurisprudence regarding 
property division.790 This Shirkat will not be considered in the current discussion as 
it primarily deals with inheritance property and other kinds of joint ownerships of 
property and not specifically partnership by mutual contract, which is our concern in 
the context of modern day Islamic finance. 
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ii. Shirkat-ul-aqd. This is ‘a partnership affected by a mutual contract’791 although for 
simplicity it may also be translated as ‘joint commercial enterprise’. Shirkat-ul-aqd 
is further divided into three kinds: 
iii. Shirkat-ul-amwal (or sharikat inam): where all the partners invest capital into a 
commercial enterprise.  This partnership form encompasses mutual partnership and 
is the simplest and most widespread form of partnership used. In this form of 
partnership, each partner contributes a specific amount of property on the basis that 
each partner may deal in the property of the partnership. Therefore, each partner 
operates as a principal for his own share and as an agent for the other partner(s) as 
long as the action as the agent are done in accordance with the permission of the 
other partner(s).792 In addition, profits are distributed in accordance with the 
partnership agreement, and the losses that are borne are divided in accordance with 
the contribution of each partner to the capital. Under sharia however, it is not 
allowed for one partner to guarantee the obligations of another, except to the extent 
that a partner acts outside his approved capacity as an agent to become liable to any 
other partner.793 
iv. Shirkat-ul-A’mal: this is a contract based on providing a service jointly. The 
resulting fee that is charged is distributed amongst the partners according to a pre-
determined agreed ratio. This a great innovation in the field of business, recognising 
the realities of modern day financial needs, encompassing not only working capital 
for production-based ventures but also allowing the growing service industry to 
benefit from Islamic modes of financing.794 
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v.  Sharikat al-Wujooh: a ‘reputational partnership’ wherein the partners have no 
investment at all. All that they do is purchase the commodities on a deferred price 
and then sell them at spot. The profit so earned is distributed between them at an 
agreed ratio.795 
 
FIGURE 4 TYPES OF SHIRKAHS 
 
Based on the different types of Shirkahs (partnerships) discussed, the term 
musharakah, which is itself not found in the books of fiqh, is a term coined by 
modern Islamic finance practitioners for their findings on the principles of sharia 
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relating to Shirkah.
796
 Specifically, the modern concept of musharakah as practiced 
by IFIs really encompasses only one particular kind of Shirkah, the Shirkat-al-
amwal, where two partners invest capital in a joint venture.
797
 However, there are 
instances of the musharakah being used as generic term for Shirkat-ul-A’mal (the 
partnership form for providing services). There is also a possibility for the partners 
to appoint a manager for the whole partnership who is allowed to be reimbursed by 
the partners. Nevertheless, this arrangement with the manager makes this 
musharakah look more like mudarabah and hence conceptually requires 
clarifications at times.
798
 
 
7. The basic rules for concluding a valid Musharakah 
Musharakah or Shirkat-ul-amwal is a financial instrument which has its roots in the 
law of contract. It is regulated by sharia and thus must comply with the basic tenets 
of a valid sharia contract. This includes, inter alia, being devoid of any kind of 
gharar (speculation) and riba (usury/interest based transactions), the presence of an 
existing subject matter, mutual consent,
799
 and issues relating to the ability of the 
parties to enter into a valid contract. These are embodied by the rules regulating all 
contracts under sharia.
800
 However, since the modern day musharakah is a 
specialised form of contract, there are some unique features that govern it over and 
above the basic contractual rules.
801
 The musharakah can be entered into by simple 
agreement and need not be formalised in writing, although it is preferred that a 
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written record be kept so as to minimise the chance of confusion.
802
 The constituents 
of the musharakah give rise to an agency relationship between the contributing 
partners, where every partner is the agent of the other and every partner benefits 
from the partnership equally, unless the contract’s terms and conditions specifically 
lay out a designated ratio for the division of profits.
803
 
The other legal consequence of having an agency relationship amongst the partners 
is that it renders all the partners capable of participating in the running of the 
business,
804
 unlike mudarabah contracts wherein the mudarib has the authority to 
run the business and the Rab-ul-Mal can only interfere in the business venture when 
the mudarib allows him to.
805
 There is, however, a provision which allows the 
musharakah to be run akin to a mudarabah contract; if the partners agree upon a 
term in their contractual agreement that only one of the partners shall be managing 
the musharakah to the exclusion of all others, then that partner shall do so.
806
 This 
would naturally lead to the proviso that the non-active partner should be entitled to 
the profit only to the extent of his investment and the ratio of the profit allocated to 
him should not exceed the ratio of his investment, whereas the partner carrying out 
the management may be entitled to more on the basis of his contribution to the 
management of the business venture.
807
 
In relation to the type of investments allowed in a musharakah, the traditional 
scholars from various schools of thought are almost unanimous in stating that a 
contribution in a musharakah has to be made in liquid form and not in the form of 
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commodities, kind or good will.
808
 This is primarily so because of the ratios of profit 
and loss to be determined at the outset of the agreement. The argument follows that 
if one of the partners contributes in liquid capital and the other contributes in 
commodity or some other fixed asset like a building, the division of the accruing 
profits or loss may not be easily discernible and may lead to an unjust distribution.
809
 
However, there is a contemporary argument that this should no longer be a problem 
with the ability of the parties to get their commodities and fixed assets evaluated 
beforehand and to then determine the ratio of the profits and loss accordingly.
810
 
 
8. Distribution of profits under musharakah 
The most important aspect of the musharakah from a legal, operational and 
governance point of view is the division of profits and it is here that the schools of 
thought under fiqh (jurisprudence) differ most drastically. The one overarching 
principle in fiqh regarding the musharakah is that the proportion of profits to be 
distributed between the partners must be agreed upon at the time of putting the 
contract into effect.
811
  The legal standing of a contract where this condition is not 
met is to consider the contract invalid.
812
 
The ratio of the profit for each of the partners must be determined in proportion to 
the actual profits accrued to the business, and not in proportion to the capital 
invested by him. The contract is not allowed to fix a lump sum amount for any one 
of the partners, or any rate of profit tied up with his investment.
813
 This may seem 
unjust from a conventional contract law point of view, but the reason for such a 
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provision is to ensure that no one partner may dominate the profit and loss ratio 
because of his relative bargaining power. Thus, this provision also falls in line with 
the aim of ensuring a just and equitable distribution of risks and returns.  
However, to mitigate the possible harshness of the aforementioned rule, there is a 
provision under the sharia rules whereby a musharakah agreement may expressly 
provide for a term in the initial agreement agreeing a lump sum or a percentage 
beforehand for any one partner.
814
 Nevertheless, this term in the contract will be 
subject to final settlement at the end of the specific time period. This means that if 
the musharakah has been successful and profits have accrued, then the fixed amount 
which had been promised and stated in the contract may be paid, but if there have 
been no profits the partner will have to return the amount. It follows that any amount 
which might have been drawn on by a partner shall be treated as an ‘on account 
payment’ and will be adjusted to the actual profit he deserves at the end of the 
term.
815
 
In the case of loss accruing to the musharakah, the juristic differences disappear and 
scholars unanimously agree that the loss that accrues has to be divided according to 
the capital contribution.
816
 Further, whilst both the Maliki and Shafi scholars are of 
the view that both profits and losses are to be distributed equally, the Hanbali and 
Hanafi scholars allow freedom of contract when deciding profits but decline the 
freedom of the parties when deciding the loss.
817
 The underlying principle here is 
distributive justice, so that whilst profit may be varied, the burden of loss can never 
be more than the initial contribution; embodying the core of profit and loss risk 
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sharing principles.
818
 So in summary, profit is based on the agreement of the parties, 
but loss is always subject to the ratio of investment.
819
 
 
9. Termination of musharakah and related governance issues 
Under the Sharia rules relating to musharakah, termination is permitted in three 
circumstances. The first circumstance is where every partner has a right to terminate 
the musharakah at any time after giving his partner(s) a notice to this effect. Upon 
doing so, the musharakah will simply come to an end.
820
 In this case, if the assets of 
the musharakah are in cash form, all of them will be distributed pro rata between the 
partners. If the assets are not liquidated, the partners may agree either on the 
liquidation of the assets, or on the distribution or partition between the partners of 
the assets as they are.
821
 If there is a dispute between the partners in this matter; for 
example, one partner seeks liquidation while the other wants the partition or 
distribution of the non-liquid assets themselves, the latter shall be preferred. This is 
because after the termination all assets are jointly owned by the partners and as a co-
owner, the distribution-seeking partner cannot be compelled to liquidate, owing to 
his right to seek partition or separation.
822
 However, if the assets are such that they 
cannot be separated or partitioned (such as machinery) then they shall be sold and 
the sale proceeds shall be distributed.
823
 
The second instance is where any one of the partners dies during the musharakah’s 
operation; the contract with him is terminated.
824
 His heirs will have the option 
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either to draw the share of the deceased from the business, or to continue with the 
contract. 
The third instance is that if any one of the partners becomes insane or otherwise 
incapable of effecting commercial transactions, the musharakah is terminated.
825
 
 
10. Termination of musharakah without closing the business 
Different rules apply to termination if one of the partners wants to bring the 
musharakah to an end, but the other partner(s) would like to continue with the 
business; such a termination can be achieved by mutual agreement.
826
 The partners 
who want to run the business may purchase the share of the partner who wants to 
terminate his partnership, because the termination of the musharakah with just one 
partner does not imply its termination between the other partners as well.
827
 The 
price of the share of the leaving partner must be determined by mutual consent and if 
there is a dispute about the valuation of the share and the partners do not arrive at an 
agreed price, the exiting partner can compel the other partners to liquidate or 
distribute the assets themselves.
828
 
The question then arises whether the partners can agree, while entering into the 
contract of the musharakah, on a condition that the liquidation or separation of the 
business shall not be effected unless all the partners, or the majority of them, wants 
to do so and that a single partner who wants to leave the partnership shall have to 
sell his share to the other partners and not force them on liquidation or separation.
829
 
It is argued that if such a term can indeed be allowed, this would then mean that as 
modern commercial agreements, musharakah contracts can be used without the fear 
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of unnecessary liquidation by an aggrieved partner, and would mean more certainty 
for Islamic finance partnerships and joint venture contracts. However, since there 
seems to be no known precedent for such an agreement, the fiqh scholars need to 
devise rules regarding this particular aspect to make it easier for the Islamic finance 
industry to compete at an international level. 
Like the mudarabah contract, the musharakah method of financial intermediation 
also has some sharia and other legal issues, albeit on a smaller scale than 
mudarabah or murabahah contracts. The major reason for this is that musharakah 
contracts are actually the only genuinely sharia-compliant contract because they are 
pure partnerships with simpler rules for the division of labour and capital, thereby 
having simpler terms for the sharing of profit and loss.
830
 There is, however, some 
scepticism surrounding the use of musharakah contracts due to the fact that they 
may leave the capital contributors open to risks of moral hazards and adverse 
selections or may be deemed too simplistic in form to be effectively utilised as 
modern day financial intermediation contracts.
831
 
 
11. Sale-based contracts 
The next category of Islamic financial instruments emanates from the basic sale 
contract and forms one of the largest types of basic sharia-compliant financial 
instruments that allow IFIs to compete at a global scale against other conventional 
financial institutions.
832
 These sale-based contracts are also important because they 
epitomise the flexibility and innovation of the modern day IFIs as an industry and 
have shown the ability of Islamic finance as a system to adapt and mould itself with 
the changing times whilst still maintaining sharia compliance. Of the sale-based 
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contracts available, the most innovative and frequently used Islamic financial 
instrument is the murabahah.
833
 The other slightly less important sale-based 
contracts are bay al salam and bay al muajjil and then there are other contracts of 
exchange such as the ijarah and istisna. 
Under Islamic law, the sale contract (called the bai) can be simply defined as ‘the 
exchange of a thing of value by another thing of value with mutual consent’.834 A 
sale contract under the sharia is considered valid if the following conditions are 
fulfilled: there has to be a written contract,
835
 the subject matter must be present, the 
price is determined and the subject matter must be in the possession of the seller or 
is capable of being delivered.
836
 
According to El Gamal, in Islamic economics and law ‘sale is the ultimate 
permissible contract’  and can be defined as an ‘exchange of owned properties, 
including services and some property rights’837 and thus justified by the Qu’ranic 
verse itself which states ‘Allah has permitted trade and forbidden riba’.838 Hashim 
Kamali has gone on to define a sale from an Islamic commercial law perspective 
when stating that ‘[s]ale is by definition, the exchange of values between two parties 
by mutual consent.’839 
When considering the aforementioned definitions, it can be seen that the sale 
contract under Islamic law encompasses a number of possibilities when deriving a 
financial instrument based on a sale, ranging from the basic sale contract with barter 
exchange to a complex sale contract like the murabahah and istisna which require 
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multiple contracts being concluded simultaneously involving principles of agency, 
future price determination and exchange of ownerships.
840
 According to Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, the basic contracts under sharia can be divided into ‘contracts of 
exchange, sale of an asset or sale of rights to utilise an asset.’841 They then further 
divide according to the type of sale, the first contract is the ‘sale of ownership’, 
whereas the second contract is the ‘sale of right to use’.842 This particular division 
shows the depth of Islamic contract law and gives an insight into how Islamic law 
relating to contracts gives both practitioners and academics a chance to be more 
creative and innovative when designing financial instruments. A sale contract under 
Islamic law requires offer, acceptance and a meeting of minds for the buyer and the 
seller, and also has a number of restrictive injunctions imposed to ensure it is not 
subject to a riba (excessive interest) transaction and is devoid of any gharar 
(uncertainty).
843
 
The sheer number of sale-based contracts utilised by IFIs makes it difficult to 
discuss all sale-based contracts, so only the most frequently used contracts in this 
category will be discussed; namely the bai al-murabahah, which epitomises the 
flexibility and innovation of the modern day IFI’s ability to adapt traditional sharia 
principles into modern day financial instruments. In addition, this contract shows the 
kind of regulatory and governance issues that come to the fore because of over-
reliance on flexibility and innovation coupled with moving away from traditional 
sources of sharia. 
 
12. Murabahah as a sale contract: bay al murabaha 
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The murabahah contract is one of the most frequently used financial instruments in 
the modern day Islamic finance industry.  The concept has pre-Islamic origins and is 
considered, from a more conventional point of view, to be a fiduciary contract.
844
 
Murabahah sales may be defined as selling goods under certain conditions; namely 
for a fixed percentage of the price or cost of the goods, or for a fixed amount of the 
money as profit. Professor Amin has translated the term murabahah as having two 
possible meanings: the first is ‘cost plus sale’ and the second is ‘fixed profit sale’.845 
The first meaning has been used more frequently and will thus be used here too. The 
proper terminology for the murabahah contract is bay murabahah, which simply 
means that it is a sale contract. ‘Bay’ is Arabic for sale, whilst murabahah is derived 
from the Arabic word riba which means ‘gain or profit’, hence the effect of the 
words together as a phrase become ‘a sale for a fixed profit’.846 According to Tarek 
Al Diwany, ‘bay al murabahah is a trust sale, where the seller names the profit 
markup that he is applying to the cost price of goods that he is selling and agrees a 
sale price with the buyer on that basis.’847 It can be seen that in practice, buyers may 
make use of this sort of exchange contract when they lack experience in buying 
goods, merchandise, or any sort of property and want the IFI to both finance the 
commodity as well as hire an expert commercial agent (or let the IFI act as the 
agent) to purchase it. They find this way of dealing easier and more convenient, 
simultaneously avoiding the liability of bargaining with the sellers and examining 
the goods in a way they may not be skilled enough to deal with personally.
848
 The 
sellers, on the other hand, use this transaction because it guarantees a fixed 
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percentage related to the price or cost of the goods, to be gained as profit for the 
service provided in the form of an executed sale on behalf of the actual buyer.
849
 
In modern Islamic banking practices, the murabahah sale is used to help a customer 
buy an asset that he may not otherwise be able to buy, by allowing the bank to first 
buy that particular asset upon the request of a particular client. The bank then sells 
that asset to the customer at an agreed and disclosed mark-up either for a lump sum 
amount or on instalments.
850
 By allowing customers to purchase goods in 
instalments, the Islamic finance industry has devised a method by which they can 
compete with the conventional leases and mortgages being utilised by conventional 
financial institutions. This contract of sale is further affected by the banks getting the 
customer to sign an undertaking whereby the customer promises to buy the property 
once the bank has bought it at its own risk. This way, when the bank or IFI buys the 
goods, there is a level of certainty that the customer will purchase it at a pre-agreed 
mark-up and thus mitigating the risk of the bank.
851
 
 There are some issues with the use of murabahah, however. For example, the 
enforceability of the promise by the customer is not clear under sharia rules. 
According to sharia principles, simple promises do not have the same contractual 
enforceability under Islamic law as they do under common law or civil law legal 
systems.
852
 Further, the promise is for a sale at a future date and may give rise to 
both riba (interest-based transactions) and gharar (uncertainty) since both the 
counter values are deferred.
853
 As we have seen in the discussion of riba and gharar, 
these are provisions against which sharia has been very clear.
854
  Nonetheless, it can 
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be said that since the IFI is taking a risk in purchasing the goods without any 
certainty about their eventual disposal, the bank is justified in charging the mark-up 
profit on the basis of the risk and return equation emphasised by the basic business 
ethical norms (Maqasid) of sharia regarding profit and loss sharing. 
855
 
Furthermore, modern IFIs tend to get around this problem of risk allocation in a 
murabahah by signing a “master murabahah agreement” with the customer, which 
specifies the terms and conditions that both the parties have agreed upon including 
the actual price, the mark-up payable to the IFI and the date and schedule of 
delivery.
856
 All such terms and conditions have to be specific and decided upon prior 
to the enforcement of the contract otherwise the agreement will be considered void 
by reason of excessive gharar (uncertainty).
857
 The most important terms in such a 
contract are those relating to the price (disclosed actual price as well as the seller’s 
profit mark-up on the base price), transfer of title of the goods being sold 
(specifically, the seller must have obtained title over the goods before being able to 
sell them) and the method of payment (either a lump sum or deferred in 
instalments).
858
 
 The legal mechanism employed when an IFI brokers such a deal allows the bank to 
act as an agent for the customer; purchasing the good on behalf of the customer and 
then allowing that customer to enter into a contract with the actual seller. If the 
original seller allows for the customer to pay the price in instalments, the IFI is 
eligible for a commission or agency fee. Conversely, if the original customer is not 
willing to sell it at a deferred rate via instalments then the IFI, as the agent of the 
customer, buys the goods and pays a lump sum to the original seller and then gathers 
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the rest of the decided price plus its own mark-up or agency fee. This is done in 
accordance with an agreement which may take the form of instalments or a lump 
sum payment. The result of this is that a credit facility can be in place for the 
customer without the interest payments.
859
 
The other possibility is for the IFI to appoint the customer as the agent of the IFI and 
allow them to buy the goods required on behalf of the bank and then place them 
under the control and possession (actual or constructive) of the IFI. The IFI then 
sells the goods on credit to the customer in line with the agreed terms and conditions 
of the master murabahah agreement, which will specify the delivery and payment 
schedule.
860
 
The flexibility and utility of murabahah in modern day IFIs can be seen from the 
fact that it is utilised as a mode of finance for the purchasing of assets, commodities 
and goods and can replicate credit sales without breaching the sharia principles 
(Maqasid) per se.
861
 A mixture of mudarabah and murabahah contracts are also 
used for syndicate financing, thus allowing IFIs to compete globally for large 
development projects.
862
 The developments in murabahah financing have been 
possible due to the extensive work done by the accounting standard setting body for 
IFIs (namely, the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions or AAOIFI).
863
 
The murabahah form of contract, despite being utilised in most IFIs, is probably the 
most controversial contractual form being employed by the modern day IFI, and has 
come scrutiny because it breaches certain main principles of sharia-based finance. 
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These criticisms will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter which discusses 
specific regulatory and corporate governance issues pervasive in IFIs utilising 
murabahah contracts.  
 
13. Investment Account Holders (IAHs)  
Another unique feature of the modern day IFI is the presence of a category of 
account holders called ‘investment account holders’ who are a sort of a hybrid 
account holder in that they have certain characteristics of both investors and account 
holders.
864
 These are the account holders who enter into a mudarabah contract with 
the bank wherein the bank invests the capital/investment of the account holder as a 
mudarib (agent) of the account holder (the Rab-ul-Mal/investor) and therefore 
guarantees no fixed return (since it is an investment according to a mudarabah 
contract and liable to only a proportion of profits, if there are any). This category of 
account holder creates a number of governance and regulatory issues arising from 
the fact that IAHs are both investors (akin to shareholders) and depositors (akin to 
their conventional counterparts). However, they lack the control (via the ability to 
vote in the AGM) that traditional shareholders would have in the running of a 
corporation, as well as lacking the security of a traditional depositor in terms of a 
fixed return or interest on initial investments (for example, deposit insurance, which 
because of its fixed nature of returns is not permitted under sharia).
865
  Thus, IAHs 
are a class of stakeholder in the governance framework of IFIs which require special 
recognition and protection from both a sharia and conventional regulatory point of 
view.
866
 These issues will also be discussed in the following chapters. 
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14. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined only the three basic modes of Islamic finance that are 
utilised by the modern day IFI. Notwithstanding, there are many other important 
financial instruments used by modern IFIs such as ijarah (a lease) and istisna (the 
sale of future assets, which is allowed as a strict exception to the rules of Islamic 
finance prohibiting buying and selling goods that do not yet exist in order to finance 
a construction project).
867
 The recently introduced sukkuk (Islamic bonds) are also 
noteworthy, but are not within the scope of this text.
868
 This refined focus 
notwithstanding, the purpose of discussing the intermediary contracts of mudarabah, 
musharakah and murabahah – in addition to the distinct IFI feature of the SSB and 
IAHs – was to highlight the kind of sharia compliance and governance issues that 
may arise when designing a regulatory framework for the Islamic financial industry 
as a whole. Such a system also has to take into account micro prudential issues, such 
as the ones highlighted in the application of traditional sharia rules to modern day 
IFI practices in the context of specific financial instruments. In addition, it should 
strive to focus on more contemporary corporate governance issues that may arise 
due to IFIs functioning as legal entities incorporated with limited liability that have 
to comply with the legal rules of the jurisdiction where they are incorporated whilst 
also being sharia-compliant. As a result, it can be said that governance and 
regulatory issues surround the SSB and IAHs. These corporate governance issues 
will be discussed in the next chapter(s) in detail. 
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   CHAPTER 7: SPECIFIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES FOR 
IFIs 
 
1 Introduction 
As we saw in the previous chapter, modern IFIs – like any other corporations - need 
to have a carefully devised corporate governance framework in place to prevent any 
failures that may occur because of internal or external issues. Despite the fact that 
there is a push from academics and practitioners alike to move towards a more 
stakeholder-oriented framework, the dominant form of corporate governance for the 
last three decades has remained the neoliberal shareholder-oriented approach 
because of a wave of deregulation in the 1970s and the 1980s in the USA and the 
UK, which have shaped the face of modern corporate governance theory and 
practice.
869
 
Having established in the previous chapters that the shareholder-oriented approach is 
unsuitable for IFIs based on both contemporary and traditional literature, we will 
now establish how in practice the influence of the neoliberal ethos has opened the 
Islamic finance industry to systemic risks at the micro- and macro-level. It will 
reinforce the claim that the stakeholder theory is well-suited to IFIs, by providing 
suggestions as to how such an approach can be used to solve most of the corporate 
governance issues arising in IFIs. 
2. The stakeholder view and Islam 
 As we have already established, the stakeholder view is of the utmost ideological as 
well as practical importance when implementing corporate governance in Islamic 
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financial institutions.
870
 Stakeholders’ values are generally incorporated in the 
mission statements of such institutions.
871
 A review of these mission statements, 
coupled with the Islamic economic model described in the previous chapter, 
emphasises that corporate governance in IFIs should focus on two broad objectives 
from a stakeholder point of view: compliance with sharia principles(Maqasid al 
sharia)  and the provision of high quality services to all stakeholders (including 
customers, investors and other stakeholders). 
As defined above, compliance with sharia would then translate into the following 
aims for the Islamic finance industry: interest-free business, the furthering of 
socioeconomic justice, and development and promotion of the Islamic financial 
system. According to Iqbal and Mirakhor,
872
 high quality services in the context of 
IFIs would mean providing services to the community as a whole (referring 
primarily, but not exclusively to the Muslim community); promoting the interests of 
related parties including shareholders, depositors and employees, and the 
development of professional and ethical qualities of management and staff. 
 
3. Issues in implementing stakeholders’ views in Islamic financial institutions 
The Governor of the Bahrain Monetary Agency conveyed the nature of IFIs’ roots in 
stating that ‘Islamic banks have grown primarily by providing services to a captive 
market, people who will only deal with a financial institution that strictly adheres to 
Islamic principles.’873 This statement outlines the fundamental aims and objectives 
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of the Islamic finance industry in the context of how it is generally viewed, and goes 
on to explain what a stakeholder point of view would eventually mean for IFIs. 
This pledge to conduct activities in accordance with sharia principles entails that 
IFIs would not: engage in interest-based transactions, conduct a purely financial 
transaction disconnected from real economic activity, engage in any transaction 
where there is exploitation of any party; participate in any activity or transaction that 
is harmful to society or participate in any activity that is not sharia compliant.
874
 
This lays out a specific outline of what stakeholder activities would entail for IFIs in 
both a conventional stakeholder context as well as a sharia-based stakeholder point 
of view. 
Failure to ensure compliance with these basic principles of corporate governance by 
IFIs would defeat the purpose of the Islamic finance industry and would lead to 
systemic risks; the most dangerous of which would be reputational risk, that would 
also encompass sharia noncompliance and sharia governance risks.
875
 To mitigate 
such risks, corporate governance structures need to be created to assure the 
stakeholders that all transactions and activities are sharia compliant, incorporating 
sharia compliance into the corporate governance framework for IFIs. However, the 
unique nature of IFIs raises other corporate governance issues that may not be 
present in conventional financial institutions and need special consideration. 
Examples of such issues include the presence of the SSB, the different account 
holders and their legal standing, the issue of informational asymmetry and issues 
surrounding transparency and disclosure requirements.
876
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Given that the fundamental aim of the Islamic financial institution is to enable its 
stakeholders to pursue their financial interests as well as fulfilling their religious and 
ethical duties, the corporate governance arrangements for IFIs need to take into 
account the importance of having a framework that credibly protects these interests 
whilst not breaching the values that underpin the ideology of Islamic finance. It is 
thus argued that for an effective corporate governance framework for IFIs, attention 
should be focused primarily on three categories of stakeholders, namely: 
shareholders, depositors, and borrowers.
877
 
Academics are of the view that the basic incompatibility of the neoliberal 
shareholder primacy model with the Islamic finance model stems from two major 
issues:
878
 firstly, the recognition of property rights in Islam as belonging to the 
individual as well as society and secondly, the issue of contractual enforcement 
under Islamic law being different in the sense that under Islamic law, whilst there is 
freedom of contract under Islamic law, that freedom is constricted by the specific 
terms and conditions as enumerated by the basic principles of sharia( Maqasid ) 
which focus primarily on the overarching principle of the protection of weak and 
exploitable parties to the contract.
879
 
The stakeholder approach, as we have already examined, fits within the framework 
of Islamic ethics and finance, since the stakeholder theory accepts the rights of 
‘other stakeholders’ besides the capital contributors (the shareholders in a 
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corporation).
880
 Another reason for accepting the stakeholder theory as being in line 
with the basic principles of Islamic financial ethics is that it is a practical 
manifestation of the business ethics philosophy, which means that it is opposed to 
the self-justifying ends of pure profit making of corporations propounded by the 
shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance.
881
 This is an ideological 
position which is also at the core of Islamic principles (the Maqasid) of business 
ethics as seen in chapter two. 
The stakeholder approach is therefore suitable for IFIs in theory, but there remain 
questions over whether it can be upheld in practice. One of the major reasons for this 
is the intense competition in the international financial market that has forced IFIs to 
move away from their basic principles and accept certain practices which may not be 
sharia-compliant.
882
 This has resulted in some unique corporate governance 
problems for IFIs, aggravated by certain characteristics of Islamic finance, such as: 
the presence of investment account holders (IAHs) and sharia supervisory boards 
(SSBs), issues surrounding the commingling of funds in banks utilising Islamic 
windows, the use of traditional Islamic contracts to duplicate conventional financial 
products, the ill-defined regulatory environment internationally and other similar 
issues.
883
 The lack of a coherent corporate governance theory specifically tailored 
for IFIs has added pressure for IFIs to comply with the existing corporate 
governance practices which have an undertone of a more shareholder-oriented profit 
maximising approach, resulting in specific risks that are faced by the IFI as part of 
the Islamic finance industry. 
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This chapter looks at some of the more prominent corporate governance issues that 
arise out of the workings of the IFIs and suggests some solutions to those problems, 
keeping in view the stakeholder theory and the basic ethical principles of Islamic 
ideology surrounding finance and commerce. 
This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will deal with specific 
governance and regulatory issues arising from the use of the three basic sharia-
compliant financial instruments and contracts as discussed in the previous chapter: 
mubarabah, musharakah and murabaha. The second part will look at more general 
corporate governance issues that arise from the operation of IFIs, such as concerns 
surrounding the SSB and their role from a corporate governance point of view, the 
protection and obligations of the IAHs which are not well-defined in the current 
legal and regulatory framework, and the operation of the two-tiered mudarabah 
contracts. In the next chapter, we shall explore the repercussion of not having a 
uniform and well established regulatory and enforcement framework. 
 
4. Specific governance issues in Islamic financial instruments: a case study of 
mudarabah, musharaka and murabaha 
As we have already seen, the basic financial intermediation in IFI is carried out on 
the basis of the two-tiered mudarabah model of Islamic banking. In line with this, 
IFIs offer three types of accounts:
884
 current accounts, unrestricted investment 
accounts and restricted investment accounts. 
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5. Investment account holders and the two-tiered mudarabah 
Each category of accounts as practiced in modern day IFI’s pose different issues for 
implementing corporate governance under the Islamic economic model but that of 
unrestricted investment account holders (UIAHs) are the most challenging. One 
problematic aspect is the ability of such account holders to have asymmetrical 
interest in risk and return of an IFI’s costs and profits respectively.885 UIAHs are 
often the most important category of IFI depositors, since they enter into a 
mudarabah contract with the financial institution to manage their funds and the 
institution then places these funds in investment pools, and the profits on 
investments - if there are any - are distributed at maturity according to the profit and 
loss sharing (PLS) ratio specified in the contract.
886
 The UIAHs, and not the IFIs, 
bear the risk of a poor performance of the investment pool. Therefore, it is argued 
that the account holders must be given more rights and a more active 
supervisory/monitoring role over the working of the IFI. This is to ensure that the 
risk and return equation for the UIAHs is proportionate to the other equity providers 
(the shareholders) who, because of their legal standing in a corporation, are deemed 
to be legal (residual) owners of the corporate property and thus have greater control 
over the working of IFIs.
887
 The reason for this position is that modern corporate law 
and corporate governance are reflections of the neoliberal ethos, which holds 
shareholders as the true recipients of all legal rights including controlling rights 
accruing to the residual owners of the corporation and thereby discards other 
stakeholders as having any major role in the corporation. This position is clearly not 
suitable for IFIs, who need to adopt a stakeholder-oriented approach of governance 
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so that the other stakeholders like the UIAHs who are as much contributors to equity 
as the shareholders are protected and catered for alongside the shareholders.
888
  
 
6 The two-tiered mudarabah and disclosure requirements 
The mudarabah contract which forms the backbone of the modern day Islamic 
finance has major issues which, if not addressed, may cause systemic corporate 
governance complications.
889
 The first issue is that the validity of this practice has 
been questioned by traditional scholars because of the form in which the mudarabah 
is being utilised in the two-tiered mudarabah model.
890
 Although there is agreement 
that the mudarabah was in fact practiced by the Prophet Muhammad himself, there 
are some serious questions as to the validity of the two-tiered model, on the ground 
that when the bank accepts deposits as a mudarib (agent) from the customers (as 
Rab-ul-Mal or the investors) does the bank/ IFI as a mudarib have the legal and 
sharia authority to forward the same money to another mudarib, this time as the 
Rab-ul-Mal? This is questionable because for the IFI to act as the Rab-ul-Mal, it 
would actually have to ‘own’ that capital, which in a two-tiered model they do not, 
as they are mere agents of the original Rab-ul-Mal.
891
 According to Muhammad 
Anwar, quoting Khittab: ‘fuqaha (Muslim jurists) are in agreement that a mudarib is 
not entitled to forward mudarabah money to a third party for business’.892 If this is 
indeed the case, the model of modern IFIs fails on ideological and legal basis - how 
can IFIs forward money under a mudarabah contract without actually owning that 
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money as they are supposed to under the sharia rules pertaining to ownership of 
funds? Despite this legal and ideological conundrum, it must be noted that the 
permission of such a transaction can be derived from an exception to the 
aforementioned opinion, which is that such a transaction can indeed be carried out 
with the permission of the original Rab-ul-Mal.
893
 Whilst the exception to this rule 
(allowing the IFI to use such capital with the permission of the original owner) in 
academic parlance justifies the use of the mudarabah as a valid shariah-compliant 
instrument to structure the modern IFIs operation, it raises a question about the 
ethics of such a practice. This is because the issue of calling the IFI the Rab-ul-Mal 
in the two-tiered mudarabah remains contentious; this ‘passing off’ of the IFI as the 
actual owners of the capital may amount to misrepresentation in legal terms, unless 
the IFI declares publicly and categorically to their customers and other stakeholders 
that they are not the actual owners of capital and are just acting as agents for other 
capital contributors (the original investors). 
The question must then be: do all IFIs disclose to all of their investing customers 
(specifically UIAHs and IAHs) the possible risks and returns that their investments 
may be exposed to, and under what circumstances and conditions their investments 
are being forwarded to other investors. This raises serious corporate governance and 
ethical questions relating to the relationship between the IFIs and the customers and 
also between the IFIs and borrowers. This also raises major concerns for the 
transparency of the working of the IFIs.
894
  It is thus argued that to cater to this 
particular issue, the IFIs should institute measures that ensure disclosure of as much 
information as possible to all customers and investors in a transparent way, so the 
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customers are fully aware of the kind of risks that their deposits are going to be 
exposed to.
895
 
 
7 Investment account holders and legal ownership issues 
Another aspect which makes the issue of disclosure extremely important is that 
under the traditional mudarabah contract the unrestricted investment account 
holders (who actually contribute to the capital of the IFI just like conventional 
shareholders) remain the owners of the capital and the IFIs merely act as agents of 
the UIAHs rather than as owners of the capital. Compare this with a modern 
corporation, where those who buy shares in the company are owners of the shares 
and no longer the capital, which is now owned by the company. So on the one hand, 
the IFI is acting as the agent of the depositors and are thus holding the capital on 
trust for the IAHs. On the other, the shareholders of the IFI who have also 
contributed equity maintain control of the capital and the assets of the IFI via the 
board of directors (BOD) including the capital contributed by the UIAHs. This in 
turn creates an imbalance of power between the two equity contributors: the 
shareholders maintain control of the IFI and thus their investments via a default legal 
mechanism which translates into a reasonably robust monitoring process of 
participation and voting in the AGM (and other legal measures under company 
law),
896
 whereas the UIAHs relinquish control over their capital (despite maintaining 
ownership) and have no protection and no supervisory role because of the nature of 
their investment under sharia principles.
897
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8 Investments account holders and deposit protection: a governance risk 
 The UIAHs face another dilemma in IFIs: despite being categorised as depositors, 
they are not protected under the conventional depositor insurance schemes because 
such a scheme would fall foul of the rules of riba.
898
 Thus, the UIAHs - despite 
being one of the main capital contributors to the IFI - have neither the control nor the 
supervision of their investments that traditional shareholders have, nor are they 
protected under deposit protection schemes as are conventional depositors, leaving 
them both vulnerable and powerless in corporate governance terms, raising serious 
concerns.  
It is therefore contended that disclosure by IFIs to IAHs (including both the RIAHs 
and UIAHs) is paramount to allow them proper supervision of their investments. 
This disclosure of information by IFIs is important from a corporate governance 
point of view because otherwise, under a traditional mudarabah contract regulated 
under the sharia, IAHs (being the Rab-ul-Mal) are not allowed any supervision or 
interference in the working of the mudarib (the IFI in this case).
899
 This lack of 
safeguarding for IAHs as equity contributors is an issue of serious corporate 
governance concern, especially when compared to the other class of equity 
contributors in a normal corporation; the shareholders who have the ability to 
supervise their investments by voting in the BOD supposedly looking after the 
interest of the shareholder.
900
 Secondly, normal shareholders can sell their shares if 
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they are not happy with an aspect of the company’s working. In a mudarabah 
contract, the Rab-ul-Mal can terminate the contract under the traditional sharia 
rules, but that becomes difficult when the IFIs stipulate a minimum time period for 
the mudarabah contract.
901
 In essence, this means that for the duration of that 
contract, the Rab-ul-Mal cannot withdraw his capital, even if they are unhappy with 
the way the IFI is handling the investments. The only possibility that the Rab-ul-Mal 
(the UIAH) has to terminate the contract is to claim negligence on the part of the IFI 
as per traditional sharia rules, which in itself is fraught with procedural and legal 
difficulties. 
902
 
9 Investment account holders and negligence: the legal risk 
Although alleging negligence is, as briefly described earlier, one method for IAHs to 
supervise and protect their investments, it raises both legal and ethical questions. 
One such problem is the difficulty of proving actual negligence in the absence of any 
specific judicial or sharia guidelines as to what amounts to negligence for this 
purpose. This particular aspect needs special attention from the judiciary as well as 
the main standard setting bodies, (the IFSB and the AAOIFI) otherwise there is a 
risk of frivolous claims of negligence by the IAHs in order to get out of a bad 
bargain. For the IFIs, this means an additional litigation risk and possibly increased 
agency costs (or extra reserves) to account for such instances.  
 
10 Taking the board of directors on board: a possible solution? 
One proposed solution for the issues discussed above is increased supervision by the 
board of directors on behalf of the account holders, providing similar protection to 
that afforded to shareholders. However, this raises the classical corporate 
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governance question of why the board would endeavour to protect the IAHs, since 
their main concern is the protection of shareholders under traditional corporate 
governance theory and practice(s). The board owes a legal duty to the shareholders 
as their ‘agents’, but no such duty is owed under traditional ideology to protect the 
interests of other stakeholders.
903
Thus it is argued that the traditional en vogue Neo 
liberal corporate governance is ideologically incompatible with Islamic finance and 
its aims and principles (Maqasid). 
 
11 A two-tiered board of directors for IFIs: The European corporate governance 
model 
Another proposal to safeguard the interests of the stakeholder – especially IAHs – 
comes from the corporate governance model utilised in continental Europe. This 
involves a two-tiered board; with one tier consisting of executive directors elected 
by the shareholders and the other comprised of representatives of other stakeholder 
groups such as employees and creditors. This second tier would sit in a supervisory 
capacity in order to monitor and ensure that stakeholder interests are catered for.    
A similar model can be introduced with amendments in IFIs across the Industry. The 
IFIs already have a second board in the shape of the SSB, but this board’s remit is 
limited to deciding religious aspects of the IFI’s affairs. However, by making certain 
alterations to the composition of this board, additional duties can be granted to this 
board to bring it in line with the continental European model. More members from 
other stakeholders can be introduced on the SSB (or the name of this new board can 
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be changed), thereby maintaining the role of religious supervision but adding other 
stakeholder representatives with monitoring and supervisory duties. These 
representatives would not be involved in the religious aspects of the IFI, but would 
ensure the interests of other stakeholders and maintain a purely supervisory role over 
the working of the IFI. This can be achieved by making certain amendments in the 
constitution (the Articles of Association) of the IFI and specifically laying down the 
exact duties and obligations of the other members of the SSB (or the stakeholder 
board). 
It is argued that by making the necessary changes in the governance structure of 
Islamic financial institutions and involving a more expansive array of stakeholder 
groups in the decision-making process, the Islamic finance industry will be more in 
line with the stakeholder model of corporate governance as well as closer to ethical 
values (Maqasid) of Islamic finance and economics. 
 
12 The investment account holders and the agency problem. 
Since it has been established that the investment account holders are stakeholders 
akin to shareholders, therein lies another theoretical corporate governance issue. In 
essence, the IAHs are principals entrusting their resources to an agent - the financial 
institution’s management – with the significant difference that, in their case, the 
agent is appointed by another principal; the shareholder.
904
 It is further argued that 
not only are the BOD elected by the shareholders, but the SSB is also selected and 
appointed by the BOD (and so also indirectly elected by the shareholders).  
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This raises fears of a conflict of interests between the supervisory roles of the BOD 
as well as the SSB,
905
 since the argument is that to counter the IAH’s inability to 
themselves monitor their interests under a conventional mudarbah contract, the SSB 
should be given the duty to do so. However, if they are appointed by the BOD, 
which then in turn is elected by the shareholders, the chances are that the classic 
agency problem would arise whereby the SSB are expected to look after the interests 
of another category of stakeholders to whom they owe no specific legal duties under 
the conventional shareholder-oriented corporate governance model.
906
 It is thus 
argued that the SSB should consist of additional members from the stakeholders 
(specifically from the IAHs and employees) so that the board may reflect the 
interests of the stakeholders and not only shareholders, therefore overcoming this 
classic agency conflict. 
The second problem that arises in applying the mudarabah model to modern day 
Islamic finance is that under classical Islamic law, the mudarabah profits can only 
be distributed once the venture has been wound up and all its assets sold off.
907
 But 
when this classic model is applied to modern Islamic banking, the problem arises as 
to how to justify distributing profits annually, as is the practise in modern day IFIs, 
to keep the customers happy and well served with annual returns out of the profits 
(or in other words, the returns on investments for the depositors).
908
 Furthermore, 
how can the banks offer depositors different maturities or liquidity options and how 
can they apportion the exact amount of return that a particular depositor has earned?  
According to Vogel and Hayes, the solution has been given in the form of a new 
legal concept of a ‘public’ or ‘shared’ mudarabah attributed to Sami Hamoud. This 
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type of mudarabah essentially continues unaffected by changes of membership and 
its returns are determined not by actual liquidation, but rather by using accounting 
techniques to provide a constructive or conjectural equivalent to liquidation.
909
 
 
13 Profit equalisation reserves and investment risk reserves: the corporate 
governance issues 
Another innovation to counter this hurdle is that of a reserve against loss so that the 
depositors agree in advance to donate a portion of their gains to a charitable fund to 
be used to meet losses of later investors or if unused to be given to charity.
910
  These 
special reserves are called Profit Equalisation Reserves (PERs) and Investment Risk 
Reserves (IRRs). These reserves function in order for the IFIs to mitigate any losses 
that may occur to the UIAHs’ investments. Consequently, the IFIs need to pool their 
reserves and profits to provide continuous profits to UIAH or in essence smooth 
profit returns to the IAHs.
911
  However, such pooling of resources may create 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and depositors because the management’s 
decision to pool resources can result in preferential treatment to UIAHs.
912
 In turn, 
this may reduce the transparency of the IFI in terms of compliance with their 
depositors’ investment objectives, raising a major corporate governance and ethical 
issue for the contemporary IFI.
913
 
The use of PER and IRR funds raises issues pertaining to the governance of these 
funds and the protection of UIAHs’ rights. The ‘smoothing out’ of profits to UIAHs 
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is an obvious obstacle to transparency and so is a major corporate governance 
issue.
914
 By maintaining constant periodical profit distribution to unrestricted 
investment account holders, the management is giving the illusion that their 
organisation is performing healthier financially than may actually be the case.  
An informal survey of 13 IFIs carried out by El-Hawary,  Grais and Iqbal shows that 
of the 4 that admitted resorting to reserves, only 2 provided information in their 
financial statements and annual reports on the share of funds transferred from or to 
these reserves.
915
 Thus, it can be asserted that such limited disclosure does not assure 
UIAHs of their fair treatment, and this may cause a number of account holders to 
leave the IFI, fearing lack of transparency. It is believed that the reason behind 
having these reserves is simply to avoid bank runs by IAHs, because of the volatility 
of the IAH’s investment and the possibility of the loss, which further makes the 
issue of return over initial investment very contentious. This basically emanates 
from the nature of the mudarabah contract and the structure of IFIs being poised as a 
profit and loss sharing entity. In essence, since there can be no guaranteed return on 
investments made by IAHs, IFIs are at risk of losing their customer base if they were 
to declare losses on investments made by the IAHs (which they should be bound to 
do ethically and legally under sharia rules regarding finance). However, this does 
not happen because corporations are naturally cautious of deterring future investors 
by declaring losses.
916
 It is observed that in practice, in order to avoid the situation 
where the IFIs may have to declare losses, they were forced to create the PER and 
the IRR to somewhat mitigate such a risk, maintaining their competitiveness in the 
international market. The conceptual clarity of these reserves and their compatibility 
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with sharia is a matter of debate as having such reserves to cover loses may fall foul 
of riba rules if they amount to a guaranteed return. This is likely to be so in such 
cases because mudabarah contracts operating under the PER and IRR are 
accompanied with the implicit assurance of returns. This also contravenes the 
concept of profit and risk sharing, since there is an assurance that there would never 
be any loss.
917
 Thus from a traditional sharia compliance point of view, the use of 
PER and IRR amounts to a major corporate governance risk.  
There is also an argument made by some contemporary academics and practitioners 
that PER and IRR can be deemed to emulate the interest-bearing accounts which are 
present in conventional banks.
918
 The argument is that the pressure to declare 
dividends for shareholders and the pressure to declare profits annually for the IAHs 
has led the Islamic finance industry to be purely profit-oriented and move away from 
their basic ideology of risk and return, distributive justice, non-speculative trading 
and their normatively stakeholder-oriented approach. It is gradually bearing 
resemblance to conventional neoliberal shareholder-oriented corporations. Thus, 
there is a definite requirement for the Islamic finance industry to reorient itself and 
go back to its roots of an ethical, religious and stakeholder-oriented industry.  
Secondly, the investment account holders lack the power to influence the use of 
resources and to verify the degree of risk of management’s investments. Unrestricted 
investment account holders may also not be able to opt out of the accumulation of 
these funds and be subject to an unwarranted and undisclosed risk.
919
 It is therefore 
asserted that such practices by IFIs to show profits and keep the depositors happy by 
artificially creating the perception of a profit and making the reporting of such 
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returns opaque to the stakeholders is a major systemic governance and regulatory 
risk.
920
 As already discussed, the reason for such practices can be attributed to both 
the pressure of competing with conventional banks and their returns on deposits, and 
the lack of a well-defined international regulatory environment. It is therefore 
imperative for the Islamic finance industry to institute measures which will mitigate 
at least the regulatory and sharia compliance risk by moving towards a principle-
based regulatory framework.  
 
14 Time-barred mudarabah contracts 
The third issue relating to the mudarabah-based IFI model is the time limits that can 
be applied to mudarabah contracts and the resulting confusion due to a difference of 
opinion amongst the major schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence.
921
 As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, an important feature of the mudarabah contract is 
that, according to Hanbali and Hanafi schools of thought, it usually functions with 
an expiry date. This is unnecessary in a conventional contract, much unlike a 
conventional contract where the contract need not have an end date but will come to 
an end if there is such a date provided for.
922
 This then means that the mudarabah 
contract will end automatically after the termination date arrives unless the parties 
mutually agree to extend that date. However, as with other Islamic finance 
instruments and concepts, scholars seem to be divided on the particular issue of 
whether the mudarabah contract can be time-barred or not.
923
 The Hanafi and 
Hanbali schools believe that the mudarabah can be time restricted and can come to 
an end automatically at the end of the designated time period without any 
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requirement of notice. However, the Maliki and Shafi schools are diametrically 
opposed to this stand, unequivocally asserting that a mudarabah cannot be time-
barred.
924
 
This raises serious issues for the practice of mudarabah in the modern IFI and may 
lead to sharia arbitrage and sharia forum shopping, whereby the IFIs may pick and 
choose the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) that is the most convenient for them, in turn 
potentially leading to further confusion in the stakeholders dealings with the IFI and 
reputational risks for the industry. One solution to this particular problem is 
suggested in the next chapter that deals with regulatory issues; the suggestion 
follows that in such a scenario the IFI ought to declare which school of thought they 
are following when allowing a particular financial instrument. Using this method, 
they can mitigate the stakeholders’ concerns and be more transparent in their 
dealings with stakeholders.  
 
15 Termination of mudarabah and the minimum time limit 
 The fourth issue related very closely to the above issue of the time-barred 
mudarabah is that there also seems to be a paucity of opinion regarding whether 
there can be a provision for a specified minimum time period before which a 
mudarabah may not be terminated.
925
 Both of these issues have the capacity to cause 
serious governance concerns in Islamic banks and commerce in general. The time-
barred mudarabah may not have a place in the fast-paced commercial context of the 
modern economy. As mentioned, the division amongst the scholars may cause major 
legal and sharia compliance issues when drafting and enforcing mudarabah 
contracts between parties. Another serious issue may be that the depositors 
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(investors) putting capital into IFIs on the understanding that the mudarabah deposit 
may or may not be time barred,
926
 but at the end of the contract find that there is no 
clear indication either way. Not all customers of the IFI who would be depositing 
their money would be institutional investors and therefore may not have the financial 
and sharia knowledge regarding these aspects. This returns us to the issue of 
transparency of the Islamic finance industry as a whole and has the potential to cause 
confusion for the customers, the IFI and the regulators.  It then falls on the regulators 
and the banks to divulge as much information as possible and as clearly as possible 
if they wish to avoid systemic threat to the integrity of the entire industry. 
 
16 An alternative solution to the time barred Mudarabah: The contractual 
stipulations 
A possible alternative solution which may be available to the IFI, its investors and 
customers is the possibility of a condition which can be incorporated into modern 
Islamic contracts to counter the maximum time limit requirement as espoused by the 
Hanafi and Hanbali schools of thought. This can be done by relying on the absence 
of sharia rules regarding a minimum time limit for mudarabah contracts.
927
 As a 
result of there being no minimum time period required before which the mudarabah 
cannot be terminated, the incorporation of such a condition in the contract may bring 
some semblance of stability and uniformity. For example, a condition may read, for 
example, ‘this mudarabah contract may not be terminated within the first financial 
year’. This would allow both parties to be legally certain as to atleast the minimum 
duration of the contract and removes some possible uncertainty surrounding this 
particular aspect. Mulana Taqi Usmani is of the opinion that this term can be 
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deemed sharia-complaint since there is no rule explicitly prohibiting it. Further, this 
can be facilitated by the doctrine of freedom of contract under Islamic law relying on 
the following Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad: ‘[a]ll the conditions agreed upon 
by the Muslims are upheld, except a condition which allows what is prohibited or 
prohibits what is lawful.’928 
 
17 The power of terminating mudarabah 
 The final issue surrounding mudarabah concerns the unlimited power of the parties 
to terminate the contract at their pleasure.
929
 This has the potential to cause 
commercial and ethical concerns for the mudarib (agent). One cause of this stems 
from the fact that today’s commercial practices are built around long-term 
relationships rather than the simple barter contracts of fourteen century Arabia and 
thus they require more long term stability.
930
 An agent’s investment of time and 
capital may need a longer maturity period before it starts to bear any returns for the 
mudarabah. This means that the unilateral power of the investor to give a specific 
notice to terminate the contract as per the sharia rules (discussed in the previous 
chapter) may be excessively harsh for the mudarib both in terms of the efforts 
already put in and the financial gains that he may have been expecting.
931
 It may also 
cause the mudarib (the IFI in this case) to lose reputation and good will in the 
market if his efforts are prematurely terminated. The nature of the mudarabah is 
such that no specific guarantees can be given by either party under the sharia rules 
pertaining to fixed returns under riba. So, a sharia-complaint mechanism needs to be 
devised in a way that mitigates the harshness of the mudarabah in this respect.  
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One possible method of mitigating the lack of transparency and disclosure is 
ensuring the availability and affordability of financial information which would 
support monitoring of a business’ performance by both private and public 
stakeholders.
932
 This would promote transparency and support market discipline, 
two of the core principles of good corporate governance practices. However, this 
requires an institutional infrastructure which facilitates the production of accurate 
financial information, the availability of agents that can interpret and disseminate it, 
and arrangements to protect its integrity.
933
 On all of these counts, the Islamic 
financial industry faces challenges. Existing limited infrastructure reduces the role 
that information flows may play in promoting competition and market activities that 
would induce managers to adopt sound corporate governance practices.
934
 
The accounting and financial information weaknesses inhibit the development of a 
competitive environment for the Islamic financial sector. The principal weakness is 
the limited applicability of international financial standards, which in turn reduces 
accuracy of the information available to stakeholders of IFI. This has the effect of 
reducing incentives to adopt control mechanisms that would reduce costs.
935
 Even 
though the AAOIFI has released its own disclosure standards, the argument is that 
these AAOIFI standards are not mandatory and have no enforcement or compliance 
mechanisms; they are largely incorporated voluntarily. It is thus argued that to have 
a viable and solid enforcement mechanism, the standard setting bodies for Islamic 
finance need to focus on a principle based meta-regulatory framework in which the 
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Islamic finance industry may institute licensing certificates, thereby allaying the 
stakeholders’ concerns regarding the compatibility of individual banks with 
international and sharia standards.
936
 
 
18 Murabaha 
Whereas the use of murabaha financing has allowed IFIs to be more innovative and 
competitive internationally, it has raised some controversies regarding the use of 
certain legal mechanisms that are not clear from the sharia point of view.
937
 
According to the Islamic finance literature, the murabaha as a sale contract is 
probably the most contentious mode of financial intermediation. A major use of the 
murabaha contract in modern day IFIs is in sale contracts that emulate credit sales 
by allowing for clients to finance sales via instalments over a period of time.
938
 
Under this practice, the IFI purchases a good from an original seller and then resells 
the goods to the consumer on instalments over a specified period of time, with a 
mark-up price, thereby allowing for IFIs to compete with conventional financial 
institutions. 
Some of the contemporary scholars and academics have been highly critical of this 
practice as being contrary to the principles of sharia (the Mqasid). These critics 
consider the murabaha contract as being valid only in very limited circumstances. 
Maulana Taqi Usmani,
939
 for example, is of the view that murabaha financing is 
valid only when the economy is transitioning to more sharia-complaint methods of 
financing (which are the mudarabah and musharakah), and he is therefore of the 
opinion that murabaha being used for long term financing under the garb of tawaruq 
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(buy back murabaha) to finance anything other than actual assets is arguably not 
sharia-compliant. 
  
19 Enforcement of promise and contractual uncertainty under the murabaha sale 
Besides the basic ideological incompatibility of the murabaha contract in the eyes of 
some practitioners and scholars, another area of contention is that of the 
enforceability (or otherwise) of the promise which the customer makes to the IFI 
before the customer orders a commodity in order for the IFI to be safe, just in case 
the customer refuses to take delivery of the ordered goods.
940
  This area is not well 
settled because simple promises under Islamic law do not have the same contractual 
enforceability as they do under common law or civil law legal systems.
941
 
The second argument that goes against the use of such promises is the fact that the 
promise relates to the sale of a good at a future date, and so may give rise to both 
riba (interest based transactions) and gharar (uncertainty). This is because both the 
counter values are deferred, and as we have seen in the discussion of riba and 
gharar, this is one of the provisions against which sharia is very clear.
942
 
Another practice that is controversial in its nature for IFIs is that they execute a 
contract of promise with the customer at the outset of the murabaha agreement, 
timed when the customer places an order, ensuring that the customer is bound to the 
contract and goes through with his order. The reason for such a promise is the fact 
that in a murabaha contract the majority of the risk lies with the IFI because after the 
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customer has placed his order, the IFI takes on the responsibility of ordering the 
goods under their own name and at their own risk.
943
 If the customer refuses delivery 
of the ordered goods, the IFI is left with that commodity without any buyer as such. 
To mitigate this risk, the IFIs execute either a simple promise or attain a security 
deposit to protect their investments (called a hamesh jadia or urbun discussed 
below).
944
 This practice of executing a simple contract of promise is performed 
separately from the master murabaha agreement, which means that it is a separate 
contract.
945
 This practice of enforcing a promise as a contract also creates a 
regulatory issue for the IFIs operating in a common law or a civil law jurisdiction, 
under which such an oral promise is enforceable in a court of law, unlike under 
sharia rules.  
Another source of controversy arises due to the timing of the promise, when the 
promise is made before the actual purchase of the goods:
946
 for goods to be dealt 
with legitimately under the Islamic law of contract, the goods must be in possession 
of the party selling them.
947
 It is therefore doubtful as to how a promise of the 
purchase of goods that are not in the possession of either the beneficiary of the 
promise (the customer) or the promisor (the IFI) can be held valid under sharia.
948
 
Further, if such a promise is not valid, how can the IFI ensure that it is not exposed 
to the unnecessary risk of the client defaulting in buying the requested goods 
willingly or unwillingly?
949
 However, if the promise is executed and is incorporated 
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in the master murabaha agreement and neither party is in possession (actual or 
constructive) of the goods, that then automatically becomes non-complaint with the 
sharia rules for a valid contract due to the lack of subject matter.
950
 It can thus be 
seen that the nature of the murabaha agreement renders such contracts incompatible 
with sharia at times. The argument follows that despite the commercial convenience 
of the murabaha contract from both a governance and sharia compliance point of 
view, it is far from free of ethical, legal and regulatory issues. 
 
20 Charging the mark-up on a murabaha: Sharia-compliant or not? 
Modern day Islamic finance practitioners and academics have argued that the 
excessive risk that IFIs are exposed to under the murabaha agreement is the 
justification for the ‘mark-up’951 or profit that the IFI charges over the actual cost 
price of the good that the client requests.
952
 However, this practice of charging a 
mark-up (and enforcement of contracts) remains contentious and needs to be tackled 
at a regulatory level to bring uniformity into the rules regulating IFIs across the 
globe. 
 A major problem arises in practicing a Murabaha contract when the client becomes 
unable or unwilling to pay the instalments under the murabaha contract as they 
become due. The root of the problem is that the IFI, unlike a conventional bank, 
cannot roll over the debt and charge a higher rate of interest or charge compounded 
interest.
953
 Consequently, it has to agree to the price plus the cost at the start of the 
agreement and has to then abide by the initial quoted sum in spite of any changes in 
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the conditions. This is because if the murabaha payments are allowed to be rolled 
over and the total price of the goods is to be varied, the contract becomes void on the 
basis of both gharar and riba.
954
 
The problem is dealt with by contemporary practitioners in a twofold manner. One 
solution in contemporary practice is that when the customer is unable to make a 
payment as it falls due, there is an argument that the IFI may charge a fee from the 
customer as compensation, as a figure representing what would have accrued to the 
bank in a normal course of business. Thus, the customer should pay the same ratio of 
profit that normally accrues to the bank for his default in that time period. For 
example, if the bank in general earns around 5% profit on regular transactions, then 
the customer should be forced to pay that compensation.
955
 However, this is clearly 
akin to riba and therefore contrary to the precepts of sharia. It is therefore not 
accepted by the majority of contemporary scholars. This is because they feel that it 
may be used to mimic interest-based lending and would also erode the ethical basis 
of the financial institution model that IFIs should be following, as this practice 
allows for exploitation of customers and is clearly against the basic ideology 
(Maqasid) of business ethics under Islam.
956
  However, the fact that the Islamic 
finance industry is not as well regulated in non-Muslim countries gives rise to the 
issue of serious non-compliance with sharia, due to lack of external oversight and 
supervision, further raising systemic governance and regulatory issues. The only 
possible solution to such sharia governance and compliance issues is to have a 
regulatory framework which can cater for specific sharia governance issues 
internationally keeping true to the stakeholder ethos of Islamic finance. 
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21 Arbun and Hamish jiddiya: A sharia governance controversy? 
The second issue that is of a controversial nature (albeit less controversial than the 
practice of charging a proportionate ratio of loss for default during a particular time 
period, as mentioned above) is the use of security for the performance by the IFI in a 
murabaha operation.
957
 Even though the AAOIFI has declared the use of security for 
performance as legitimate, not all sharia scholars agree. Some object to the use of 
hamish jiddiya (a security deposit which is taken by the IFI before the murabaha 
contract is concluded) and arbun (which is taken from the buyer as part of the price 
after execution of the sale agreement).
958
 The purpose of this security deposit is to 
ensure that the IFI is not exposed to unnecessary risks in the event that the 
customer/purchaser becomes unable (or unwilling) to go through with the purchase 
as promised (this problem traces back to the issue of simple promises not being 
enforceable under sharia), since the IFI has to purchase the goods on its own 
account and has to acquire title and possession as required under the sharia rules 
before being able to sell the same goods to the customer who requested the 
purchase.
959
 Although this practice of arbun has been declared controversial by the 
Hanafi, Maliki and Shafi scholars, the Hanbali school of thought has allowed this 
practice on the pretext it is excessively harsh on the IFI in commercial terms to be 
left exposed to the risk of customer default, thereby creating an imbalance between 
the bargaining positions of the parties.
960
 The practice of hamish jaddiya has been 
accepted as valid by most of the contemporary scholars.
961
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Security deposits before/after the conclusion of the contract have been allowed to 
somewhat limit the IFIs’ exposure to risk. Such measures bring symmetry to the risk 
and return profiles of IFIs, bringing security not only to individual financial 
institutions but also to the industry as a whole.
962
  
 
22 Murabaha buy-back and Tawaruq sale 
Under the murabaha contract, there is also an argument against the IFIs charging a 
fixed sum over the market price when selling goods to the customer on a deferred 
basis, with some of the academics arguing that this is a legal method of 
circumventing the ban on charging interest.
963
 This argument is more persuasive in 
the case of special kind of murabaha sale, called the murabaha buy-back sale or 
tawaruq. However, it should be borne in mind that simply charging a mark-up to 
make a profit in a simple murabaha is in line with sharia because the IFI is taking a 
risk in purchasing the goods without any certainty about their eventual disposal, and 
thus the bank is justified in charging the mark-up due to its exposure to risk.
964
 
The working of a tawaruq (buy-back murabaha) is explained in figure 5 below. 
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COMMODITY VENDOR sells to the IFI in one 
instance, and then buys the goods back 
from the customer of the IFI at the market 
price prevelant at that time, thus providing 
cash to the client in an indirect sale 
CUSTOMER/PURCHASER/SELLER 
buys the goods from the IFI on 
credit and then sells the same 
good in the secondary market 
thereby getting cash from the 
sale, which may now be used for 
other purposes of the business 
like paying bills etc 
BANK/IFI buys goods from the 
commodity vendor and then 
sells the goods to the customer 
at a profit and on credit on 
instalments 
Tawaraq is basically a modified form of the basic murabaha contract which is used 
for monetising the process in order to provide cash (or credit) to the client.
965
 In a 
simple three party transaction, the IFI receives the request from the client to provide 
credit facility to it; it then buys some goods (usually precious metal in the open 
market) via another vendor, and sells those goods to the client under a murabaha at a 
cost-plus, deferred basis on instalments.
966
 The client then sells the same goods back 
to the vendor on a spot sale and gains the liquid cash for its use. This way, the client 
is able to gain credit facility via the use of a murabaha agreement with the bank 
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using another intermediary (the vendor). The main problem with this transaction 
arises when the IFI itself is the trader (vendor) of the goods, selling the goods at a 
profit to the client, and then buying the same goods back on a spot transaction 
(hence termed the ‘buy-back agreement’), which is criticised as being used to 
circumvent the requirements of the sharia in a sale transaction and is criticised for 
allowing a window to be opened for riba transactions.
967
 
This kind of murabaha contract gives rise to two systemic sharia governance 
problems. The first of these problems is ideological; concerning the question about 
whether murabaha contracts being used as an alternative for credit sales in the form 
of ‘cash loans’ and ‘credit facilities’ can be deemed sharia-compliant.968 The 
criticism in this context is that the murabaha was never meant to be used as an 
instrument to support credit sales to clients; rather, it was and should be used as a 
sale contract whereby the IFI simply purchases the assets that are requested by the 
clients and then makes a valid sale to the client at a declared and disclosed profit (the 
mark-up). It is argued that this type credit facility should only be used to cover 
actual commodity spot sales,
969
 and any other kind of expenditure such as overheads, 
running finances, and even credit mimicking sales should never be covered by the 
murabaha sale contracts, since it is paramount for credit sales to be divorced from 
any real economic activity.
970
  
Thus, the practice of tawaraq - being a derivative of the basic murabaha contract - is 
heavily criticised by some contemporary scholars
971
 as being of dubious sharia 
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compliance.
972
 It is pertinent to note, however, that despite this criticism from a 
school of scholars, these practices still remain in practice, especially in the East 
Asian countries. This practice is, for example, accepted in Malaysia by their 
National Sharia Board.
973
 This again is an example of sharia forum shopping and 
sharia arbitrage, where due to a lack of uniformity between the different schools of 
thought, the IFIs can adopt practices as per their convenience. This may lead to a 
race to the bottom situation in regulatory terms, where all IFIs try to move to 
jurisdictions which are less strict in enforcing sharia rules. 
 
23 The LIBOR controversy  
The second of the major systemic and sharia compliance issues in the murabaha 
transactions is the determination of the profit margin when selling a good to the 
client. In practice, the profit margins utilised by the IFI are determined by reference 
to LIBOR (London interbank offered rate), which itself is based on the interest rates 
used by banks in borrowing money. The criticism is that if LIBOR is the benchmark, 
then it leaves the entire Islamic finance industry susceptible to fluctuations in the 
interest rates, and are thus deemed un-Islamic and haram.
974
 
However, in recent times efforts have been made by the Islamic finance community 
to set up an Islamic Interbank Interest Rate Index (IIBR), designed as an alternative 
to LIBOR, and it is hoped this will provide the Islamic finance industry a chance to 
move away from the use of conventional interest rate indexes.
975
 This, it is argued, 
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will help prevent systemic issues in the Islamic finance industry caused by the use of 
international interbank interest rates in murabaha contracts.  
From a corporate governance perspective, it can therefore be seen that the main 
financial intermediary contracts of mudarabah and murabaha are fraught with 
traditional sharia issues. It is argued that the major reason for IFIs adopting these 
financial intermediaries of doubtful sharia-compliance is the competitive pressure to 
mimic the neoliberal shareholder-oriented conventional financial institutions in order 
to attract customers with better returns. It is asserted that the Islamic finance industry 
needs to move away from the pure profit-maximising ethos and go back to their 
roots of being an ethical system of finance catering to the maximum number of 
stakeholders. The best way to do this in modern day IFIs is to institute a stakeholder 
corporate governance model both at the macro- and the micro-level.  
 
24 Sharia supervisory boards: moving towards regulatory oversight 
 Another distinct feature that underpins the modern IFI is the presence of a sharia 
supervisory board (SSB). This body (or person) is responsible for the sharia 
compliance of all features of the IFI and consists of sharia qualified persons who are 
employed (as a mandatory obligation) by all IFIs to ensure that all financial 
instruments and services are in accordance with sharia.
976
 These SSBs are an 
integral part of the modern Islamic financial industry, dealing with issues relating to: 
the approval/disapproval of financial instruments in line with sharia through fatwas 
(religious pronouncements), the disposal of any income as charity attained by the IFI 
which was not in compliance with sharia, determining the levels of zakat at the IFI, 
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and giving advice on the distribution of returns to the shareholders and investment 
account holders.
977
 
From a governance point of view, the role of the SSB in IFIs is extremely important: 
without the SSB (or a sharia qualified person) the IFI cannot be truly sharia-
compliant. On the other hand, the existence of SSBs also causes some unique 
corporate governance issues for IFIs. These issues are related to the independence of 
the SSB, the competence of the SSB, conflict of interest of the SSB, transparency in 
the working of the SSB, confidentiality surrounding the SSB, agency costs involved 
in the monitoring and supervision of the SSB, and the possibility of conflict between 
the opinions of the SSB and the BOD.
978
 
One major aspect of the SSB is their ability to affect the management of the IFI, 
since without the approval of the SSB the IFI cannot effectively operate, creating in 
essence a two-tiered board, one being the executive board and the other being the 
SSB. This is something which has caused problems in effectively regulating IFIs; 
most regulators in non-Islamic jurisdiction are unsure as to how to handle the role of 
the SSB in context of the corporate governance structure of the IFI.
979
 
It is also pertinent to mention that the regulation of SSB’s own activities has been a 
matter of much debate and concern in academic and the practice, especially 
concerning those IFIs which are working in a secular jurisdiction where sharia is not 
recognised as a valid source of law. This creates two problems: first, the 
admissibility of fatwas as valid legal pronouncements and secondly; the availability 
of sharia qualified persons to carry out the role of the SSB for the IFIs.
980
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The IFI, in order to cater for the SSB, will normally have a two-tiered structure; the 
main executive board having been elected by the shareholder in the AGM and the 
SSB as the second board consisting of sharia qualified persons who are hired and 
appointed by the executive management of the IFI. Somewhat foreseeably, this two-
tiered structure may result in a continuous tussle of power between the SSB and the 
BOD, since the two boards are usually working towards different goals. The BOD 
works towards upholding the profitability of the IFI and maximising returns on the 
investment of the shareholders
981
 and the SSB works towards ensuring that every 
action is taken in line with the laid down precepts of sharia, which should include 
ensuring that the stakeholders are well catered for and the IFI remains true to the 
basic ethos (Maqasid) of Islamic finance.
982
 
 
25 The SSB and the stakeholder-oriented model: the role of remuneration for the 
BOD 
It is at times argued that ensuring sharia compliance ought to actually be a part of 
the executive BOD too since the purview of operations compliant with sharia 
principles is a major part of the basic mission statement of the IFI.
983
 Also, since the 
burden of ensuring that the IFI works within its mission statement lies with the 
executive board, it should automatically be expected that the BOD ensures this 
aspect. Thus, there should be no conflict between the aims of the SSB and the 
BOD.
984
  However, the inherent nature of the current corporate governance structure 
leaves a lot to be desired in this regard. This is primarily because the international 
                                                          
981
 However as will be seen this issue itself is very contentious, since in the IFI there are two different 
types of equity providers, the shareholders as well as the UIAH. This is dealt in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
982
 Diwany (n 711)  
983
 Islamic Finance: Opportunities, Challenges and Corporate Governance Issues’, World Bank 
Seminar, Washington, 24 April 2006 
984
 Omar and Haq (n 712) 
262 
 
financial market is structured in such a way that all executive incentives are based on 
the ability of the management to maximise returns for the shareholders,
985
 thereby 
shifting the focus of the BOD to a more profit-maximising approach. This focus of 
the Islamic finance industry on incentivising their executive boards and other officer 
based on the profit of the individual IFIs is an issue which needs to be examined at a 
regulatory level.  
In view of the international trend of incentive-based remuneration for the executive 
officers and board members of financial institutions, it becomes difficult to argue 
that IFIs should avoid such incentive-based remuneration when the industry needs to 
attract high-calibre personnel.  It is in essence a self-defeating argument for IFIs, 
since the IFI is premised on following the Sharia principles (Maqasid), stakeholder-
orientation and social responsibility, but if they do not incentivise the top 
management adequately, they will not be able to attract the best possible talent. On 
the other hand, if they do incentivise them as the conventional financial industry 
does, they will have to forego their ambitions to be stakeholder-oriented and will 
have to resort to focusing on maximising profits. It is thus argued that the industry 
needs to determine its own standards in every aspect, keeping in view the basic 
principles of sharia business ethos (the Maqasid framework), since using the 
existing shareholder-oriented forms of governance may lead to IFIs facing systemic 
risks. This is something which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
26 Conflicts of interest between SSBS and executive management. 
Next, we shall explore the issue of possible conflicts of interest between the SSB 
and the executive management/BOD. The SSB, in theory, have the power to veto all 
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measures and financial instruments that they deem non-compliant with sharia, but 
there are questions whether the members of the SSB can truly be considered 
independent because they are appointed by the board. It is thus argued that the issue 
surrounding the independence of SSB is a matter that needs regulatory intervention 
at a national level and an international level.  
It is also argued that the powers of the SSB to act as the final arbitrator for matters 
pertaining to sharia issues can also be enhanced by outlining the authority of the 
SSB in the articles of association of the IFI by designating specified situations in 
which the SSB would be the ultimate authority. This may also be done by placing 
such powers on a statutory footing, as is the case in Pakistan’s rules and regulations 
governing the Islamic banking and finance sector.
986
 As a minimum, the powers of 
SSB should include access to all records and staff, a power to conduct internal audits 
and a power to demand an explanation from the responsible party in case of any 
adverse findings. This will need a complete revamp of the current corporate 
governance framework at the industry level by way of regulatory intervention; 
otherwise the efficacy of the SSB is going to be left at the mercy of the executive 
management and the BOD.  
 
27 Fatwas and the power of the SSB 
Connected to the powers of the SSB, another noticeable issue is the concern 
regarding the pronouncements of the SSB (the fatwas) and their standing as effective 
pronouncements in the current corporate governance structure.
987
 A fatwa is a 
‘[l]egal opinion issued by a qualified scholar on matters of religious belief and 
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practice’.988 However, their standing in a jurisdiction where sharia is not recognised 
creates a systemic issue for the Islamic finance industry. With the SSBs currently 
being powerless to implement any of their rulings in many jurisdictions, it is up to 
the standard setting bodies to institute mechanism through which these 
pronouncements can be vetted as well as be enforced. A classic scenario would be 
where in a non-Islamic jurisdiction there is a conflict between the management of 
the IFI and the SSB regarding a new product that the IFI wants to launch. If the SSB 
is of the opinion that the product must not be launched because it is not sharia-
compliant, but the management still wants to launch it, there are two options open to 
the members of the SSB: they resign on the basis of their principles or they accept 
whatever the management says. This latter option is a forced one, because aside 
from these two options, there is no other mechanism which would currently allow 
the SSB in most jurisdictions to enforce their opinions. This is aggravated by the 
lack of recourse to dispute settlement mechanism in such a case, since in most 
jurisdictions the local judiciary will not enforce sharia rulings. Also, under normal 
corporate law(s) in most common law and civil law jurisdictions, the final decision 
of the BOD/management regarding the running of the corporation will take 
precedence over any other opinion. It is thus argued in the next chapter that the 
Islamic finance industry must have access to specialist alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) methods to ensure the integrity of fatwas. Without such a framework, it is 
argued that the fatwas will lose their legal standing and the IFIs face a serious 
reputational risk. 
                                                          
988
 Wafik, Grais, and P. Mattio. "Corporate Governance And Stakeholders’ Financial Interests In 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services." Stockholm: World Bank, November 2006 
265 
 
To alleviate some of these problems regarding fatwas, some jurisdictions have 
moved towards the concept of centralised SSBs.
989
 For example, in Pakistan and 
Malaysia the governments have delegated the authority to regulate the Islamic 
finance industry to a central sharia body. This leads to standardisation of sharia 
practices and the resolution of issues through harmonisation at a governmental level. 
This has also led to the judiciary being proactive with regards to issues surrounding 
Islamic finance.
990
 However, this approach is not suitable in secular non-Islamic 
jurisdictions, because having central sharia supervisory boards would not be 
possible at governmental level. This then brings us back to square one with regards 
to the enforcement of fatwas as proper legal opinions.
991
 
The other issue regarding fatwas is with regards to the inconsistencies in fatwas 
between the different schools of thought as well as between different jurisdictions 
(or even between individual IFIs).
992
 This is an issue of systemic proportion and may 
cause serious damage to the industry if not dealt with properly at a regulatory level. 
These inconsistencies pose a unique risk for IFIs as an industry; that of sharia forum 
shopping and sharia arbitrage. This is another example of where positive regulatory 
intervention (or at least monitoring) is required by a singular body (or an amalgam 
of different standard setting bodies) internationally.  
Another solution offered for this difficulty is the gradual codification of fatwas, 
combined with a suggestion that there should be a centralised fatwa database 
available to all stakeholders, including the customers and regulators for easy 
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consumption and reference.
993
 This task can be delegated to an existing international 
organisation like the IFSB or the AAOIFI, whose purposes already involve the 
promotion of harmonisation and convergence of sharia interpretations. 
Alternatively, a new organisation could be established to promote and promulgate on 
the subject matter. Thus, it is suggested in the next chapter that such a function 
should be carried out by an amalgam of the existing standard-setting bodies (i.e. the 
IFSB and the AAOIFI) as a supranational regulatory authority with the powers to 
issues certificates of compliance and issuing licenses (along with the powers to 
revoke such certificates and licenses if the organisation fails to comply with the set 
standards) to institutions that intend to work as IFIs. This way, the issues relating to 
the compliance of predetermined standards can be dealt with at an international level 
and the international community can move towards a new and more harmonised 
regulatory architecture for IFIs.  
 
28 Conclusion  
It is argued that the corporate governance arrangements of IFIs are currently largely 
modelled around those of the conventional shareholder corporations, in spite of the 
explicit mandate to promote social welfare and pursue stakeholders’ interests. This 
configuration leads to a distribution of rights and responsibilities that essentially 
leaves control with shareholders. The most notable variation in IFIs’ corporate 
governance structure is the presence of a sharia board of scholars and a sharia 
review unit that ought to ensure compliance with Islamic law, along with the issue of 
investment account holders and their standing in the IFI. Such an implementation 
has far-reaching repercussions for the Islamic finance industry, as discussed in this 
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chapter. It has also been established that sharia compliance decisions affect all IFI 
stakeholders and thus form the basic governance aspect of any particular IFI and 
need to be regulated more harmoniously across the globe.
994
 
The other aspect of corporate governance for IFIs is the issue of the basic financial 
intermediary contracts that are being utilised by the modern IFIs. As we have 
explored, they have certain systemic consequences for the whole industry if not 
corrected, regulated and governed as per the actual ethos (Maqasid) of Islamic 
finance. In the next chapters it is argued that all of these internal as well as external 
governance and regulatory issues can be addressed via a stakeholder oriented 
principle-based meta-regulatory framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
994
 Iqbal, Zamir and  Mirakhor. "Stakeholders Model Of Governance In Islamic Economic System", 
Islamic Economic Studies, Vol. 11, No.2 (March 2004), 43-6, 2004 
268 
 
CHAPTER 8: DRAWING A SYNERGY BETWEEN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE - A MOVE TOWARDS A MORE 
STAKEHOLDER-ORIENTED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
FOR MODERN IFIs 
 
1 Introduction 
Having discussed the internal corporate governance issues in the previous chapter, 
we can now move to discuss the external aspects of the framework which form a 
major part of sharia governance. 
This chapter explores the argument that there can be no single ideal model for 
regulation of IFIs. Rather, a model that recognises the IFI as operating within a 
separate sector and sets standards and legislation specific to them is better suited.  
Rationale for separate arrangements can be found in the enactment of Islamic 
finance laws in countries that had previously opted for a homogenous regulatory 
framework, as well as in the creation of specialised Islamic finance regulatory 
divisions in the regulatory bodies. However, as we will see in this chapter, 
establishing separate laws or institutions for the regulation of IFIs could be an issue 
in non-Islamic countries. Further, IFIs seem to flourish even in some countries that 
do not address the specificities of IFI through specific legislation.
995
 This is the case, 
for instance, in the UK, Saudi Arabia or Bahrain; where the lack of an IFI-specific 
legal framework is not synonymous with a neglect of the industry. Conversely, 
regulators in these countries have shown some willingness to adapt regulatory 
arrangements whenever needed, guided by the imperatives of fair competition, 
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systemic stability and investor protection. However, the fact remains that regulators 
are secular regulators with little or no expertise in Islamic finance, and in view of the 
fast paced developments in the industry, regulations specific for the Islamic finance 
need to be flexible, adaptive, dynamic and principles-based. In the current regulatory 
environment this is not the case. The regulation for the Islamic finance is both 
lagging behind the industry and is not uniformly applicable throughout different 
jurisdictions, despite the presence of uniform standards set by two standard-setting 
bodies: the AAOIFI and the IFSB. The problem lies at the enforcement end of these 
regulatory efforts. 
It appears, therefore, that the suggestions presented in the previous chapter for 
solving the internal corporate governance problems may form a reasonable solution 
to the immediate problem. Nonetheless, these suggestions do not resolve the macro-
level external regulatory issues and it would ultimately be necessary to find 
organisational solutions that resolve this and other corporate governance problems 
that emanate from such external regulatory issues.
996
 In conjunction with mitigating 
conflicts of interest and other corporate governance issues, regulatory efforts would 
need to emphasise the transparent and ethical conduct of business. In this regard, the 
need to ensure transparency and compliance to standards set by an external 
regulatory mechanism requires streamlining and harmonising efforts. This, it is 
argued, can be best carried out by a principle-based meta-regulatory framework 
which focuses on the stakeholder model as an embodiment of the Islamic ethos 
regarding economics and finance. 
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2 The regulatory state and the stakeholder theory: laying the ground work for 
the regulatory framework for IFIs 
David Lea, in his writing, insists that the stakeholder rights are best described as 
moral duties rather than specific legal duties.
997
 The reason that he gives is that since 
the stakeholders have a claim in the company as moral beings, it is best to define 
their interests as being informal and imperfect duties rather than special and perfect 
duties. This is so because whilst these duties are an obligation for the stakeholders, 
they are also more flexible and can be adopted by the firm or industry according to 
specific needs of the particular segment of stakeholders. The reason for the 
preference of stakeholder duties as moral duties rather than legal duties is the fact 
that once they become legal duties, they would rob most of the normative 
stakeholder duties of their moral content
998
 and would suffer the same consequences 
that some laws in the corporate regime do; that is, they become redundant. 
Another major reason is that since the list of stakeholders is generally not delineated 
and since a stakeholder in an organisation can be defined as ‘any group or individual 
who can effect or is effected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives’,999 
it would not make sense to define set duties because different stakeholders may be 
owed different duties. To keep the stakeholder concept viable and of relative utility, 
it is best to define their rights in the form of a moral obligation from the managers’ 
point of view. 
 The other objection to making the stakeholder duties legal duties is the fact that by 
doing so, the burden of enforcing them would shift to the corporations, which might 
easily cause the government to relinquish its all-important supervisory role and no 
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longer play a valued part in regulating the corporation.  From a regulatory point of 
view, this loss of the supervisory role of the government would be a catastrophe; the 
only way the government would ever be able to keep a check on corporate policy 
would only be when a law is broken, meaning that governmental intervention may 
come ‘too little too late’. Keeping the government part of the regulatory structure is 
best for both the stakeholders and the companies because the supervisory role is best 
performed by the government. Looking at this argument from an international 
perspective, another aspect becomes clear; by keeping all responsibilities owed to 
stakeholder groups as uniformalised, imperfect duties the firm may adapt to their 
particular needs meaning that the corporation would become more dynamic in 
adapting to different cultural and societal settings.
1000
 
It is thus also argued that the concept of making the stakeholder duties as moral 
duties can be satisfactorily amalgamated into the business ethics and CSR ideals 
when the state is made a moral player with regard to outlining the regulatory policies 
for an industry. Only when the state is itself involved in the regulation and 
supervision of an industry as a major moral player (or in other words as a 
stakeholder) can it be possible to make prudential regulations for any industry. So, 
David Lea’s argument can thus viably be furthered by making the state a moral 
player while making the stakeholder duties as moral duties. This combination of the 
state acting as a moral player at a macro-level with corresponding moral duties of 
the stakeholders at the micro-level can be deemed successful only if used in meta-
regulations given by the state in an industry such as Islamic finance. As we have 
already established in the previous chapters, the Islamic finance industry is not 
restricted to any one particular jurisdiction, rather operates internationally under non 
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uniform rules and principles without any specific enforcement mechanism. As such, 
the argument of having an effective meta-regulatory framework at a national level 
can be extended by analogy to the international level and the state’s responsibility 
can be delegated to a supranational regulatory authority like the IFSB and the 
AAOIFI for an industry like Islamic finance. 
 
3 Meta-regulations: A new avenue for Islamic finance? 
Meta-regulation can be defined as ‘the proliferation of different forms of regulation 
(whether tools of state law or non-law mechanisms) each regulating one another and 
is a key feature of contemporary governance’.1001 The concept also holds that law is 
not the right method to regulate stakeholder rights since it is believed that law will 
rob the hallmark flexibility of both these concepts. This holds truer for an industry 
like Islamic finance, since the focus of the industry is on the stakeholder nature and 
thus needs a flexible approach to regulation.  
In other words, 
[m]eta-regulation can also entail any form of regulation (whether by tools of state 
law or other mechanisms) that regulates any other form of regulation. Therefore, it 
might include legal regulation of self-regulation (e.g., putting an oversight board 
above a self-regulatory professional association), non-legal methods of ‘regulating’ 
internal corporate self-regulation or management (e.g., voluntary accreditation to 
codes of good conduct, etc.), the regulation of national law-making by transnational 
bodies (such as the EU), and so on.
1002
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This shows that even though the legal fraternity has made strides to assimilate the 
social responsibility of the corporation via legislation and court decisions, the best 
way to capture the essence of stakeholder duties is by means of meta-regulation.
1003
 
This thesis argues that it follows that IFIs need to be regulated and governed 
prudently via meta-regulations where the private sector, the government sector and 
the international supranational regulatory and standard setting authorities are 
involved in devising the regulatory framework based on the principles espoused by 
sharia( the Maqasid Al Sharia). The need to have a prudential, harmonised 
regulatory framework holds much more importance for the Islamic finance industry 
than the conventional finance industry. Specifically, this is because the Islamic 
finance industry’s operations transcend different jurisdictions whilst maintaining the 
same basic ideology and ethos, which causes a non-uniform application of rules and 
regulations and consequently causes governance and regulatory issues. As a result, 
harmonisation of the Islamic finance industry’s standards is by far the most 
important issue from a regulatory and governance point of view and needs the input 
of all those jurisdictions and stakeholders who are affecting and affected by the 
Islamic finance industry.   
 What stakeholder theory proponents are normatively trying to achieve via 
regulation is not to give a one-size-fits-all solution, but rather to elaborate the fact 
that the stakeholder approach ‘points to the need for social controls to encourage the 
beneficial effects of the institutional behaviours and to regulate or prevent the 
harmful effects.’1004 Similarly, this perspective resonates with Michael Jensen, who 
says that the  
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‘role of the government1005 is to set up such a system whereby the cost of 
externalities are minimized, meaning that the cost of one person acting in one 
particular fashion should not bear a cost on another person. This adds to the normal 
role of the state (or other regulatory bodies) of ensuring that the contracts that are 
entered by people and organizations are abided by at all levels, and that the power of 
enforcement and coercion should remain with the state (or other such designated 
regulatory authorities).
1006
 
 Both Jensen and Wood are focusing on the same point about the role of the 
government in the affairs of the economy at a macro-level and in the affairs of the 
firm at the micro-level by means of regulations and laws. This is to ensure the 
balance that is required in any civilised society between maximising one’s own 
welfare and ensuring that it is not done at the cost of another. The aforementioned 
argument should be reiterated here; that for an industry like the Islamic finance 
industry, where national regulatory mechanisms are not always available, regulation 
via an international meta-regulatory framework is possibly the best way to balance 
out the competing interests of the free market mechanism with the need of financial 
stability for society in general. Thus, by using meta-regulatory mechanisms, an 
international regulatory framework can be created which will fulfil all the basic 
requirements for individual IFIs, namely sharia-compliance as well as allowing IFIs 
to operate in jurisdictions which are not Islamic per se. The logical conclusion that 
follows from these arguments is that the stakeholder point of view is the most 
suitable for the Islamic financial industry at both a macro regulatory level as well as 
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a micro institution level and provides the necessary uniformity of rules, regulations 
and enforcement mechanisms that has been missing in the industry to date.  
Meta-regulation is specifically well suited for IFIs because of the lack of a coherent 
single body to oversee the operations and enforcement of regulatory standards of 
IFIs as an industry. Thus, a principle-based approach with emphasis on substance 
rather than form (in ideological and practical terms) can be best achieved through 
meta-regulations with a focus on gauging results rather than rules. Consequently, the 
international standard setting and regulatory bodies need to ensure that their 
regulatory framework for Islamic financial institutions is in line with the stakeholder 
approach so that the essence of the Islamic teachings is comfortably amalgamated 
with the conventional corporate governance and regulatory practices at both the 
macro- and the micro-level. 
 
4 The regulatory issues emanating from Corporate Governance theory and 
Islamic financial theory 
According to Iqbal and Mirakhor, the issues to be taken into account regarding the 
regulatory framework for IFIs are the ‘clarity and enforceability of property rights, 
the quality of contract law, the efficiency of judicial recourse, [and] the feasibility of 
quick dispute resolution mechanisms.’1007 All of these issues for IFIs, when 
discussed from an international or cross-jurisdictional regulatory point of view, can 
be seen to be systemic as they relate to the essence of Islamic finance. The failure to 
take into account any of these issues means that IFIs as an industry lose their core 
Islamic identity and are then labelled as Islamic merely in form and not in substance.  
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As we have already seen, property in Islamic literature is approached differently 
from the western perspective.
1008
 The Islamic perspective of property makes it an 
inherent social concern, whereas the western point of view espoused by the capitalist 
neoliberal ideological standpoint makes it an inherent individual right with very little 
that is owed to the collective.
1009
 Accordingly, it is argued that the issue of property, 
along with the issue of enforcement of sharia principles (sharia governance), is at 
the heart of the regulatory conundrum of the Islamic financial industry.  
 
5 The aim of the regulatory framework for the Islamic finance industry 
It can thus be argued that under the sharia principles, the objective and aim of a 
financial institution is to act as a medium through which wealth is circulated and 
transferred from that area (or segment) of the economy where it is in abundance, to 
an area where it is needed. The financial institutions are thus first and foremost 
facilitators of wealth distribution and then secondly profit-making entities (emphasis 
is to be put on profit-making and not profit maximising) under the Islamic concept of 
a business organisation.  
As Islam encourages entrepreneurship and is inherently abhorrent to the hoarding of 
wealth, the economic systems has to be such that either people voluntarily part with 
their wealth via investments or are forced to part with their wealth via the obligatory 
payment of zakat (Islamic wealth tax). In view of this macro-level objective of the 
financial system, it is imperative that a prudential regulatory system is put in place 
which furthers a management system which caters for the stakeholder nature of the 
IFI and ensures a risk averse operation of the IFI. However, this task is made 
difficult for IFIs because of their cross-jurisdictional operations where they are 
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forced to operate for competitive reasons in jurisdictions where sharia law and 
principles may not be recognised. Therefore, IFIs are left without any effective 
enforcement mechanisms for the principles and rules needed to allow the financial 
institutions to be ‘Islamic’ in their true sense. 
 As a result, the main issue that arises from the external governance of IFIs is the 
issue of sharia governance and the enforcement of standards set by the IFSB and the 
AAOIFI. This issue is an inherent part of the corporate governance framework for 
all IFIs and needs the most attention, but at the same time is the most difficult to 
regulate from a conventional regulator’s perspective.1010 One of the major reasons 
for IFIs not having a uniform regulatory regime can be traced back to the issue of 
sharia forum shopping and non-uniformity of the religious pronouncements (fatwas) 
by different sharia scholars.
1011
 Whilst other generic issues surrounding the 
corporate governance debate have been dealt with in different regulatory standards 
as issued by the IFSB
1012
 and AAOIFI, the issue of sharia governance still remains a 
contentious issue primarily due to a lack of any viable internationally applicable 
enforcement mechanisms. There are many instances where the schools of thought 
have differed over the major issues and this in turn has allowed different IFIs to 
abide by the different pronouncements of scholars from different schools of thought, 
leading to uncertainty at both the regulatory as well as individual institution 
level.
1013
 Thus, it is argued that the IFIs need a double layered sharia governance 
oversight and supervision framework: the first layer being external sharia 
governance framework instituted either by national regulators or an international 
supra national regulatory body; and the second being internal sharia governance 
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framework instituted by the IFIs themselves. Both of these can be achieved through 
a principle-based meta-regulatory framework which encourages sharia compliance 
at the macro-level. 
 
6 The current regulatory framework: the three approaches 
The regulation of IFIs thus becomes strategically important when discussing the 
external sharia governance framework. It may therefore be stated that there is a need 
for regulation to achieve public good for society and the regulation needs to be 
framed in such a way that enhances the climate for investment and trust in the 
markets both in Islamic countries and in international markets.
1014
 The biggest 
challenge for IFIs as an industry is to formally put in place a framework whereby a 
unified system of sharia governance at macro-level is put in place while maintaining 
the IFI’s compatibility with conventional regulatory and governance requirements. 
This is complicated by a number of factors, of which sharia forum shopping and 
sharia arbitrage are the most systemic from a sharia governance perspective. This is 
followed by the fact that IFIs operate in different jurisdictions, which gives rise to 
the corporate governance issues discussed in the previous chapters as well as cross-
regulatory issues where the IFIs operate. These jurisdictions can be divided into 
three distinct groups for the purposes of this thesis.
1015
 
a. The first group 
The first group is formed of those jurisdictions which recognise sharia as a valid 
legal source of law and allow legal rulings by sharia boards and scholars to be 
endorsed and accepted in the local judiciary. Countries which fall into this category 
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are Pakistan, Sudan, Malaysia and Iran. These jurisdictions will have in place a 
central sharia regulatory authority or a body that is recognised both by the 
legislature and judiciary. These jurisdictions don’t have any problem in supervising 
and regulating the sharia aspects of IFIs both externally and internally. The 
distinctive feature of these jurisdictions is that they will have a central regulatory 
authority that can give verdicts about the sharia standing of a particular financial 
instrument, contract, transaction and any internal supervisory regime in place. In 
summary, they regulate any and all aspects relating to the sharia supervisory board 
and any religious pronouncements that they may give pertaining to an IFI’s 
operation. This can be translated to mean that sharia governance is dealt with by the 
central regulatory body. In essence, these jurisdictions have a more ‘top down’, rule-
based approach whereby the central bank (or the appropriate department of the 
government) continually regulates, monitors and licenses the IFIs. The advantage of 
this particular approach lies in the certainty for IFIs in knowing exactly what rules 
and procedures they need to follow. Secondly, the issue of compliance of the 
regulatory standards set by the central regulatory bodies is also handled by such 
bodies with the help of the local judiciary and other national dispute settlement 
processes, therefore instilling confidence in the general public and allowing IFIs to 
easily follow mandatory governance standards. For example, in Pakistan the Islamic 
finance industry is regulated both by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)
1016
 and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP).
1017
 The SBP handles all 
Islamic financial institutions like banks,
1018
 whereas the SECP handles all 
musharakah and mudarabah companies. Both set out detailed specifications for all 
activities ranging from traditional corporate governance standards for voting at the 
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AGMs, the role of the BODs, to remuneration of the executives, the appointment of 
the sharia supervisory board,
1019
 the issuance of fatwas, the acceptability of new 
financial instruments and capital requirements.
1020
 The other distinct aspect of the 
Pakistani (and other similar jurisdictions) regulatory approach is the proactive role 
that the judiciary plays in dealing with sharia-related issues. The judgement of the 
Pakistan Supreme Court regarding the ban on riba and Islamic banking in general is 
considered as a great judicial achievement laying down the ideological frontiers for 
modern day Islamic finance practices.
1021
 In essence, both sharia governance and 
corporate governance issues are handled by the central authorities, leaving very little 
room for individual IFIs to manoeuvre in terms of creativity. The other positive 
aspect of the Pakistani regulatory approach is the fact that the SBP has adopted 
many of the international regulatory standards set out by the IFSB and the AAOIFI, 
which means that the regulation of IFIs is already in line with most of the IFSB and 
AAOIFI standards, bringing uniformity into the regulatory framework.
1022
 
Whilst this regulatory approach works well in jurisdiction such as Pakistan where 
sharia is recognised as a legal authority, such a regulatory approach cannot be 
integrated at a more international level where IFIs operate in jurisdictions without 
provision for a central regulatory authority accepting sharia as a separate and 
distinct legal system, from the prevalent legal system nor a judicial system that 
accepts fatwas as possessing legal standing. This means that IFIs are not deemed as 
separate and distinct entities in the eyes of the law and are dealt with under the same 
regulatory regime as normal financial institutions. As a result, there is a definite 
need for a different regulatory approach than the rule-based approach as practiced in 
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Pakistan, since not all jurisdictions will have made legislative and regulatory 
changes to accommodate Islamic financial Institutions along the same lines as 
Pakistan or Malaysia.    
b. The second group 
This brings us to the second group of jurisdictions. These are those jurisdictions 
which do not have a separate central regulatory authority which supervises the 
running of the IFIs yet still recognise sharia as a valid source of law for IFIs. 
Therefore, these jurisdictions provide for regulation through some legislative or 
regulatory means but do not go as far as providing a central sharia authority to 
oversee the operation of the IFIs and instead accommodate the Islamic financial 
institutions within its existing regulatory framework. Kuwait is a good example of 
such a jurisdiction where the legal code provides for sharia to be the dominant legal 
source for all aspects.
1023
  However, it then explicitly states through another decree 
that the sharia principles will not be mandatory for commercial purposes
1024
 whilst 
also providing a definition of an IFI
1025
 and allows them to operate under sharia 
principles and requires the bank’s assembly to appoint a sharia board in accordance 
with principles laid down by the AAOIFI.
1026
 
The other distinct feature for the regulatory approach by jurisdictions such as Kuwait 
is the issue of dispute settlement, since there is no central sharia body to oversee the 
operations of individual IFIs and any dispute arising pertaining to sharia is to be 
dealt with by the fatwa board in the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic affairs.
1027
 
Nevertheless, there is no recourse to the mainstream judiciary as is the case in 
Pakistan, Malaysia and Iran. The responsibility of such a referral falls on the BOD of 
                                                          
1023
 Z Hasan, Sharia Governance In Islamic Banks (Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2012) 212 
1024
 Commercial Code Of 1981 Article 102 
1025
 Central Bank Of Kuwait Law No. 32, Article 86 
1026
 Z Hasan (n 1023) 214 
1027
 Z Hasan (n 1006) 187 
282 
 
the IFI,
1028
 thereby maintaining the decorum of a traditional BOD being the main 
decision-making body of the IFI. Consequently, the corporate governance 
framework is essentially that of traditional Anglo-American corporate governance.  
This structure of regulation and governance provides IFIs with a flexible 
environment to operate without there being a central rulemaking body to oversee 
their operations. However, at the same time there is an acceptance of Islamic 
financial institutions as separate entities from normal financial institutions and thus a 
limited parallel system for the IFI is provided. This is different from the regulatory 
practices of jurisdictions that fall in the first category like Pakistan and Malaysia in 
that there is no central body that makes rules for IFIs. Nonetheless, where a financial 
institution is set up as an IFI, the law recognises it as such and provides for a 
separate regulatory regime under the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.
1029
 
Therefore, IFIs are afforded some flexibility and are permitted to rely on the non-
judicial administrative bodies and legislative intervention as and when the need 
arises. However, this regulatory approach may not be completely suitable for IFIs 
working in all jurisdictions in an international context. The reliance on a body such 
as the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, as well as recognition by the 
legislature, means that IFIs are recognised as separate and distinct entities that are to 
be dealt with separately by the state, fatwas, religious pronouncements regarding the 
sharia acceptability (or otherwise) of operational issues and the recognition of the 
legal validity of governance structures within individual IFIs. This gives these 
jurisdictions the advantage of operating in a more flexible regulatory environment 
than the more rule-based centrally controlled first group of jurisdictions like 
Pakistan, Malaysia and Iran. 
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c. The third group 
The third group of jurisdictions includes those where there is no provision for 
recognition of sharia principles and the regulation of IFIs is mostly carried out under 
secular regulations and law with some concessions given to IFIs (specifically for 
taxation purposes) just to encourage them to keep operating in that jurisdiction. The 
best example of such an approach is the UK’s attitude towards IFIs.  
The UK, with its historically dominant position in world finance and an equally 
strong legal and judicial system, has grappled with the regulatory issues surrounding 
Islamic finance for some time now. The main regulatory authority at the time of 
starting this thesis was the FSA,
1030
 which had published some basic policy papers 
detailing the working of IFIs and had made some regulatory inroads into recognising 
and allowing IFIs some permissiveness in very limited aspects like taxation and 
deposit protection.
1031
 However, since the FSA and its predecessors are all secular 
regulators with no knowledge and expertise of sharia, the regulatory regime has not 
been adapted to incorporate the unique religious nature of IFIs. Nonetheless, a 
number of endeavours have been made by the HM Treasury and the FSA to allow 
for certain tax exemptions for Islamic house mortgages; allowing for waiver of 
stamp duties when dealing in murabahah home financing transactions; and other 
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such specific areas of Islamic finance.
1032
 These exemptions given by the legislature, 
though very encouraging, do not go far enough to help in the regulation of IFIs as 
distinct from conventional financial institutions. Keeping in view the fact that IFIs 
intend to compete internationally with conventional financial institutions, it becomes 
clear that IFIs will have a competitive disadvantage in many regulatory aspects when 
operating in secular jurisdictions wherein the legal system does not recognise sharia 
as a valid source of law. An example of this is the case of Beximco Pharmaceutical 
vs Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC , wherein the English courts refused to enforce the 
contract since it was too vaguely stated in the terms of the contract that the 
governing law was to be the ‘principles of the glorious sharia’.1033 The courts stated 
that the term ‘glorious sharia’ was too vague to be given any effect, demonstrating 
the kind of legal and regulatory issues faced by the IFIs in secular jurisdictions. 
Thus, this approach is obviously unsuitable for the Islamic finance industry. 
 
7  The regulatory debate and the aim of Islamic finance: regulating on principles 
The other major issue that may arise in a jurisdiction like the UK in the context of 
regulation of IFIs are the issues of sharia supervisory boards. According to 
traditional and contemporary sharia scholars, the religious aspects of the IFI’s 
operation are to be the exclusive domain of the SSB,
1034
 in that their verdict on a 
particular practice or transaction is to be final and mandatory (except where 
legislation allows for a review of such pronouncement by a higher sharia scholars 
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body, as is the case with the Islamic banking department in the State bank of 
Pakistan).
1035
 However, in the case of SSBs operating in IFIs in the UK, their role 
has been restricted to being merely advisory, since identifying them as having an 
executive role would mean that the SSB would come under the purview of the ‘fit 
and proper criteria’ of the FSA and also become liable under the general duties owed 
by directors under sections 170-177 of the Companies Act 2006. The SSB being 
labelled as merely advisory has very far-reaching knock on effects: the IFIs present 
in UK are basically operating without any effective sharia supervision and 
enforcement and therefore may lead to a product being approved by the IFI’s BOD 
which may not be sharia-compliant, which is a systemic reputational risk for the 
Islamic finance industry as a whole.  
The other important issues related to the SSB are: the regulation of their 
appointments, their terms of contracts, their remunerations and their 
qualifications.
1036
 All of these issues emanate from the fact that without a proper 
regulatory oversight, IFIs may not be able to operate with as much confidence as 
they would in a jurisdiction like Pakistan or Kuwait, wherein both the legislature and 
the judiciary have acted proactively to establish a system of regulatory oversight by 
way of positive intervention.   
It is therefore argued that from a corporate governance point of view, the issues 
pertaining to the SSB can be divided into the following four aspects: transparency 
and independence, confidentiality, competence and disclosure.
1037
 The argument 
follows that all these aspects can be handled well under an international meta-
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regulatory framework which focuses on the unique stakeholder nature of the Islamic 
finance industry.  
The biggest challenge for the Islamic finance industry in general, although more 
prevalent for those operating in jurisdictions which do not recognise the separate 
nature of sharia as a source of law for IFIs, is to instil confidence in the general 
public that the IFI is actually ‘Islamic’ in essence and not just an ‘eye wash’. As a 
consequence, it is imperative that a regulatory regime is put in place which can 
provide the necessary support for the Islamic finance industry as a whole. Moreover, 
this should be a regime which is principle-based and goal-oriented so that rather than 
relying on rules, the local regulators can easily and flexibly apply such principles 
which facilitate the working of the IFIs in an environment where there is 
transparency in their operations. This should entail clearly defined sharia aspects so 
that the public is aware and well-informed in addition to a regulatory regime which 
ensures prudent risk management to ensure proper appointments to the SSB and 
other office bearers. It should also allow for religious pronouncements by sharia 
scholars capable of incorporation into the overall framework of the IFI’s operational 
ambit. 
 
9. Conclusion  
 It is argued thus that such a proper regulatory regime for the Islamic finance 
industry can only be made possible when the governance structure of individual IFIs 
are also structured to strongly incorporate the business ethics and CSR model as 
espoused by the stakeholder corporate governance theory, and the governance 
structures depart ideologically from the neoliberal profit maximising ethos of the 
Anglo-American corporate governance model, with profit-making to be seen as a 
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means to an end and not an end in itself. The regulatory framework for IFIs should 
be focused on principles of upholding the unique perspective of property rights as 
set out under the sharia, focusing on the social, economic and legal needs of the 
whole range of stakeholders rather than just shareholders and creditors.  
The high amount of divergence in regulatory practices across the globe for IFIs, 
coupled with the failure of individual IFIs to uniformly abide by corporate 
governance standards every time,
1038
 logically leads to a strong case for a regulatory 
framework capable of taking into account the specificity of IFIs, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining enforcement mechanisms that do not stifle the 
(relatively new) industry and still maintain the cultural aspects of individual IFIs. In 
this regard, it is argued that a unique regulatory framework with a focus on 
principles of Sharia is to be instituted by the industry at an international level. For 
this to be a practical framework, the normative values of Islamic finance(Maqasid)  
have to be made the focus and the regulatory framework ought to be principle and 
goal/performance based. 
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CHAPTER 9: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
1 A goal and principles based meta-regulatory framework for Islamic finance.  
 
The terms “goal-based” and “performance-based” regulation tend to be used 
interchangeably. In either goal-based or performance-based regulation, the 
regulation does not specify the means of achieving compliance, but rather sets out 
goals that allow alternative ways to achieve regulatory compliance.
1039
 Sometimes, 
these regulations promote or encourage the use of management systems with a 
continuous improvement cycle to move a company to and beyond barebones 
compliance with a regulatory goal.  The other major characteristic of a performance-
based regulatory framework is that it places more importance on reviews, 
inspections, audits and their control, frequency and timing. The latter are 
underpinned by a determination of where the board's resources should best be 
focused. Tied to this regulatory approach is the use of performance indicators to 
assess relative levels of regulatory compliance by the regulated entities. 
 It is thus argued that a meta-regulatory framework which is ‘smart’,1040 proactive, 
flexible and responsive needs to be instituted for the Islamic finance industry.
1041
 It 
is also recognised that the international standard-setting agencies like the IFSB and 
the AAOIFI, which have been publishing best practices and guidelines, need to be 
fully involved in the institution of this new international regulatory framework. It is 
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also pertinent to mention that the gap between the set standards and their actual 
application in practice lies at the enforcement end; at the moment there is no 
effective means of enforcement for the standards set out by both the IFSB and the 
AAOIFI at the international level for the industry. The best method of enforcement 
is to incorporate these standards into the national regulatory framework of the 
individual countries, however as we have already seen, such an approach is 
impractical for countries which do not accept sharia as a valid and separate source 
of law, which leaves many of the IFI’s internationally under regulated and under 
supervised.  
For this aim of an effective enforcement mechanism to be attained, the comity of 
nations that allow IFIs to operate within their jurisdictions need to agree on common 
enforcement standards as well as develop guidelines in their frameworks so that a 
heightened sense of importance is placed on  licensing, reviews, inspections and 
audits. To achieve this purpose, the major task of the international standard-setting 
bodies (the IFSB and AAOIFI) should be to expand and to develop performance 
indicators to assess relative levels of regulatory compliance in such a way that is 
principle and outcome focused and takes into account the basic principles of sharia 
governance( the Maqasid). The indicators ought to deal with both sharia governance 
as well as conventional corporate governance standards for financial institutions, 
which may be borrowed from well-established standard-setting bodies like Basel 
Accord or the OECD and then customise specific standards tailored to the needs of 
the IFI. The purpose of this principles-based framework will be to act as 
supplementary standards for sharia compliance and not in lieu of local national 
regulations. In the case of a conflict between conventional governance and 
regulatory standards, the IFI should have the freedom to decide which standards they 
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intend to apply if the conventional governance standards are stricter than those 
proposed by the IFSB or the AAOIFI. In case of national regulatory standards being 
more lax than those set out by the IFSB and AAOIFI, the IFI must opt for the 
sharia-compliant option. 
 The need for this principle based meta-regulatory framework stems from the fact 
that a rule based punitive framework (as instituted in Pakistan) cannot work across 
the globe for all IFIs. Further, the absence of expertise and sometimes the inability 
as well as unwillingness of local regulators to devise an appropriate and separate 
framework for IFIs (as seen in the UK-based regulatory model) might allow some 
IFIs to operate either in a regulatory vacuum or a regulatory environment that may 
even force them to be regulated under conventional regulations and rules. This leads 
to sharia compliance issues which may lead to the systemic failure of the whole 
industry.  
 
2. Policy recommendations: a move towards a principle-based regulatory 
framework. 
It is in light of the foregoing discussion regarding the regulatory and corporate 
governance issues that this thesis argues that the best enforcement mechanism from 
a regulatory perspective for IFIs is a system of certifications for such financial 
institutions which wish to operate as IFIs. In this regard, the two leading standard-
setting bodies (the IFSB and the AAOIFI) should be given the mandate to issue 
‘certificates of compliance’ for all IFIs wishing to operate as sharia-compliant 
institutions.  These certificates of compliance would be recognition of the fact that 
the financial institution is indeed operating as an IFI and has complied with all the 
standards laid down by either the IFSB or AAOIFI (whichever standard is chosen by 
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the jurisdiction). These certificates will give validity to the sharia aspects of the IFI 
and should be aimed to instil confidence in the stakeholders that are dealing with the 
IFI.  
These recommendations are premised on the recognition that the Islamic finance 
industry has expanded its operations in the recent past and are no longer restricted to 
Islamic countries, and consequently need a more harmonised regulatory framework 
that can be applied uniformly to all IFIs. This issue is coupled with the requirement 
of having an effective enforcement mechanism for the regulatory standards, which is 
made all the more difficult because of the cross-jurisdiction operations of the IFI. It 
is for this reason that no one national regulatory and enforcement mechanism can be 
deemed sufficient. Thus, the best way to ensure compliance with the standards of the 
AAOIFI and the IFSB is to give these bodies the power to issue and revoke these 
certificates of compliance, which would allow the IFIs’ stakeholders to function 
confidently knowing that the particular IFI is actually sharia-compliant and is 
following good corporate governance practice(s). Following this section are some of 
the basic policy recommendations that this thesis deems appropriate for the 
aforementioned regulatory issues. 
 
a. Cooperation with national regulators 
For such a regulatory framework to be successful, it is imperative that the national 
regulators are willing to accept these standards as decisive on all things sharia, 
especially in such jurisdictions where sharia is not an accepted as a valid source of 
law. It is argued that national regulators should be encouraging and facilitating such 
IFIs in obtaining these ‘certificates’, as these will give a boost to the local IFI in 
terms of confidence in their operations as well as encouraging more competition 
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amongst them. This will translate into tangible financial results in the long-term for 
the country’s financial system. 
  
b. Instilling confidence in the public: a service to the stakeholders 
Along with increasing transparency and uniformity of sharia governance standards, 
these certificates would instil confidence in the customers and other stakeholders 
that the IFIs in their particular jurisdiction are actually sharia-compliant. Take the 
example of the UK, where HM Treasury has categorically stated that they would not 
be following any one particular jurisdiction’s example in devising a regulatory 
framework for the IFIs operating there, but are willing to accept certain AAOIFI 
standards.
1042
 The other extreme is the example of Pakistan where, despite having a 
designated department for regulating the Islamic finance industry in the State Bank, 
the regulators often borrow standards from both the IFSB and the AAOIFI and 
incorporates them into the local regulatory framework.
1043
 This shows that both 
kinds of jurisdiction; those that have instituted a separate regulatory framework for 
the IFIs like Pakistan and those like the UK, who have not instituted a separate 
regulatory framework, are in any case utilising the regulatory standards given by 
IFSB and AAOIFI. It is thus argued that these standard-setting bodies should be 
given more enforcement powers via the ability to issue and revoke these ‘certificates 
of compliance’ if the Islamic finance industry has to become risk-free and 
harmonised across the globe. 
 
c. The criterion for issuance of the certificates of compliance: a sharia principle 
based criteria 
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These certificates of compliance should be based on the following operational 
aspects of the financial institutions: the sharia compatibility of the IFI’s operation, 
their governance framework (including the appointments of SSB and the 
apportionment of the powers and duties of the board of directors and the SSB), 
dispute resolution mechanisms, the decision-making process of the SSB and their 
fatwa pronouncements, information disclosures, and sharia compliance audit 
processes. Besides sharia governance compliance, the other criterion should be the 
adherence to the best practices of corporate governance for IFIs as already published 
by the IFSB and the AAOIFI.
1044
 These have been tailored to the specific needs of 
IFIs, thereby ensuring both sharia governance and conventional corporate issues are 
catered for. 
 
d. Keeping them sharia-compliant: the process of sharia audits  
After the initial issuance of these certificates, the international standard-setting 
bodies should be given the authority to carry out sharia and performance audits 
biannually (or annually) to maintain a supra supervisory role over the banks. 
However, the requirement of obtaining these certificates of compliance should not 
be in conflict with the regulatory arrangements of the jurisdiction where the IFI is 
operating. As discussed, this certificate of compliance should be supplementary 
requirements for the sake of the stakeholders involved to instil the confidence that 
the IFIs are not only sharia-compliant but also follow conventional best practices 
regarding information disclosure, corporate governance, auditing, reporting and 
human resource policies. These certificates of compliance are to be taken as 
assurances to the stakeholders regarding the IFIs so that they stand as a sound, well 
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regulated financial institution that is also sharia-compliant. Also, this method of 
regulation is in line with the meta-regulatory nature of the supervisory framework 
needed for the Islamic finance industry, since by instituting the mechanism of 
certifications by the IFSB and the AAOIFI, the Islamic finance industry is allowed 
to self-regulate as well as delegate a supervisory role to the IFSB and AAOIFI to 
oversee such self-regulation of IFIs. 
 
e. Agency costs and revocation of certificates of compliance 
It is also recognised that this would mean increasing agency costs for IFIs, especially 
those IFIs which are working in countries like the UK and the rest of the non-Islamic 
world where there is neither a possibility of allowing for a special concession at the 
regulatory or state level for IFIs nor a judiciary willing to accept sharia as a valid 
source of law. To add to this problem, there is also a dearth of suitably qualified 
sharia scholars in such jurisdictions. It is thus argued that the initial costs of 
obtaining the compliance certificates issued by the international standard-setting 
bodies, which should be borne by the IFIs themselves, will eventually be balanced 
out by the confidence that is instilled in the stakeholders as well as local regulators. 
In turn, this would mean increased financial stability and consequently less chance 
of bank defaults and bank runs for the Islamic finance industry as a whole. Upon 
considering both the possibility of corporate governance or sharia governance 
failure and the alternative of the cost of monitoring the IFI by a sharia body like the 
IFSB and/or the AAOIFI, it is likely that a cost-benefit analysis will favour the 
latter. This is so because allowing an IFI to operate without proper sharia 
compliance is likely to lead to a loss of confidence by the consumers, customers, 
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regulators and creditors, and may lead to a systemic failure of the whole Islamic 
financial industry.  
It is therefore argued that the national regulators across the globe need to develop 
mechanisms to advance cooperation efforts with the IFSB and AAOFIF in order to 
facilitate the growth of IFIs in their jurisdiction. The measures for their cooperation 
with the IFSB and AAOIFI need not be necessarily be in the shape of legislative 
interventions, but in adopting the standards set out by the IFSB and AAOIFI as 
supplementary yet obligatory for the IFI, should ensure that the sharia governance 
issues are handled by the AAOIFI and/or the IFSB rather than local regulators who 
may be ill-equipped to carry out such functions. The role of the IFSB or the AAOIFI 
should also include the authority of revoking the ‘certificate’ in the case of an IFI, 
after repeated warnings and supervisory notes, failing to correct the sharia 
governance problem that was occurring. Whilst the certificate of compliance with 
sharia standards can be withdrawn by the IFSB and AAOIFI, the national regulator 
can still decide according to its own standards whether the financial institution still 
qualifies to function as a conventional financial institution or not. This way, both 
aspects of the regulation can be achieved without compromising the integrity of 
either system and at the same time strengthens the market for the operations of IFIs. 
It is thus argued that even though very limited national governmental intervention 
may still be necessary, it should be selective and carried out on a case-to-case basis 
for IFIs.  
In case of the local regulator wanting to devise a separate regulatory framework (on 
the same lines as done in Pakistan, Malaysia and Iran) for the Islamic finance 
industry as a whole, they may be allowed to do so on the basis of the sharia 
compliance standards issued by the IFSB or the AAOIFI. It is also argued that since 
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any one single regulatory regime is seen to be insufficient to regulate Islamic finance 
across the broad spectrum of different jurisdictions; including the Civil law system, 
Common law system and the Islamic legal systems, smart regulatory practices would 
mean that a single ‘straight jacket’ regulatory framework would in any case be 
doomed to fail.  
An example of a flexible regulatory measure meant to cater for the stakeholder 
nature of Islamic finance may be that when an IFI launches a new financial product, 
the IFI should disclose which Islamic jurisprudential school of thought they are 
adhering to. This way, rather than focusing on form, the instrument will be sharia-
compliant whilst also ensuring full disclosure, thereby adhering to both good sharia 
governance principles and corporate governance best practices regarding 
transparency and disclosure. In further pursuance of this, the standard setting bodies 
like the IFSB and AAOIFI should clearly state that as long as the religious 
pronouncements (fatwas) regarding a particular product, transaction or practice are 
made in accordance with one of the schools of the thought and that information is 
declared, the instrument will be declared as sharia-compliant. Another benefit of 
this approach will be that the issue of sharia arbitrage is mitigated to a large extent, 
allowing the consumers to make an informed choice about the product they are 
choosing and which school of thought that product adheres to, so that if a consumer 
so wishes he may accept or reject it on the basis of their affinity to a particular 
school of thought. Utilising this approach means that the pressures for the local 
regulators of balancing national regulations and regulations pertaining to sharia are 
reduced, allowing for IFSB and AAOIFI to accept the responsibility of sharia 
compliance and at the same time allow the individual IFI to have some flexibility 
and keep a competitive edge in relation to product innovation. 
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f. The SSB and Fatwas 
Another very important aspect that has caused some concern is the regulation and 
harmonisation of internal sharia compliance mechanisms like the SSB and religious 
pronouncements (fatwas). It is argued that these aspects should be the sole domain 
of the IFSB and the AAOIFI if the local legislature is not willing to make any 
amendments in its regulatory framework to accommodate them. Even where these 
amendments have been made (as is the case in jurisdictions like Pakistan, Malaysia 
and Iran), they should be made in consultation with the IFSB and AAOIFI, either by 
selecting such provisions that have already been published completely or selecting 
those which are in line with the national regulatory framework and leaving the rest 
to be dealt by the IFSB and AAOIFI. The other recommendation to mitigate this 
possible issue of the balance of power between the SSB and the executive board is to 
amend the articles of association (constitution) of the IFI to specify the exact ambit 
of powers for the SSB and also to specify the recourse to a particular dispute 
resolution method in case of a conflict of opinion between the SSB and the BOD. 
For example, recourse to a local or international arbitration body which specialises 
in Islamic finance rather than the local courts may be preferable because the local 
judiciary of a secular jurisdiction may not be well-versed at all with Islamic finance 
principles and practices. It follows that if the powers of both the BOD and the SSB 
are clearly set out, the chances of conflict per se are reduced. 
 Moreover, there must be better cooperation and coordination, particularly between 
and within governments and the financial and security regulatory authorities, so that 
there may be some uniformity in the regulatory environment in most jurisdictions 
where IFIs are working. Failure to do so will lead to sharia arbitrage and forum 
shopping by the individual IFI and may give way to a ‘race to the bottom’ consisting 
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of IFIs looking for the most relaxed regulatory environment. This could risk IFIs 
forgoing (deliberately or accidentally) the basic tenets of sharia principles regarding 
finance and business, which could turn out to be systemic and may lead to the loss in 
confidence across the globe in Islamic finance as a whole. This also has to be taken 
into consideration with the political context of the new world order; there is a lot 
more scepticism surrounding any and everything sharia (including but not limited to 
finance). This means that the industry has to focus on the regulatory aspects and 
concentrate all its energy in devising a framework that not only stabilises but also 
encourages public confidence in the industry.   
 
g. Achieving the ‘public good’ through the meta-regulatory framework. 
It is further argued that a ‘smart’ principle based meta-regulatory framework is the 
optimal way of achieving the ‘common good’ as a sub set of the normative ‘public 
good’( Maslaha framework) via financial intermediation of banks and other 
institutions.
1045
 As previously discussed, a neoliberal profit-maximising approach is 
the antithesis of the public good argument with the popular slogan of ‘greed is 
good’.1046 With the special emphasis of Islamic finance on achieving welfare for the 
whole of society, it has been argued that in normative as well as practical terms, the 
purpose of the Islamic economic system is the achievement of the public good( 
Maslaha) by ensuring a just and equitable distribution of wealth amongst the 
members of society. Further to this aim, the presence of a carefully devised meta-
regulatory framework for IFIs which focuses on stakeholder practices and embodies 
business ethics is not only a requirement but is incontrovertible for both the practice, 
as well as the theory of, IFIs at both individual and industry level. Since the focus of 
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any meta-regulatory framework is to be able to identify a public interest goal and 
then devise regulatory measures aimed at achieving that public interest goal, it is 
argued that since the public aim of IFIs is to facilitate and act as intermediaries to 
ensure a just and equitable distribution of wealth in society( the Maqasid al Sharia 
of economic and financial activity), the emphasis of the standard-setting bodies 
ought to be fixated on the principles of Islamic finance as well as good corporate 
governance practices. This would ensure that all stakeholders are confident and feel 
safe and secure in using IFIs.  
 
h. The normative mission statement of the IFIs 
The aim of a regulatory framework for IFIs ought to be  
‘to support social, ethical and economic development - providing the citizens, the 
depositors, the investors and other stakeholders who are directly and indirectly 
involved, with the protection and confidence they need to feel safe when dealing 
with the Islamic finance industry as being well structured, safe secure, sharia 
complaint, well governed and risk averse.’ 
For such a framework to be implemented alongside the sharia governance 
framework, special emphasis will also have to be placed on the internal corporate 
governance framework by the international standard-setting body, which should in 
turn be appropriately influenced by the stakeholder theory and its practice; focusing 
on the principles of honesty, integrity, property rights (as espoused by sharia), 
ethical trading, societal responsibility, stakeholder justice, employee participation, 
investor protection and transparency.  
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i. The BOD and the SSB: Altering the constitutional powers of Islamic financial 
institutions 
It is also argued that adherence to the Islamic governance and regulatory standards 
should be made a part of the responsibility of the BOD in the IFI by virtue of them 
being the main executive body. It should be the responsibility of the BOD of the IFI 
to be in constant contact with the standard-setting bodies (the IFSB and the AAIOFI) 
to ensure compliance with the standards set out and the BOD should have a fiduciary 
obligation to the IAHs and the shareholders to ensure that all such measures are in 
place. This would make the IFI sharia-compliant as per the guidelines and standards 
laid down by the national regulators and the IFSB and/ or AAOIFI.  As argued 
previously, whilst this extra duty of care to ensure sharia compliance would increase 
agency costs from a corporate governance point of view, the alternative of not 
adhering to these standards and practices may lead to the loss of confidence 
regarding the sharia compliance of the IFI by all the stakeholders including local 
regulators, the shareholders, employees and the IAHs. So whereas the initial 
adherence to these extra sharia standards may not seem cost effective, in the long 
term the IFI as a whole will be better off by doing so. 
 The other aspect that has been of concern is the issue of the status of the SSB in the 
management of the IFI. It is argued that, based on the foregoing discussion, when 
considering the unique nature of the IFI, there can be no exception to the issue of 
sharia compliance within the IFI. Thus, it is not only a matter of normative 
importance, but rather it is a fundamental aspect for a financial institution which 
wants to operate as an IFI that the SSB is given an authority over  all the sharia 
aspects of the IFI. This may entail giving more powers to the SSBs.  It has been 
asserted that the sharia compliance issues should be left to the IFSB and AAOIFI in 
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the proposed regulatory framework; this would mean that the BOD would be 
responsible for the overall running of the IFI but the SSB will be held exclusively 
responsible for the sharia compliance aspects of the IFI’s operations.  
It has to be emphasised, however, that the SSB will have executive powers only in 
matters pertaining to sharia, meaning that where there is a conflict of opinion 
between the BOD and the SSB, the SSB’s opinion may only matter to the regulatory 
body that is concerned with handling Islamic finance Institutions and not to the local 
secular financial and securities regulators. The consequence of such a division of 
regulatory responsibilities will be that the IFI may still continue to operate as a 
normal conventional financial institution if it fails to abide by religious 
pronouncements (fatwas) of the SSB and the certificate of sharia compliance may be 
withdrawn, thereby revoking the IFI’s sharia-compliant status. These issues can be 
highlighted in the AOA (articles of association) and MOA (memorandum of 
association) of the IFI at incorporation, so that there is a clear cut distinction of 
powers and responsibility. 
  
j. Dispute resolution 
It is also argued that any disputes that may arise regarding sharia compliance should 
be addressed to the IFSB, AAOIFI or any other such organisation which may have 
expertise in the resolution of sharia issues.
1047
 It is therefore being argued that the 
IFSB and/or the AAOIFI should institute such dispute resolution methods in 
consultation with national regulators which would be deemed appropriate to the 
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Islamic finance industry, especially where the local courts are not well-versed in 
sharia issues.  
In case of a sharia issue being resolved in favour of the SSB, and the BOD is not 
content with the relevant solution, there will be two possibilities for them: the first 
will be to declassify as a sharia-compliant IFI and continue to operate as a 
conventional financial institution, and the second will be to accept the SSB’s point 
of view. By virtue of this choice, the executive power of the BOD is not taken away 
and they may continue to run the IFI as a non-sharia body which would satisfy the 
national corporate laws. This may again seem strange to secular regulators, but as 
noted previously, the essence of an IFI has to be its sharia compliance and not its 
profit-making or operation purely for the sake of the investors (the shareholders). 
The central role of the SSB (or any other sharia supervisory body) cannot be 
undermined under any circumstances. 
 
k. SSB qualifications: the regulatory response 
This brings us to the important issue of sharia qualified persons suitable for modern 
day IFIs. It is argued that the SSB’s members ought to be approved or acknowledged 
as sharia qualified by the IFSB or the AAOIFI before allowing them to undertake 
the task of issuing fatwas and sitting on the SSB. This will require a standardised 
testing process for the sharia qualifications and should be carried out en mass at 
least twice a year to ensure that only the right people are selected for the job. The 
standardised testing should be conducted in such a way that satisfies both 
conventional knowledge of banking and finance as well as sharia finance. This way, 
sharia qualified persons in Islamic finance will be able to better understand the 
modern day financial architecture and draw a synergy between Islamic finance and 
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conventional finance. In addition, the qualifying test should provide for all the 
different schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence so that all aspects of Islamic 
finance are catered for and the best and the most qualified of the people are selected 
for the central role of the SSB members. 
The extra costs of ensuring compliance with the requirements of standardised tests 
should be borne by the IFIs themselves, this cost will be moderated by the 
knowledge that such initial costs will go a long way in instituting a more 
professional and risk-averse approach in the long term. Sharia compliance - forming 
the major part of the operation of the IFI - has to be stream lined.  
It is thus acknowledged that there has been a lot of work already undertaken in 
issuing sharia qualified scholar statuses across the globe: Malaysia, the UK, Bahrain 
and Pakistan have set examples of the kind of qualifications that should be 
acceptable. With many different bodies already issuing such a qualification,
1048
 it is 
recommended that in the proposed regulatory framework, the IFSB and the AAOFI 
may allow these local academic and licensing bodies to continue to do so and 
delegate some of their own powers to allow these private bodies to continue to issue 
these qualifications. In addition, to monitor their activities and set out detailed 
guidelines for the purpose of harmonising the tests or institute a new regime of 
standardised testing. These smaller and local bodies can issue ‘sharia qualified 
statuses’ in line with the central syllabi as laid down by the IFSB and the AAOIFI. It 
follows that the issue of SSB qualification and the competence of the members can 
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be dealt with effectively at a regulatory level bringing the much needed harmonised 
testing standards. 
 
3. Conclusion  
The Islamic finance industry has come a long way in modern times and has made 
strides in almost all aspects of their operation. However, the regulatory pressure to 
abide by conventional governance and regulatory practices seems to be leading the 
industry to lose focus on the fundamental reason for its existence; to facilitate and 
promote socioeconomic justice in society for its adherents and all those who wish to 
participate in it. This is a fact that can be directly referred back to the main sources 
of sharia-based finance: the Qur’an and the Hadith. It is in reply to this mounting 
regulatory pressure that this thesis is suggesting a more internationally acceptable 
stakeholder-based meta-regulatory framework which balances out the diverse 
aspects of IFIs being both legal entities acceptable under conventional corporate 
governance theory as well as being a product of the fundamental norms of Islamic 
finance and economics literature. Nonetheless, they may not always be theoretically 
reconcilable, as discussed in detail in previous chapters on Islamic finance literature 
and conventional corporate governance literature.  Accordingly, it is asserted that the 
policy recommendation given in this chapter is deemed to be suitable for the whole 
of the Islamic finance industry despite the jurisdictional differences between the 
different countries. 
Overall, the introduction of new internal and external corporate governance 
structures, together with the reinforcement of existing ones, can provide stakeholders 
with sufficient comfort on the actions of management and other aspects of the 
financial institution. Internally, this requires procedures for the protection of 
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minority shareholders and provisions for increased disclosure, transparency, 
independence of the SSB and effective resolution of any possible conflicts between 
the executive management and the SSB. Further, concrete approaches to addressing 
the problems of commingling, UIA holders’ rights and the utilisation of reserves 
would complete the internal corporate governance of the IFI and make the Islamic 
finance industry a robust financial alternative to conventional financial institutions. 
For external factors, recognising the specificity of the IFI would lead to the stability 
of the industry and the protection of stakeholders. Regulators need to be flexible and 
to work with the Islamic financial institutions to fully understand the needs of the 
industry and thereby develop an appropriate regulatory framework. In addition, 
recourse to private self-regulatory initiatives may be more important in Islamic 
finance than in the conventional financial industry. In those countries where 
regulations present constraints on Islamic finance, IFIs need to evaluate the available 
options to determine which licensing status is best tailored to their needs and those 
of their stakeholders. Thus, the licensing issue may even lead to more systemic 
problems if the jurisdiction does not recognise sharia  
It is therefore recognised that a lot of work has been done at national levels, but yet 
more may have to be undertaken by the international standard-setting bodies in 
respect of laying down more tailored requirements for the specific issues pertaining 
to: enforcement of Islamic contracts, designation of shareholders and IAHs as 
separate class of investors needing separate protections and standards of conduct, 
information disclosure, abiding by the societal aspects of their operations by 
declaring how that is being done even if the national regulation and laws do not 
require it as such, fulfilling auditing and accounting standards as laid down by the 
international standard setting bodies (though AAOIFI has been very proactive in this 
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regards) and ensuring enforcement of those standards as per local and IFSB and 
AAOIFI requirements.  Thus, a meta-regulatory framework which is based on the 
basic principles of Islamic finance and oriented towards the stakeholder theory is the 
best solution for the aforementioned internal and external governance issues, 
including those issues pertaining to the lack of enforcement and compliance at an 
international level. 
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